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Abstract 
 
 
This central premise of this thesis is that Lars von Trier is a political director. Through a 
detailed formal analysis of five films I proceed to discuss the political implications of 
form, something that has not been acknowledged by scholarship so far. In this thesis, I 
employ Brecht as a methodological tool so as to discuss the shift from a dialectical 
cinema devoted to the production of knowledge effects, to a post-Brechtian one that 
brings together points of tension that remain unresolved.    
Chapter 1 proceeds to a historical evaluation of Brecht’s reception in film theory and 
considers the ways that Brecht’s theory and practice can address the cinematic and 
political concerns of the present. The chapter also locates von Trier under the rubric of the 
post-Brechtian by comparing him to past film practices.  
Chapter 2 moves to a discussion of von Trier’s Europa trilogy and focuses on issues of 
historical representation. Emphasis is placed on formal elements that challenge the 
narrative laws of classical cinema. The chapter argues that von Trier follows Brecht’s 
mistrust of a historical representation based on pictorial verisimilitude, without however 
sharing his forward-looking politics and his view of history as Marxist science. 
Chapter 3 discusses Dogme 95 and The Idiots (1998). Firstly, the chapter discusses 
Dogme’s combination of a political modernist rhetoric with a realist one and places 
Dogme’s return to the past in a historical context. Secondly, the chapter considers the role 
of performance as a formal and thematic element in The Idiots. I draw attention to the 
ways that the camera becomes performative and brings together material of dramaturgical 
importance with moments that are the product of cinematic contingency. My discussion is 
very much informed by contemporary post-Brechtian performance and film studies 
invested in the discussion of ‘corporeal cinema’.  
Chapter 4 discusses Dogville, a film with obvious references to Brecht. Unlike previous 
readings, I shift the emphasis from the film’s assumed ‘Anti-Americanism’ and proceed 
to a formal analysis that can rethink the film’s politics and innovations.  
While Brecht has been thought to be as a fleeting presence in von Trier’s films by most 
critics, this thesis suggests that our knowledge of von Trier’s formal innovations can be 
deepened and enlivened by discussing them in conjunction with Brecht’s theory. By 
returning to Brecht, we can also rethink the importance of form as the key to a film’s 
politics.  
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Notes to the Text  
 
UK English is used throughout the text. Quotations using American English remain 
unchanged. 
 
 
All illustrations (in the appendix) and Lars von Trier’s Manifestoes are courtesy of Lars 
von Trier and Zentropa Productions.  
 
In each chapter, I put in parenthesis the release year of the films only the first time I refer 
to them. Similarly, references to characters from the films are accompanied by the actors’ 
names in parentheses only the first time they are mentioned.  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
   
 
Introduction 
 
 
Aims: Politics as Form in Lars von Trier  
The central premise of this thesis is that Lars von Trier is a political director and a formal 
study of his films can reveal their dialectical aspect, something that has not been 
acknowledged by scholarship so far. The title of the thesis refers to a quotation from his 
second feature film Epidemic (1987), in which von Trier – who performs himself – 
reflects on the filmmaking process and firmly asserts that ‘a film should be like a stone in 
your shoe’.1 This quotation has either been ridiculed by the popular press or has been used 
as a means of strengthening the understanding of von Trier as a ‘provocateur’, an 
egocentric director who wants to be in the spotlight. This emphasis on the director’s 
persona is largely responsible for the overlooking of the political implications of the 
films’ form.  
This thesis follows a different line of argument and aims at discussing formal 
aspects of von Trier’s films that can be understood politically. By the term political 
cinema, I understand a formal elaboration of the subject-matter that is concerned with 
changeability. Thus, instead of reproducing a static view of history, social relationships 
and ethics, political cinema is interested in historicising them and showing them as 
susceptible to change. In this way, my understanding of politics in cinema is not informed 
by a modus operandi that produces political content. A broader definition would 
acknowledge that all films are political, since consciously or unconsciously they 
propagate certain values, beliefs and evaluations of certain aspects of social reality. A 
more useful definition would understand as political, objects that employ formal elements 
                                                          
1
 Von Trier quoted in Epidemic dir. by Lars von Trier (1987) (Electric Parc, 2005) [on DVD].  
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that are concerned with representing and not reproducing reality. Seen through the prism 
of this definition, political cinema aims at ‘de-naturalising’ our perception of the world 
and revealing its constructedness instead of treating it as ‘normal’ and ‘permanent’.2 
The logical question that arises is how cinema can achieve this effect. Very 
schematically, I suggest that the prerequisite for rendering social reality and relationships 
as changeable is a film practice that starts by questioning the means of its own 
articulation. By challenging the established film language and the standardised subject 
and object relationships, one asks the audience to make the dialectical leap from the 
habitual perception of film as a reflectionist medium, to one that understands it as a 
medium which employs aesthetic practices that shape our understanding of the real. In 
this way, one does not offer the audience ‘an eternal and unchangeable picture of the 
world’, but she/he shows the world in its changeability.  
Changing a medium’s function so as to render the familiar strange is the 
cornerstone of the theory and practice of Bertolt Brecht, whose writings were hugely 
influential in film theory and practice from 1968 until the late 1970s. Brecht’s radicalism 
resided in his conviction that the political implications of the medium do not rest on the 
reproduction of political subject-matter. Quite the opposite, Brecht suggested that changes 
in social and historical reality demand new modes of representation that are not keen on 
reproducing reality as one experiences it in every-day life. Brecht advocated formal 
abstraction that would guarantee a distance between reality and representation, so as to 
politicise aspects of social life that one considers as apolitical. The prerequisite for 
                                                          
2
 As I proceed to explain below, the process of de-naturalisation describes Brecht’s work who considers 
that one needs to make the audience think of the real not as self-evident but as subject to process, since 
reality is socially constructed. The process of de-naturalisation has its origins in the Russian Formalist 
idea of the ostranerie, which as Fredric Jameson says describes the ‘opposition between habituation and 
perception’. See Jameson, The Prison House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism (Princeton, Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.50.   
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‘denaturalising’ the audience’s view of the world was the questioning of the medium’s 
language.  
Embedded in his will to change the medium was an interest in revealing that the 
reproduction of the experiential aspect of reality fails to grasp the ‘real’ processes and 
historical developments taking place. Viewed from this standpoint, Brecht’s aesthetics 
intended to deconstruct the reality that one experiences with her/his direct senses into its 
social/historical laws. The ultimate aim was that the audience would question the 
portrayed reality and the established tropes one uses to make sense of the drama. This 
politicised aesthetic introduced the idea that social relationships and history cannot be 
simply perceived dramatically. Drama presupposes processes that can be understood in 
terms of subjects and individuals, whereas capitalism valorises processes that take place at 
the level of the masses.3  
In this thesis, Brecht’s theory is the methodological tool that I employ so as to 
identify the political implications of form in certain films of Lars von Trier. I suggest that 
our knowledge of von Trier’s formal experiments can be deepened and enlivened by 
discussing them in conjunction with Brecht’s theory. Furthermore, this thesis stages an 
attempt to explore the filmic applications of Brecht’s theory in a historical reality where 
Brecht’s certainties are not applicable. In this context, the thesis takes von Trier as an 
example of a director that pushes forward certain aspects of Brecht’s theory and practice 
and makes us rethink the widely used and at times abused epithet ‘Brechtian’, when it 
comes to the art of cinema.  
Let us first briefly discuss von Trier’s stance towards Brecht and politics in 
cinema. Despite the fact that the thesis is not concerned with identifying Brecht’s 
‘influence’ on von Trier, I consider it instructive to demonstrate the latter’s awareness of 
                                                          
3
 See Bertolt Brecht, Against Georg Lukács’, trans. by Stuart Hood, in New Left Review, 84:1 (1974), 
pp.39-53, here p.40.  
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Brecht’s theory and practice as well as to investigate his views on form as the key to one’s 
understanding of a film’s politics. In an interview given after the editing of Dogville 
(2003) – which along with Manderlay (2005) is the only film that has been critically 
received as ‘Brechtian’ – von Trier explains that the film was inspired by Brecht and 
when asked about him he said: 
 
Brecht was something of a domestic God when I was growing up, whereas my 
generation has tended to view him as a rather old-fashioned genius. Fashions 
and tastes are constantly changing, of course... I experienced Brecht’s dramas at 
a fairly young age and have never returned to him or his work. They exist in my 
memory mostly as feelings and atmospheres.4  
 
 
Similarly, in an interview after the completion of Manderlay, von Trier discussed the 
film’s formal austerity in relation to Brecht’s practice. As he says: 
 
I thought of Brecht’s work, which is not exactly the same as this, but requires 
stylised settings. My mother was crazy for Brecht and dragged me to the theater 
to see his plays. I’m always looking for ideas that I believe are good for film.5 
 
 
In an interview von Trier gave me during the editing of Melancholia (2011), I asked him 
about Brecht and he stated: 
 
I know in principle Brecht’s basic theory of the Verfremdungseffekt. I can 
understand this effect. On the other hand, truth is difficult to define and in 
particular, when we are dealing with the media. It is not just how a character 
says something, but it has to do with all aspects of cinema. It is more the feeling 
you have as a director. There are moments that I can understand that I got a 
second of truth, though it is a banal word. For me, it is very obvious when I 
capture a moment of truth.6  
 
 
Von Trier’s comments indicate his awareness of Brecht’s theory and practice. However, 
one senses a different perception of the author/director’s role in the sense that the artist is 
                                                          
4
 Von Trier quoted in Stig Björkman, Trier on von Trier, trans. by Neil Smith (London: Faber and Faber, 
2003), pp.243-244. 
5
 Von Trier quoted in, Jennifer Merin, ‘Interview: Lars von Trier’, in New York Press, available online at 
http://www.nypress.com/article-12778-interview-lars-von-trier.html, accessed 2 April 2011.  
6
 Von Trier quoted in Angelos Koutsourakis, ‘Interview with Lars von Trier’, see appendix, p.272.  
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not the person who holds epistemological mastery and aims at communicating an 
unequivocal piece of knowledge to the audience. This position helps to expose the shift 
from an aesthetic that intends to align dialectical contradictions so as to communicate 
knowledge effects, to one that brings together points of tension that remain unresolved. I 
shall return to this point and elaborate on it in detail in the first chapter.   
My desire is to investigate the ways in which von Trier challenges film form and 
the cinematic institution in order to produce a certain degree of indeterminacy that 
activates a more productive participation on the part of the audience. I see that 
indeterminacy as part of an anti-commodity aesthetics that aspires to restore the 
communicative aspect of the medium and go beyond the perception of the filmic object as 
a consumable product. This idea is of political importance given that the changes afforded 
by technological development in the field of cinema and the media allow for a highest 
degree of verisimilitude in the representation of reality. By reducing the medium’s role to 
the production of reality effects, one intensifies the separation between producers (artists 
and their crew) and consumers (the audience). 
On this basis, the politics of a film does not hinge on the reproduction of political 
content that reduces the audience to the status of consumers, but on formal elements that 
aim at disorientating and shocking the audience. The goal of such an aesthetics is the 
production of visual narratives that make the audience question the portrayed reality and 
the established dramaturgical tropes. The connection between formal complication and 
political effects has been acknowledged by von Trier in an interview given after the 
completion of his graduate film, Images of Relief [Befrielsesbilleder: 1982]. When asked, 
whether Erik Clausen’s films (a Danish social realist filmmaker) are more politically 
dangerous than his own, von Trier stated that a film that has an ‘oppressed people is 
always right’ thematic content can be easily co-opted by the industry. Von Trier suggests 
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that film experimentation can be more political rather than the reproduction of political 
content using conventional film language. As he says:  
 
I mean that if you make a film that is reactionary in its form, then the contents 
are insignificant. This is the way it is: you can’t have rebellious or reformist 
content without adapting the form at the same time. You can’t separate the one 
from the other.7 
 
Von Trier’s argument is very much informed by his lack of interest in a very popular 
genre of Danish cinema of the time, namely social or humanistic realism (examples 
include directors such as Kaspar Rostrup, Eric Clausen, and Helle Ryslinge). His film 
aesthetics and his understanding of politics were formulated by his interest in Danish 
filmmakers, such as Jørgen Leth. Leth was very much influenced by the theory and 
practice of Brecht and Jean-Luc Godard. His films inaugurated a type of cinema, which 
employed formalist experiments so as to ‘adopt an analytic stance towards what is most 
natural, obvious and mundane’.8 This experimentation with film language and its capacity 
to represent reality is key to one’s understanding of the politics of von Trier’s cinema too.  
The politics of von Trier’s films does not reside in the elaboration of class-conflict 
or the dramatisation of political subject-matter. It is rather his employment of distancing 
effects that challenge the concreteness of iconic information, complicate the narrative 
structure and draw attention to the processes that intervene in the transformation of the 
given raw reality into filmed object. In the Europa trilogy [The Element of Crime (1984), 
Epidemic (1987), Europa (1991)], sound and image are organised contrapuntally and do 
not allow for the total subordination of speech to action, a process that generates 
chronological transgressions and challenges the linear representation of history. In the 
                                                          
7
 Von Trier quoted in, Lars Schwander, ‘We Need More Intoxicants in Danish Cinema’, in Lars von Trier 
Interviews, ed. by Jan Lumholdt (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003), pp.13-23, here p.23.  
8
 Jørgen Leth quoted in, Mette Hjort and Ib Bondebjerg, ‘Jørgen Leth’, in The Danish Directors: 
Dialogues on a Contemporary National Cinema, ed. by Ib Bondebjerg and Mette Hjort, (Bristol, 
Portland: Intellect, 2000), pp.58-74, here p.61.  
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Goldheart trilogy [Breaking the Waves (1996), The Idiots (1998), Dancer in the Dark 
(2000)], von Trier employs hand-held cameras and a shooting style that is concerned with 
finding material instead of framing it.9 In effect, the filmic process is incorporated in the 
final product. In both trilogies, the aim is the introduction of a certain degree of 
abstraction that accumulates material which does not necessarily have a story-telling 
function, a method that acts as a resistance to an imposed unequivocal meaning. 
Additionally, in Dogville and Manderlay, von Trier challenges film language by means of 
an ascetic aesthetics that reduces action to a set that consciously resembles a theatre stage 
and allows for a ‘clinical’ examination of the depicted social relations.  
Another point that merits attention and displays von Trier’s interest in involving 
the audience in a more productive way is his utilisation of a Brechtian separation of 
elements and his preference for a fragmented representational strategy. In certain films, 
such as Breaking the Waves and Dancer in the Dark, he employs a Brechtian separation 
of elements that makes one aware of music’s intervention into the narrative.10 The parts 
that have music do not intend to embellish the image or guide the viewer emotionally. For 
example, prior to Selma’s (Björk) execution in Dancer the Dark music connotes 
optimism, which is radically negated by the scene that follows. Furthermore, the complete 
absence of music in the most intense scenes in Epidemic, Breaking the Waves, Dancer in 
the Dark and The Idiots does not suggest plausible attitudes that the viewers shall adopt 
towards the material, nor does it reveal the director’s viewpoint. Consequently, the 
audience needs to assume a more productive role instead of anticipating certain 
unequivocal feelings.  
This refusal to offer clear-cut explanations is strengthened by a formal 
organisation that shows preference for a fragmented narrative structure which privileges 
                                                          
9
 In Dancer in the Dark, this method applies mainly to the non-musical scenes.  
10
 See Brecht, ‘On Film Music’, in Bertolt Brecht: On Film and Radio, ed. and trans. by Marc Silberman 
(London: Methuen, 2000), pp.10-18, here p.14.  
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the production of images at the expense of a text-bound dramaturgy. In The Element of 
Crime, the story line functions as a skeleton for the production of visual tableaux that do 
not strictly follow the laws of narrative continuity. In Epidemic, fragmentation is achieved 
through a complex narrative structure that shifts from the storyline of the filmmakers 
while preparing a film, to a film-within-the-film narrative, which is their imagined film 
in-process. In Europa, the voice-over intervenes to introduce spatial and temporal changes 
and to blur the boundaries between the diegetic and the hypodiegetic levels of narration. 
In some cases, such as in Epidemic, Breaking the Waves, Dogville, Manderlay, Antichrist 
(2009) and Melancholia the films are divided into chapters. Each chapter has a title that 
introduces certain expectations to the audience and highlights the literary associations of 
this structure. Finally in The Idiots, the loose dramaturgy, as well as the film’s emphasis 
on performance, – as a formal and thematic element – demonstrate a preference for a 
paratactic/episodic style which is not interested in unifying the various fragments but 
opens the film to moments that go beyond dramaturgical consistency. Obviously, all films 
produce a certain amount of meta-effects that break the diegetic world apart and give the 
audience time to reflect on the material.  
The fragmented narrative and the lack of dramaturgical cohesion have their 
bearing on the films’ content and place action, narrative scenes and units of meaning into 
collision asking the audience to sort all this out themselves. As I elaborate in the next 
chapter, the aesthetics of the fragment figures importantly in Brecht’s theatrical/film 
theory and practice. Brecht argued in favour of a film practice that treats film form as a 
series of tableaux that do not follow the rules of dramatic continuity and render the 
representation of reality ambiguous. Similarly, von Trier’s films privilege narrative 
discontinuity over the view of the narrative as a unified whole. Such a discontinuity aims 
at instigating questions so as to make the audience participate in the construction of 
9 
 
meaning. The point of rupture between von Trier and Brecht is the shift from the 
Brechtian to the post-Brechtian something that I discuss in detail in the first chapter. This 
shift can be largely attributed to the political and historical changes that have invalidated 
Brecht’s political certainties. Brecht’s contention that making the familiar strange is the 
prerequisite for the politicisation of art is still valid. What one needs to question is his 
belief that certain formal complications may produce specific political effects and 
responses.  
On this basis, the thesis argues that Von Trier brings together dialectical 
contradictions that act as provocations towards the audience and do not allow for a 
‘passive’ viewing of the films, but force the audience to respond. For instance in Europa, 
the detached view of history that shows the reversibility of roles between Nazi 
sympathisers and Western allies negates the reduction of history to a humanised narrative 
of victims and perpetrators. This method advances a historical depiction that favours 
processes taking place on a mass level over a dramatisation of history and confronts the 
audience’s ideological certainties. In other films, such as Breaking the Waves, Dancer in 
the Dark and Antichrist, the subject matter raises ethical questions in relation to gender 
issues, going beyond a politically correct representation. This modus operandi reveals the 
conservative aspects of certain genres that von Trier manipulates, such as melodrama, the 
musical and the thriller, and operates as a critique of the cinematic institution. As I will 
discuss in chapter one, the critique of cinema as an institution is an important part of 
Brecht’s film theory and practice and I will expand on the political implications of this 
gesture.  
En route to stimulate new perspectives on the politics of von Trier’s films, the 
project deals specifically with five films and in particular with the Europa trilogy, The 
Idiots and Dogville and not with his whole filmography. This decision is mainly for 
10 
 
reasons of space and because my desire to engage in a formal analysis demands a more 
exhaustive discussion of the objects, which goes beyond a study of their content. I have 
chosen to discuss these five films because I suggest that a study of their portrayal of 
history and the individual along with their employment of theatricality and performativity 
can help us identify the politics of form in von Trier’s films. Furthermore, I am convinced 
that the Europa trilogy’s interest in the European traumas of the past acquires a renewed 
historical significance in the contemporary historical circumstances, since the optimism 
for an integrated Europe has been called into question by the problems that have arisen 
from the current financial crisis. My discussion of The Idiots and Dogville intends to 
focus on the films’ dialogue with performance art and theatre so as to rethink their politics 
and innovations. What connects my analysis of the five films I discuss is my interest in 
discussing von Trier’s predilection for a film practice that is keen on producing questions 
and conflicts instead of narratives that make the characters fit the actions and the other 
way around. On this basis, I explore the contradictions that arise from the films’ 
dramaturgical inconsistencies.  
Other films that I have left out, such as Breaking the Waves, Dancer in the Dark 
and Manderlay can benefit from a Brechtian discussion. I do not discuss Manderlay, 
because the film shares many formal similarities with Dogville. My analysis of Dogville’s 
form can make up for the film’s absence from this thesis, by covering formal and thematic 
issues common to these two films. I have already mentioned some formal aspects of 
Breaking the Waves and Dancer in the Dark that allude to Brecht. The films’ politics 
resides in the fact that they produce temporary feelings of empathy with the main 
characters. However, empathy is eventually replaced by anger and both films become a 
meta-commentary on the relationship between film and reality, art and life, a gesture that 
can be aptly characterised as Brechtian.  
11 
 
Another important object absent from this thesis, is The Five Obstructions [De 
Fem Benspænd, 2003], a film which is a ‘treatise’ on the filmmaking process and makes 
evident von Trier’s interest in challenging the established film grammar. The film is co-
directed with Jørgen Leth and is based upon von Trier’s willingness to challenge his 
mentor and assign him the task of remaking his avant-garde film The Perfect Human [Det 
Perfekte Menneske, 1967] in five different ways, each time with a different formal 
obstacle. The film demonstrates von Trier’s tendency to make virtue out of necessity by 
employing obstacles in the filmmaking process. These obstacles lead to a loss of 
‘authorial style’ and stimulate the director’s productivity, since he has to avoid the 
repetition of formulas that have been previously proved successful. These are some issues 
that I discuss in my analysis of The Idiots and Dogville so as to make up for the film’s 
absence from the thesis.  
Finally, the rest of the films that have not found their place in this thesis, such as 
Medea, (1988) (an adaptation of Carl Theodor Dreyer’s script), The Boss of it All (2006), 
Antichrist, and Melancholia share von Trier’s preference for a loose narrative structure 
that does not allow for the complete fusion between script and image. This aspect of the 
films, that is, the employment of the script as material, can be understood under the rubric 
of the post-Brechtian something that I elaborate in detail in the first chapter. From an 
early point of his career, von Trier explained that his aim was to work his way from the 
script towards the image and stated that the cornerstone of a counter-cinematic aesthetic is 
the making of films that are not ‘plot-bound’. As he says: ‘We have to make some 
“counter-films”, that give you the opportunity to experience something broader than this 
plot-bound thing, which is so hackneyed and only exciting from a craftsmanship point of 
view, like when a carpenter makes a table’.11 Von Trier’s point demonstrates laconically 
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 Lars Schwander, ‘We Need More Intoxicants in Danish Cinema’, in Lars von Trier Interviews, pp.13-
23, here p.15.  
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the function of his films, which do not simply narrate stories. The central topos of all his 
films is that they all reflect on the film as medium, produce meta-commentaries that 
explore the very relationship between cinema and reality, and aspire to change the 
habitual ways of viewing a film.    
 
Review of Secondary Literature  
There is a plethora of articles, film reviews and interviews devoted to the study of Lars 
von Trier. The numbers have increased after the international success of the Dogme 
project. Much has been written on von Trier’s views of cinema, his personal background 
and the way his films reflect his persona. Little has been written on the political 
implications of form and the ways that von Trier’s cinema can be understood beyond the 
individual von Trier. In this section I proceed to discuss the monographs published so far 
and some articles that discuss von Trier’s career so as to trace the dominant trends in his 
reception. In the chapters to follow, I expand on the critical reception of the films under 
discussion with reference to other resources not mentioned here.  
Peter Schepelern has offered a detailed and thorough study of von Trier’s films 
that has produced many advances in the field. Schepelern’s book, Lars von Triers Film 
Tvang Og Befrielse – unfortunately unavailable in English translation – explores von 
Trier’s career from an early stage. Schepelern starts by discussing von Trier’s 
early/student films, such as Why Try to Escape from Which You Know You Can't Escape 
from? Because You Are a Coward [Hvorfor Flygte Fra Det Du Ved Du Ikke Kan Flygte 
Fra?Fordi Du Er En Kujon: 1970], The Orchid Gardener [Orchidégartneren: 1977], Mint 
the Blessed [Menthe: La Bienheureuse: 1979], Nocturne (1980) and Images of Relief 
[Befrielsesbilleder:1982]. Schepelern’s book examines in detail von Trier’s career until 
Dancer in the Dark. The book is more or less predicated on an understanding that there is 
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a connection between von Trier’s life, his background and his education which, as 
Schepelern claims, can help us understand the films he makes. Schepelern offers a variety 
of resources that enrich our understanding of von Trier’s works. His book refers to the 
impact that artists, such as August Strindberg, Richard Wagner, Ernst Jünger and Brecht 
have on his films. Schepelern also offers plenty of evidence regarding von Trier’s critical 
reception on the part of the Danish press and explains the director’s gradual establishment 
as one of the leading figures in contemporary European cinema.12 
Schepelern’s study is one of the most important in the field, because of the 
richness of his research material – consisting of rare pictures, press reviews and various 
interviews that von Trier has given him. Schepelern insists a lot on the individual von 
Trier, but his analyses of the films help us understand their formal complexity and place 
them in a historical context.13 Jack Stevenson proceeds to discuss von Trier the individual 
too, but unlike Schepelern, he does not analyse the films and he is mainly busy describing 
the process of their production and their reception.14 The same applies to his book, which 
is mainly devoted to the Dogme project and, like the former one, offers little insights into 
the films’ form.15  
Another important point of reference is Torben Grodal, who conducts a cognitive 
analysis of von Trier’s films. Grodal acknowledges von Trier’s employment of 
‘distancing effects’, but he does not understand them as political, but as reflections of von 
Trier’s life. In his view, von Trier’s combination of ‘distancing’ and ‘lyrical’ effects aims 
at the creation of ‘subjective images’. Grodal suggests that ‘Trier’s oeuvre is part of his 
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ongoing interpretation of central problems in his own life – especially the establishing of 
unambiguous relationships with other people and the problems of achieving some kind of 
personal control’.16 Very problematic is his point that von Trier’s films activate ‘cognitive 
and emotional dispositions that are universal and innate’.17  
If we turn our attention to the audiences’ reception of von Trier’s work, it can be 
clearly seen that the films divide the viewers and deny any sense of ‘universal’ human 
feelings. This point can be reinforced by the strong reactions stirred by certain films. For 
instance, Breaking the Waves has instigated a variety of responses and has even divided 
feminist viewers/scholars. Certain critics see it as a film that reproduces the patriarchal 
ideology, whereas others understand it as a feminist film tout court.18 The Idiots was 
banned in Ireland and censored in the USA.19 Similarly, Dogville and Manderlay caused a 
huge controversy during their projection in the Cannes film festival.20 These pieces of 
evidence dispute Grodal’s argument concerning ‘the universality’ of von Trier’s films.  
Grodal’s critical approach is indicative of a tendency to see von Trier’s films as 
objects that can be explained through an examination of the director’s personality. In the 
same way, Caroline Bainbridge discusses the evolution of von Trier’s career and argues 
that von Trier’s cinema searches for ‘authenticity in artifice’. Bainbridge understands this 
to be von Trier’s search for ‘an authentic sense of self’.21 Nonetheless, her book offers 
much to the study of von Trier. Drawing on theories of psychoanalysis and intertextuality, 
she analyses the form and the content of the films. Then again, one senses that, like most 
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of the aforementioned critics, she sees the form as subordinate to the content and focuses 
on the ways von Trier has shaped his own image.22 
One major exception is Jan Simons who conducts a formalist analysis based upon 
the argument that von Trier’s films can be understood ‘as cinematic games’. Simons’ 
book proceeds to explain von Trier’s cinema from a theoretical angle that draws on game 
studies, game theory and the aesthetics of the new digital media. Simons suggests that 
‘von Trier’s films are a cinematic version of contemporary computer games’ something 
that he supports through a game analysis of the films’ form and content.23 His argument is 
stated on the basis that von Trier’s films do not strive for a direct correspondence between 
representation and reality but they literally see the filmmaking process as a game. He 
compares the role of the narrator in von Trier’s early films with the role of a computer 
game player and claims that the characters can be seen as ‘avatars’ either in the hands of 
the narrator or of other game players that remain unidentified by the protagonists.24 
Simons suggests that in von Trier’s films characters enter an unknown world and are 
confronted with the task of adaptability, which is the rule of the game.25 Consequently, he 
understands von Trier’s films to be iterations of a game that produces certain outcomes. 
The problem with his argument is his insistence that game theory is the only valid way of 
approaching the films. Simons goes so far as to suggest that von Trier’s Dogme project 
cannot be seen under the rubric of political modernism or André Bazin’s theories of 
realism, but mainly as part of a postmodern game culture.26 
Simons’ analysis is less inclined to discuss issues of spectatorship and the ways 
von Trier challenges audience expectations. This is something that Linda Badley’s recent 
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book does. Badley discusses von Trier’s dialogue with cinematic genres and the ways his 
films challenge audience expectations. Like some of the previous writers, Badley is 
committed to an ‘auteurist’ reading of Lars von Trier’s films. As she says: ‘Lars von Trier 
after all is a performance and his work a narration of his signature’.27 Badley understands 
von Trier’s life ‘as a public myth featured in the elaborate metatextual apparatus that 
accompanies all his productions’.28 Elsewhere, Badley acknowledges the political aspects 
of von Trier’s cinema, but she resorts to von Trier the individual to explain some very 
complex aspects of his films.29  
One contradiction that arises when looking at the scholarship, is that most of the 
aforementioned critics understand von Trier to be part of a postmodern culture, but they 
still insist on an ‘auteurist’ reading that draws attention to the director himself and his 
creativity. These two approaches are in conflict with each other, given that postmodern 
culture has radically redefined and questioned terms, such as originality and creativity. 
Certainly, von Trier has absolute control over the films’ final cut and refuses to conform 
to the standards of the mainstream film industry, but his work raises questions that cannot 
be simply answered by resorting to the directors’ intentions.  
Structure of the Thesis 
One can conclude that though useful bits are to be found on the critical works on von 
Trier’s cinema, none of the aforementioned studies is interested in marrying formal 
analysis to a discussion of the films’ politics. An advantage of this thesis is that it can fill 
this gap by proceeding to a discussion that goes beyond the director’s life and his personal 
background. I take quite seriously von Trier’s views on the film medium, but I do not let 
his biography and his interpretations over-determine my work. After all, I think that 
Schepelern’s book has successfully explored the connection between von Trier’s 
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biography and the way his life has affected his filmmaking practice. Following Barthes’ 
famous essay, which treats the author as an ‘instance of writing’, this thesis considers that 
the films’ formal complexity and contradictions defy a hermeneutical approach that draws 
solely on von Trier’s life and his own interpretations.30 
By contrast, this thesis wants to pose a set of questions not considered so far. How 
and why do the non-linear representation of history and the problematisation of agency in 
the Europa trilogy challenge a unified view of history and force us to question the 
historical present? Why can historical pessimism be understood politically? Why does the 
Dogme Manifesto marry a political modernist rhetoric with a realist one and how does 
The Idiots’ emphasis on performance in the form and content go beyond a pure 
reproduction of reality? How and why does Dogville – a film with obvious references to 
Brecht – go beyond the closed form of the Brechtian fable? These questions are integral to 
our understanding of the films’ formal richness, their dialectical contradictions and their 
politics.  
By using Brecht as a methodological apparatus and by re-reading von Trier as a 
post-Brechtian director, I intend to answer this set of questions and identify the political 
implications of form in the five films under discussion. One could object that going back 
to Brecht to understand von Trier might be a conservative approach. I would refer the 
sceptics to Jacques Derrida’s argument that in moments of crisis radical thought needs to 
return to the past and proceed to criticise it and borrow from it at the same time. Derrida 
intimates that Marxism is still alive when it is ready to undertake its ‘self-critique’.31 I 
suggest that the same applies to Brecht’s theory, which can still enliven film theory and 
practice. Changing historical circumstances alter the ways we use certain theoretical 
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apparatuses. Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, for instance, explain the revival of 
André Bazin’s theories in light of the transition from analog cinema to digital. As they 
explain, ‘a theory is never historically stable and takes on new meanings in different 
contexts’.32 According to Elsaesser and Hagener, film theory does not necessarily extend 
into the future but to the past as well, so as to rethink certain arguments from a different 
perspective.  
Rethinking Brecht’s theory in relation to film can be beneficial for film theory, 
since cultural studies’ emphasis on issues of minorities, race and the representation of ‘the 
other’ has enriched film theory, but it has tended to privilege content over form. Formal 
issues have been downplayed while certain readings highlight moral questions as opposed 
to political ones, since the changes proposed suggest the reformation of a system and not 
its radical transformation. As Mike Wayne points out, issues of ‘diversity, subversion and 
resistance’ that are the cornerstone of contemporary thought ‘are also the stock-in-trade of 
capitalist mass culture’.33 Brecht can help us re-examine the connection between form and 
politics and appreciate the formal complexity that characterises certain films.  
With the previous comments in mind, the first chapter of the thesis proceeds to a 
historical evaluation of Brecht’s reception in film theory. The chapter investigates aspects 
of Brecht’s theory that can still be beneficial for film theory and practice and others that 
have been outdated. This chapter also considers the ways in which Brecht’s theory can 
address the cinematic and political concerns of the present. Furthermore, the chapter 
locates von Trier under the rubric of the post-Brechtian by comparing him to past film 
practices.  
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Chapter two moves to a discussion of the Europa trilogy and advances a 
dialectical reading of the films. The purpose of the chapter is to focus on formal elements 
that challenge the narrative laws of classical cinema. I suggest that the films’ preference 
for visual constellations over the reproduction of a concrete historical narrative with a 
beginning, middle and end problematise historical representation and question the view of 
history as a teleological process. My ultimate purpose is to discuss the formal abstraction, 
which permeates the films, in ways that go beyond an understanding of it as a ‘subjective’ 
narration. In particular, I want to explain how the ruptures in dramatic linearity 
defamiliarise our sense of temporality, question teleological stories and valorise processes 
over concrete dramatic narratives. On this basis, I suggest that von Trier follows Brecht’s 
mistrust of a historical representation based on pictorial verisimilitude, without however 
sharing his forward-looking politics and his view of history as Marxist science.  
In Chapter three, I discuss Dogme 95 and The Idiots. The aim of this chapter is 
twofold. Firstly, I am interested in analysing the reasons why the Dogme manifesto 
employs a political modernist rhetoric so as to place Dogme’s return to the past in a 
historical context. Unlike other critics, I do not see Dogme as postmodern parody or 
solely as a marketing trick. What I find particularly productive and worth-while analysing 
is that Dogme reconciles a political modernist language that alludes to Brecht with a 
realist aesthetics. As I discuss in the first chapter, during the 1970s this gesture was out of 
the question, given that Brechtian cinema was seen as oppositional to the realist aesthetics 
of the long-take and deep-focus cinematography advocated by André Bazin. Secondly, the 
chapter considers the role of performance as a formal and thematic element in The Idiots. 
I want to draw attention to the ways that the camera becomes performative and brings 
together material of dramaturgical importance with moments that are the product of 
cinematic contingency. I discuss the film’s emphasis on performativity in light of the 
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developments in post-Brechtian performance art and argue that the film valorises its 
‘performant’ over its story-telling function.  
The last chapter discusses Dogville, perhaps von Trier’s only film that has been 
unanimously received as political on the part of the commentators and the critics and 
whose form has obvious references to Brecht. This chapter wants to move the discussion 
from the film’s assumed ‘Anti-Americanism’ and proceeds to a formal analysis that can 
rethink the film’s politics. I concentrate principally on the film’s employment of 
theatricality and performativity. I identify the conflicting forces that set apart identity, in 
order to disrupt ideological certainties and expose the simulative aspect of certain values 
and morals. I want to show as well that Dogville, despite its employment of Brechtian 
tropes, goes beyond the closed form of the Brechtian fable. I consider this point key to our 
understanding of the film’s politics, which does not share Brecht’s ideological certainties. 
I hope that the discussions that unfold will open the way for further exploration of the 
formal richness that characterises the rest of von Trier’s films and will open up readings 
that shift the interest from von Trier’s personality, to a more focused discussion of the 
political implications of the films’ form.   
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Chapter 1- Brecht’s Position in Film Theory and Practice  
 
Brecht on the Film Medium                                
Given that Brecht provides the methodological framework of my thesis, this chapter 
investigates Brecht’s own writings on film and his reception in film theory. More 
precisely, I am interested in discussing Brecht’s writings on film form and the cinematic 
institution and identify how his theory became a theoretical apparatus for the rethinking of 
film theory and practice. My intention, overall, is to distinguish between certain aspects of 
Brecht’s writings on cinema that can be productive in film analysis and practice. I also 
want to differentiate my methodology from the 1970s reception of Brecht so as to open 
out my reading of Lars von Trier under the rubric of the post-Brechtian. Certain aspects of 
Brecht’s cinematic writings that I discuss below, such as the representation of the 
individual, the aesthetics of interruptibility, the loose dramaturgy and his dissatisfaction 
with the commodification of cinema figure importantly in my discussion of von Trier.  
Brecht as a modernist was fascinated by the film medium and its potential to offer 
representations of reality that could encourage critical reflection on the part of the 
audience. One of the aspects of the medium that he considered to be revolutionary was its 
ability to do away with character psychology and show the individual as representative of 
his/her social role. Influenced by Marx’s theoretical antihumanism, Brecht saw the 
individual as the product of the historical and social circumstances as opposed to the 
bourgeois concept of “human essence”. According to Marx, a theory of subjectivity 
cannot allow for a scientific investigation of human relationships and lapses into an 
abstract humanism. The effect is that such an abstract humanism fails to see the individual 
as a historical emergent and as a producer of history.1 
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Part of the aims of Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt (making the familiar strange) is 
the demonstration of the individual’s dependence on processes that defy its self-
determination. For Brecht, cinema could show the individual as historically defined in a 
more effective way than the theatrical and literary dramaturgy. As Brecht explains, in 
contrast to bourgeois drama’s and novel’s psychologically motivated characters, cinema 
presents socially motivated type characters. Consequently, the audience cannot dissociate 
the portrayed characters from their historical and social positions. As Brecht says: 
 
For the theatre for instance, the cinema’s treatment of the person performing the 
action is interesting. To give life to the persons, who are introduced purely 
according to their functions, the cinema uses available types who encounter 
specific situations and assume in them particular attitudes. All motivation from 
within the character is excluded; the person’s inner life never provides the 
principal cause of action and seldom its principal result; the person is seen from 
the outside.2  
 
 
From these comments, one can see that Brecht draws his conclusions from the early 
cinema’s experiments, which treated characters as types motivated by their social 
functions and not by psychology. Equally important is to acknowledge Brecht’s interest in 
the Russian avant-garde and in particular in Eisenstein’s cinema. Martin Walsh suggests 
that Brecht’s meeting with the Russian director in Berlin in 1929 was crucial for the 
formulation of his film and theatre theory too.3 Indeed, Eisenstein’s paradigm fits into 
Brecht’s perception of the cinema as a medium that does away with psychological 
motivation. Eisenstein’s concept of the dialectical conflict created by the juxtaposition 
between seemingly unrelated materials and his prioritisation of actions and historical 
events that surpass the characters might be the type of cinema that Brecht had in mind. 
                                                          
2
 See Bertolt Brecht, ‘The Threepenny Lawsuit’, in Bertolt Brecht: On Film and Radio, ed. and trans. by 
Marc Silberman (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.147-199, here p.164.  
3
 See Martin Walsh, The Brechtian Aspect of Radical Cinema, ed. by Keith Griffiths (London: BFI, 
1981), p.16.   
23 
 
The early cinema’s portrayal of type characters was also influential in Brecht’s 
valorisation of a gestic acting as opposed to a dramatic one. For Brecht, the social gestus 
can offer simplification, through an exposition of attitudes that minimise psychological 
traits. Gestus assists in the depiction of the individual as the product of forces and laws 
that cannot be discerned in the phenomenology of human relations. According to Brecht, 
a gestic acting is concerned with showing an action; that is, quoting it rather than 
imitating it. This acting activates the audience’s critical faculties and allows them to 
reflect on the characters’ attitudes. Of paramount importance in Brecht’s favouring of a 
gestic acting was Charlie Chaplin’s depiction of characters in his films. Brecht considered 
Chaplin as an actor who did away with past dramatic traditions based upon the imitation 
of feelings. His acting placed emphasis on the very process of creating a character. By 
shifting the emphasis from the act of imitation to that of showing, Chaplin showed his 
characters being motivated by their social roles and conditions. In effect, Chaplin’s acting 
corresponded with Brecht’s Marxist conviction that the individual is changeable and not 
fixed.4 Brecht’s admiration of Chaplin is emblematic of his view of cinema as an art form 
that could combine political analysis with popular entertainment.  
In the same manner that Chaplin’s acting demonstrated the process of creating a 
character and his/her actions, Brecht thought of film as a medium that had the potential to 
represent dramatic actions and include the very process of copying them. Thus, film could 
turn into a non-empathetic medium given that the focus would be on actions over 
characters’ psychology. As Brecht says: 
 
In fact the film demands external action and not introspective psychology. 
Capitalism has an impact on this by provoking, organizing, and mechanizing 
certain needs on a mass scale, revolutionalizing everything. It destroys great 
areas of ideology by concentrating only on external action, by dissolving 
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everything into processes, by abandoning the hero as the medium and mankind 
as the measure of all things, and smashes the introspective psychology of the 
bourgeois novel. The external point of view is proper to cinema and it makes it 
important. For the cinema the principles of non-Aristotelian drama (a type of 
drama not depending on empathy, mimesis) are immediately acceptable.5 
 
 
This quotation reveals Brecht’s utopian view of the medium and his belief that certain 
formal principles can lead to the production of radical effects. By valorising actions over 
characters, cinema could become a means of teaching historical awareness. The 
prerequisite for this effect is that the medium adopts an external point of view that de-
individuates the narrative and focuses on the historical processes and their changeability. 
By implication, Brecht aspired to make the act of representation more complex so as to 
encourage responses on the part of the audience. In encouraging the audience to reflect on 
the filmic material, Brecht thought that the viewers would be able to see the historicity of 
human relationships and the very falsity of their ‘naturalisation’ on the part of the 
bourgeois society.  
Brecht’s understanding of cinema as a medium that could analyse social relations 
aimed at stimulating the audience’s capacity for action in the social sphere. One important 
document that offers some practical examples of his valorisation of external actions at the 
expense of character-based dramaturgy is the film Kuhle Wampe: or Who Owns the 
World? [Kuhle Wampe, Oder: Wem Gehört Die Welt?, (Bertolt Brecht, Slatan Dudow, 
Ernst Ottwald :1932)]. Kuhle Wampe tells the story of a German working class family in 
Berlin and raises questions regarding the rise of unemployment in Germany during the 
1930s. The film consists of four independent parts that are interrupted by musical 
compositions accompanied by images of factories and council houses. Kuhle Wampe is 
heavily influenced by Eisenstein’s intellectual montage. As Marc Silberman observes, the 
montage sequences in the film interrupt the narrative with material that does not serve 
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diegetic purposes. Story development is minimised in favour of a loose sequence of 
episodes that deconstruct dramatic actions. This deconstruction aims at linking dramatic 
actions with the social conditions of their construction.6  
As a result, characters are shown as representatives of their social roles and not as 
individuals with unchanged psychological traits. The scene that demonstrates Brecht’s 
interest in identifying the social drive in the characters’ behaviour is the one that portrays 
Fritz’s suicide (Ernst Busch), the youngest member of the Bönike family. What precedes 
this incident is a family argument regarding the son’s inability to find work. Tired of the 
lack of prospects, Fritz decides to end his life. The camera remains immobile focusing on 
the character, while the lack of extra-diegetic music heightens the grotesque atmosphere. 
A different frame follows and shows a banner hung in the kitchen wall saying: ‘“Don’t 
blame the morning that brings hardship and work. It is wonderful to care for those one 
loves”’.  
This banner juxtaposes a protestant/capitalist ethic into a working-class 
environment. Later on, Fritz approaches the window in a very ‘clinical’ manner as if it is 
part of an every-day routine and takes off his watch. While preparing to jump from the 
window he is careful enough not to damage the family’s flowers. The mechanical 
approach towards the portrayal of the suicide fails to establish empathy for the victim. 
The filmic treatment of the material draws upon Brecht’s concept of gestus which aimed 
at connecting an inner attitude with the outside social reality. In this scene the camera 
becomes ‘gestic’ and as Silberman points out: 
 
The camera here becomes the ideal instrument ‘for looking from the outside’; 
the camera as sociologist allows the filmmaker to construct each sequence with 
distinct cinematographic techniques and a visual rhythm dictated by external 
action. Brecht’s critique of mimesis and illusionism transfers here to the 
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cinematic medium where the goal cannot be the duplication of external reality, 
as if it is there, waiting to be reproduced.7   
 
This scene connects the personal with the political/historical through an anti-humanist 
methodology that does not portray suicide as a personal tragedy, but as a phenomenon 
that can be understood historically. This passage of the film summarises some of the 
fundamental Brechtian tenets, such as the valorisation of historical/social forces over 
characters and the detached portrayal of dramatic actions, which intend to identify the 
social laws that regulate one’s actions.   
As maintained by Brecht, certain formal choices make the cinematic medium more 
effective with regard to the minimisation of character-based dramaturgy and produce a 
fragmented form that de-individuates actions and reveals their social/historical 
significance. Brecht understands cinema’s political effectiveness in its ability to create a 
fragmentary diegetic pattern. This preference for an incomplete and episodic narrative 
served the purpose of preventing the audience from being carried away by the plot. This 
episodic form could freeze the actions and give the viewer time to ponder the represented 
social relationships and the questions/contradictions introduced by the narrative. His 
argument is reminiscent of his point in the notes to Mahagonny, in which he explains that 
the episodic form of the epic theatre expects the audience to stand outside and question 
the portrayed events instead of adopting an empathetic attitude.8 The following quotation 
clarifies Brecht’s perception of the cinema as a medium that benefits from an 
episodic/paratactic style.  
 
Film obeys the same laws as static art. It is essentially static and must be treated 
as a series of tableaux. Its effect must arise from the clear interruptions, which 
would otherwise just be common errors. The tableaux must be so composed that 
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they can be taken in at a single glance like a sheet of paper, but yet they must 
withstand separation into details so that every detail corresponds in the larger 
scheme with the centre.9  
 
 
Underlying Brecht’s preference for arranging a film as a series of tableaux is his 
conviction that this visual style leads to a formal abstraction that renders the represented 
reality enigmatic. In this way, the audience’s critical faculties are aroused and the viewer 
is confronted with material, which she/he has either to confirm or dispute. As I explain 
later on, Brecht’s early thoughts on the medium have an optimism born of little 
experience of the medium, while later he developed a more sceptical attitude. 
Brecht’s emphasis on an aesthetics of interruptibility by means of a succession of 
fragments/tableaux aims at confronting the viewers with images of reality, in which they 
are asked to recognise themselves and see, at the same time, reality as a construct.10 The 
collection of different fragments brings together contradictions that are offered to the 
audience to be resolved. Moreover, in his film writings, the valorisation of the fragment is 
also interested in showing reality as discontinuous rather than unified. This attitude of 
detachment could make the audience doubt the images’ veracity and negate the 
stereotypical perception of representation as reproduction of a seemingly unified reality. 
Brecht’s argument draws upon the Marxist rejection of empiricism according to 
which the outward appearance of social phenomena does not offer an understanding of 
their historical/social significance.11 Thus, Brecht distinguished between the reproductive 
and the constructive use of the medium. The former paradigm is keen on reproducing the 
empirical reality, whereas the latter is more interested in showing that what appears as 
‘real’ is subject to transformation, because reality is socially constructed. As such, a 
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constructive use of the medium presupposed the presentation of a familiar reality in a way 
that it would appear strange and changeable.12 
The constructive method is predicated upon a process of selecting fragments of 
reality and of showing, at the same time, this very process of assembling. In this way, the 
relationship between the profilmic material and its reproduction is made evident and the 
final cut does not appear as an uncritical portrayal of the empirical reality. The key 
principle of the constructive method is montage, a term Brecht employs in his theatre 
writings too. Montage stresses representational discontinuity and serves the role of 
isolating moments that can reveal aspects of reality which are not necessarily visible. As 
Brecht says: 
 
The film image is limited by its frame, everything which is inside of this frame 
takes on dimensions and a significance which is relative to this frame and does 
not exist outside of it. In other words, the frame limits and delimits a field which 
determines a number of geometric, architectonic and plastic relations which do 
not exist in reality. At least, by limiting certain relations which in reality are lost 
among an infinity of others since reality is not limited by a frame, it underlines 
them.13  
 
 
In Brecht’s view, montage is a formal element that reinforces the productive over the 
reproductive use of the medium. His valorisation of this formal principle was very 
influential in the post-1968 film theory, which I am going to discuss later on.  
In many respects, this preference for the fragment indicates an interest in the 
process over the product. Montage operates as a means of interrupting the diegetic flow, 
in order to enact questions that go beyond the film’s dramaturgy. Of particular interest in 
Brecht’s theory is the connection between montage and his concept of the gestic acting, 
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which has been acknowledged by Roswitha Mueller.14 Neither of the practices is content 
with the reduplication of reality; both are interested in the very process of interruption, 
with the view to preventing the audience from being absorbed by the story development. 
In Chapter three of this thesis, I will discuss the ways von Trier employs a film practice 
that pushes forward Brecht’s concept of gestus. The distancing effects are achieved by a 
film style that does not employ montage sequences, but long-takes that focus on the 
actors’ performances. The produced gestures create clashes between the diegetic and the 
meta-level and reveal unforeseen connections between the bodies.  
Brecht’s writings on film are infused with enthusiasm over the new medium and 
its potential to create complex representations of reality. Yet Brecht is busy identifying 
‘intrinsic properties’ in film, without taking into account the fact that the medium is also 
subject to historical transformations. As a modernist, he was fascinated by the 
possibilities offered by technological development. However, his initial enthusiasm over 
the film as medium fades away, and the main reason for that can be attributed to the fact 
that he became suspicious of cinema’s ability to make the audience participate 
productively. As he says:  
 
In the theatre the public regulates the representation. The cinema in this respect 
has enormous weaknesses which seem theoretically insurmountable... the rigid 
fixation of the perspective: we see nothing except what the single camera eye 
has registered… Due to the fact of mechanical reproduction, everything tends to 
present itself as a finished result, constraining, unchangeable. We return to the 
fundamental reproach: the public has no opportunity to modify the actor’s 
performance, he does not find himself confronting a production, but the result of 
that production, which was produced in his absence.15 
 
 
This quotation taken from a discussion between Brecht and Theodor Adorno is directly 
reminiscent of the latter’s suspicion of the political efficacy of the film medium. Brecht 
maintained that theatre’s division between text and performance allowed for a more 
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productive spectatorship, in which the actor is influenced by the auditorium. Brecht 
concluded that cinema was prone to producing dramatic material that is consumed without 
critical reflection on the part of the audience. An important factor that made him doubt the 
medium’s ability to make the familiar strange was the fact that the audience’s viewpoint 
in the cinema is always fixed. As he says: ‘we only see what one eye, the camera, saw. 
This means that the actors have to act for this eye alone’.16  
Certain directors, such as Alexander Kluge, Jean-Marie Straub/Danièle Huillet and 
Jean-Luc Godard, who have consciously adopted Brechtian strategies in their films have 
tried to solve the unalterability of film’s performance through a representational strategy 
that makes the relationship between text, performance and camera viewpoint problematic. 
Similarly, von Trier’s preference for uneven camera movements that destabilise the 
represented material pays equal attention to the process and the product so as to create a 
perceptual instability. As I discuss in the third and the fourth chapter, in The Idiots (1998) 
and in Dogville (2003) the camera’s role is not that of the panoptic master that determines 
and controls every movement on the part of the actors. The camera is rather dedicated to a 
process of movement and readjustment and generates conflicts and contradictions that 
defy the understanding of the object as a ‘finished result’.  
To sum up, Brecht’s evaluation of the film medium is, to a large extent, restricted 
by his historical experiences. For instance, one can see that certain formal aspects that he 
considered to be revolutionary, such as montage, have been co-opted by the commercial 
film industry. Furthermore, Brecht’s initial optimism regarding cinema’s ability to break 
with the dramatic realism that characterised other art forms, such as literature and theatre, 
has been invalidated. The merit of his cinematic writings lies in his dissatisfaction with 
the mere duplication of the empirical reality and his valorisation of representational 
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strategies that aim at activating the audience’s responses. It is his distinction between 
productive representation and reproduction that has much to contribute to film theory and 
practice.  
Brecht’s Critique of the Institution of Cinema  
Brecht, aware of the film industry’s understanding of film as a commodity, argued in 
favour of a radical film practice that would be combined with a criticism of the institution 
of cinema. The argument rests on the assumption that film’s means of production are 
capitalist and without questioning its commodity status the filmmaker unconsciously 
reproduces the capitalist ideology.  
 
As long as cinema’s social function is not criticised, film criticism remains a 
critique of the symptoms and has itself only symptomatic character. It exhausts 
itself with issues of taste and is limited by class-given prejudices. It cannot 
recognise taste as a commodity or the weapon of a particular class but rather 
accepts it as an absolute (what everyone is able to buy is accessible to everyone, 
even if not everyone can buy something).17 
 
 
The redefinition of the relationship between the filmed object and the audience is a 
necessary step for overcoming the commodity aspect of the medium. Brecht explains that 
mainstream film production does not question the reduction of the audience to the status 
of a consumer and the dominant view of the film object as a saleable product. In effect, 
the institution of cinema ends up reproducing a division of labour, in which the film 
director and the crew are perceived as the producers of work, while the audience is 
relegated to the status of the consumers.   
As a result, the public’s influence on the produced works is analogous to the 
customer’s influence upon the product. The root of the problem is social, since the 
relegation of the audience to a position of ‘non-production’ serves the interests of the 
capitalist mode of production. Brecht’s point is clearly based on the assumption that the 
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film industry’s modus operandi reproduces a normalised image of the social structure, 
which cannot be influenced by the collective body, namely the auditorium. As he says: 
 
But mainly the sharp description between work and recreation characteristic of 
the capitalist mode of production divides all intellectual activities into those 
serving labour and those serving recreation and makes of the latter a system for 
the reproduction of labour power. Recreation is dedicated to non-production in 
the interest of production.... Those who buy tickets transform themselves in front 
of the screen into idlers and exploiters. Since the object of exploitation is put 
inside them, they are, so to speak, victims of ‘imploitation’.18  
 
 
By participating in this exchange-value process the audience unintentionally becomes an 
accomplice in the legitimation of its status as ‘non-producer’, something that has 
consequences on the viewers’ understanding of themselves as social subjects.  
Thus, Brecht’s critique of the institution of cinema is dedicated to rethinking the 
role of the audience, with the intention of re-evaluating its role and transforming it from a 
passive observer to a producer. On this basis, Brecht saw the revolutionary potential of the 
cinema in its ability to become a public sphere that could be entertaining and educative at 
the same time. But in order to achieve its productive potential, cinema should go beyond 
the industry’s adherence to ‘public taste’. For Brecht, ‘public taste’ is a synonym for the 
reproduction of the familiar.19 Here the familiar stands for the production of objects that 
show a harmonised image of social reality and perpetuate the division between producers 
and consumers. A productive use of the medium, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
exposition of the familiar as commodity, so as to demonstrate the interrelation between 
aesthetics and politics. Thus, producing for a medium without changing its function is not 
enough.  
The latter point constitutes one of the most crucial aspects of Brecht’s film theory. 
To change the medium’s function it is not enough to introduce revolutionary topics within 
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the established language. A mere portrayal of a political subject-matter leads to 
comfortable contemplation and consumption of the material. On the contrary, a political 
utilisation of the medium is predicated upon the preference for the unfinished, for the 
object that raises questions and makes the audience respond actively. Consequently, a 
radical rethinking of the institution of cinema is concerned with altering the established 
relationship between screen and audience, so as to activate the latter’s productive 
faculties.  
To achieve this transformation, Brecht proposes a practice that pays equal 
attention to the process and the product. In demystifying the productive process, Brecht 
aims at denying bourgeois society’s distinctions between the artist and the public and the 
very idea of the artist as a gifted individual. In this context, technological development is 
seen as a positive evolution that can reveal art’s reliance on apparatuses that are social 
tout court. These apparatuses defy the bourgeois concept of art as something deriving 
from an individual experience. The nub of Brecht’s analysis is that the director’s 
dependence on apparatuses renders the understanding of cinema as a reflectionist medium 
obsolete. The social aspect of the apparatuses denies the idea that cinema can offer a 
candid/neutral depiction of reality. Without perceiving the role that the apparatus plays in 
the finished product, the director reproduces the traditional forms of expression, which are 
determined by the capitalist reality.  
Brecht’s argument rests on the assumption that film does not rely much on the 
‘creative individual’ but on the technological apparatus. As Steve Giles points out, for 
Brecht, this concept is not something restricted to film. Human activity involves 
apparatuses that traditional art theories fail to acknowledge, partly due to their essentialist 
approaches towards the ‘artistic’ and the ‘human’.20 From this perspective, Brecht 
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understands the technological aspect of film production to be a form of transcending the 
bourgeois perception of art. The intervention of the technological apparatus brings to the 
surface art’s dependence on technological developments, and as an extension, to the 
economic and productive forces. The camera is engaged in a process that records reality 
and produces a copy of it at the same time. This dual function collapses the distinction 
between the original and the copy. In this way, cinema’s reliance on mechanical 
reproduction could strengthen the audience’s understanding of the visible – and here the 
term refers to the filmic visible and the social one – as something that can be constructed 
and not as unchangeable.     
Brecht’s critique of the institution of cinema aspires to address film’s reliance on 
the capitalist means of production. On this account, a demonstration of film’s dependence 
on social factors can be beneficial for film practice too. The core of his argument is that 
cinema cannot be politically effective, unless it is liberated from capitalist exploitation. 
What I want to keep from Brecht’s critique of the cinematic institution is his call for 
objects that denounce the relegation of film to a medium that reproduces the commodity. 
What I see as historically relevant, is his idea that spectatorial passivity conditions people 
to be socially passive, something that I discuss in Chapter two, in my analysis of von 
Trier’s critique of cinematic voyeurism. Brecht thought that passive spectatorship 
relegates the audience to the status of the consumer, whose power relies on its buying and 
not on its productive capacity. In many respects, his critique of the cinematic institution 
follows his theatre writings and his inspiration to bridge the gap between the author and 
the public.      
Brecht’s Theory as the Road to Film Radicalism  
This section discusses Brecht’s reception in film theory. As I have organised Brecht’s 
work on cinema into his critique of form and his critique of the cinematic institution, I 
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will organise Brechtian film theory into those works preoccupied with film form and 
those works preoccupied with cinema as institution. I am interested in identifying the 
ways that Brecht’s film’s writings were employed by certain critics as a means of 
envisaging a counter-cinematic film practice. Given that my focus is on Brecht’s impact 
on film theory, I have omitted numerous film reviews that employed Brecht’s theory to 
discuss various films.21  
One of the central points of Brecht’s theory and practice was his re-evaluation of 
the term realism. As I discussed in the first section, Brecht thought that the mere 
reproduction of reality resisted the medium’s ability to produce radical effects. For 
Brecht, realism is a set of historical conventions and not a transhistorical aesthetic form 
that gives absolute access to social reality. In his view, reality can be understood by 
means of experimentation and not through reduplication. In this context, realism in art can 
be achieved by means of a practice that takes things apart and analyses them in order to 
show their changeability. Correspondingly, the first writings, which utilised Brecht’s 
materialist dialectics in film theory, employed an anti-realist approach towards the film as 
medium. The main line of argument was that radical cinema should go beyond the 
understanding of the medium as a means of reflecting reality.  
What was opposed by these critics was the school of thought inaugurated by 
André Bazin’s writings which were described as idealist. Bazin thought that cinema, 
unlike other arts, gives its audience a more genuine image of reality because of its 
dependence on the photographic image. The photographic image becomes an image that 
results from a process of mechanical reproduction, a process that he considered to be 
more ‘objective’ as opposed to other arts that relied on imitation. As he says: ‘Originality 
in photography as distinct from originality in painting lies in the essentially objective 
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character of photography’.22 Bazin advocated a film aesthetics that freed the audience’s 
vision and did not simply focus on events of dramatic importance. His essays on Italian 
Neorealism, Jean Renoir and Orson Welles advocated certain formal principles, such as 
the use of continuity editing, depth of field, and deep focus, on the grounds of their ability 
to incorporate aspects of reality that did not serve dramaturgical purposes. In his view, 
these formal features allowed for more spectatorial freedom and gave the audience a more 
direct access to reality than a type of cinema that relied on analytical editing.23  
The popularity of Brecht’s call for a constructive realism led critics, who valorised 
a dialectical film practice, to oppose Bazin’s theory as an uncritical appeal for 
reproductive realism. In chapter three, I discuss Dogme 95 and von Trier’s The Idiots 
(1998) and I identify the signs of convergence between Bazin and political modernism. I 
want to show that certain aspects of realism are not antithetical with a type of cinema that 
does not efface the process of its own production. Yet this was not the case in the 1960s 
and 1970s, because realism was seen as equivalent to pure reproduction.  
This line of argument can be identified in an essay written by Jean Narboni and 
published in Cahiers du Cinéma in 1967. Narboni lays out his anti-realist position and 
argues that a materialist film practice is predicated upon an interest in challenging the 
direct correspondence between image and reality. He explains that films can be political 
through a process that integrates ‘lived experience’ into their formal elaboration of the 
content. Thus, a political film is one that is not content with reproducing conflicts, but one 
that reveals the gap between image and reality. The crux of the argument is that the 
interest is not in the reproduction of a coherent and unquestionable reality, but in the 
process of ‘staging a spectacle’. By turning towards itself and the process of its own 
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making, film becomes a theoretical activity that foregrounds its material construction and 
connects the very act of seeing with a process that takes things apart. The aim of this 
practice is to educate the audience that there is not an unequivocal association between 
appearance and reality.24  
A similar approach can be observed in Jean-Paul Fargier’s article written in 1969. 
Fargier employs a Brechtian language in his writings, which is made evident in his 
assertion that a politically orientated cinema is concerned with the production of 
knowledge. Fargier explains that the cognitive effects produced by a film are directly 
related to the production of knowledge about the film’s own making. Like Brecht, Fargier 
asserts that a self-reflexive practice is a theoretical process that allows for a detached 
processing of the material. Thus, the production of images is not concerned with an 
illusory reflection of reality, but with the theorisation of the medium, a process that 
interprets the production of images as writing. From this perspective, the audience adopts 
a reading attitude and sees the production of images as a procedure that merits analysis 
and not as an unequivocal reflection of reality. As he writes: 
 
A dialectical film is one made in the consciousness, which it is able to transmit 
to the audience, of the exact process whereby an item of knowledge or a 
depiction of reality is transformed by degrees into screen material to be then 
reconverted into knowledge and a view of reality in the audience’s mind.25  
 
Fargier’s comments resonate with Brecht’s discussion of a constructive realism, which is 
predicated on the audience’s productive participation. In the same way, Fargier explains 
that the audience’s role in dialectical cinema is to decipher the images and read the signs 
in contradiction and not in combination. What is problematic in his argument is his 
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assertion that such a film practice ‘transmits knowledge produced by historical 
materialism’.26 This point reveals the theoretical tendency of the time to assume that 
certain formal aspects can teach the audience the Marxist methodology. 
Such an anti-realist rhetoric permeates Colin MacCabe’s essay ‘Realism and the 
Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses’, published in Screen in 1974. MacCabe 
spends some time laying out the basic principles of Brecht’s theory and practice. He 
focuses on Brecht’s mistrust of the empirical reproduction of reality and compares it to 
the classic realist text, which represents the world without questioning the means of its 
own production. As MacCabe says: 
 
The relationship between the reading subject and the real [in the classic realist 
text] is placed as one of pure specularity. The real is not articulated – it is. These 
features imply two essential features of the classic realist text: 1. The classic 
realist text cannot deal with the real as contradictory. 2. In a reciprocal 
movement the classic realist text ensures the position of the subject in a position 
of dominant specularity.27   
 
 
MacCabe’s evaluation of classic realism’s characteristics aims at investigating the 
possibility for a subversive filmmaking practice based upon Brecht’s theory. In his view, 
the question that radical cinema needs to address is that of the position of the audience 
towards the material. In this way, revolutionary objects start by questioning the 
spectator’s role as a viewing subject. This change in the subject and object relations can 
be achieved by a narrative structure that does not provide ‘ready-made’ knowledge but 
creates diegetic gaps that encourage the audience’s productivity. MacCabe sets as an 
example Kuhle Wampe and Tout Va Bien (Godard, Gorin:1972), because both films 
portray historical reality not as self-evident but as a problem.28 
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Evidently, MacCabe’s investigation of the route towards a Brechtian cinema does 
not go beyond Brecht’s writings on the film medium. He rightly points out the importance 
of the contradiction principle in dialectical cinema. What his analysis lacks is the 
demonstration of certain formal structures that may lead to the productive effects that 
Brecht envisaged. Stephen Heath’s discussion, on the contrary, which was published in 
the same Screen issue, is perhaps the most detailed attempt to explore the productive 
effects that Brecht’s theory may have in filmmaking practice. According to Heath, a 
Brechtian film practice needs to question the ‘fetishistic’ facet of the photographic image. 
Following Brecht, Heath proposes an aesthetics of interruptibility, which gives the 
audience the ability to be inside and outside the film. Thus, a necessary step is the 
overcoming of the ‘novelistic’ unifying portrayal of actions. Interruptibility can be 
achieved by way of montage sequences that disrupt the diegetic flow. As Heath says:  
 
The focus of this possibility seems to be the capacity of film to hold back the 
narrative, not to exhaust the images in the momentum of revelation, and this is 
the meaning of Brecht’s emphases on the static nature of the film and its 
potential for non-introspection, the presence of the image against the 
consciousness of developing presence.29  
 
 
This emphasis on narrative interruption is identical to meaning-making production. As 
Heath explains, this method abandons organic unity and the singularity of meaning and is 
interested in creating a ‘multi-perspective’ that denies continuity editing and ‘the fixity of 
depth’.30 What emerges is not the production of a coherent narrative structure but an 
aesthetics of ‘negativity’, which defies identification with the characters and the story. 
Like the preceding writers, Heath stresses the fact that this aesthetics endorses a reading 
attitude that is in opposition to dominant cinema’s emphasis on providing a perfect 
illusion of reality. In this formulation, Heath seems clearly influenced by the anti-realist 
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language of the time. His understanding of montage as a formal element that can make 
representation more complex comes in contradistinction with Bazin’s valorisation of 
continuity editing.  
In many respects, Brechtian/materialist cinema was seen as the exact opposite of 
Bazin’s realist theses. This distinction between the two traditions is made evident in Peter 
Wollen’s article “‘Ontology’ and ‘Materialism’ in Film”, published in 1976 in Screen. 
Wollen distinguishes between the materialist film language and the one advocated by 
Bazin, according to which meaning emerges naturally from the mechanical registration of 
the profilmic reality. Moreover, Wollen discusses materialist film practice as a process of 
‘semioticization’ of the filmed object. Brecht plays a significant role in his diagnosis of 
dialectical cinema, something that can be seen in his valorisation of a self-reflexive film 
practice that renders the filmed material complex, with the view to exploring the reality 
outside the cinema. As he writes: 
 
A reversal of the relations of dominance between non-cinematic and cinematic 
codes, between signified and signifier, can lead to the production of the film-text 
rather than the film-representation or the film-object. Film-making can be a 
project of meaning with horizons beyond itself in the general arena of ideology. 
At the same time it can avoid the pitfalls of illusionism, of simply being a 
substitute for a world, parasitic on ideology, which it reproduces as reality. 31 
 
 
 
The major point of convergence between Wollen, MacCabe and Heath is that in their 
examination of Brecht’s role in radical filmmaking, they all proclaim the primacy of the 
text as opposed to the film object. Wollen’s essay is the first to clarify this issue. As he 
says ‘the concept of text’ needs to be introduced into film practice, something that he 
identifies in Godard’s reading of Brecht.32 Along these lines, the essential concern of a 
Brechtian film practice is the creation of a film language characterised by fissures and 
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gaps. In contrast to mainstream cinema, this paradigm does not intend to simulate actions 
but to introduce ideas that remain incomplete and transform the viewer to a reader, 
something that at the time was equivalent to productive spectatorship. 
A different line of argument can be identified in Peter Gidal’s essay ‘The Anti-
narrative’, published in Screen in 1979. Gidal’s point hinges upon the consideration that 
radical film practice should retain Brecht’s basic theoretical axioms and go beyond his 
preference for presenting contradictions through narrative. According to Gidal, all 
narrative films are reactionary because they cannot avoid perpetuating the passive 
spectatorship that defines commercial practices. Gidal affirms that narrative 
unconsciously reproduces bourgeois society’s gender and racial stereotypes. What this 
article proposes is a film practice devoted to an aesthetics of negativity and 
‘meaninglessness’, which is committed to destroying the visual pleasure granted to the 
audience by the narrative cinema.33 Doubts over the effectiveness of this ‘meaningless’ 
cinema proposed by Gidal have to do with the fact that an anti-narrative structure fails to 
employ self-reflexivity in ways that go beyond the tautological assertion that the audience 
is viewing a film.34 
 It is fair to conjecture that all the aforementioned discussions have stimulated 
thinking with respect to Brecht’s position on radical film practice. However, one can take 
issue with the critics’ tendency to read film objects in canonical ways, as if certain film 
practices reproduce pre-existing Marxist ideas. Thus, despite the critics’ interest in form, 
one senses that film form held a secondary status in the discussions, as if it was the means 
for the reproduction of theory. Partly, this can be attributed to the understanding of Brecht 
as a ‘didactic’ writer, something that can be seen in more recent writings.35  
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 Certain critics have expressed their reservations regarding the way Brecht’s 
theory was used as a way of envisaging a political film practice. Dana Polan, for instance, 
argues that while many writers paid much attention to the ways that specific filmic codes 
could be transgressed by dialectical cinema, these discussions failed to clarify how formal 
transgressions could change the audience’s perception of the historically formed reality. 
Polan concludes that film theory needs to be more open to the possibility that Brecht’s 
theory can be operative in films that manipulate familiar aspects of the dominant cinema. 
His argument is predicated on the basis that defamiliarisation can only be fruitful if 
something familiar is rendered strange.36  
The validity of the anti-realist trend has also been called into question, since films 
were classified as political on the grounds of certain stylistic traits that were assumed to 
be transhistorically radical. As Sylvia Harvey argues: 
 
In one of those odd reversals of history, some of the anti-realist theorists of 
the’70s made a mistake very similar to that of Lukács: they tended to assume 
that texts could be defined as ‘radical’ on the basis of stylistic properties alone, 
rather than on the basis of the tripartite relationship between textual properties, 
contemporary social reality and historically formed readers. It is the engagement 
with knowing the world in order to represent and transform it that is central to 
Brechtian aesthetics. This process of knowing is to be understood as historical in 
the sense that it involves the question “by whom?”, “for whom?” “under what 
circumstances?”, and a sensitivity to the problem of access whether to particular 
sorts of buildings or to particular sorts of discourses.37  
 
 
The questions that Harvey asks at the end of the previous quotation are the necessary step 
that one has to take so as to rethink the currency of Brecht’s film writings. The core of 
Brecht’s theory is that forms are changeable and historically determined. Consequently, in 
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the course of time certain formal elements become de-radicalised or co-opted, whereas 
others require second thoughts. For instance, contemporary films by the Dardenne 
brothers and Béla Tarr, which follow a long-take Bazinian aesthetics, challenge our 
habitual viewing of films in a more effective way as opposed to films that employ 
montage sequences and fast editing. Thus, the prerequisite for rendering the familiar 
strange is to understand the historicity of both the term ‘familiar’ and ‘defamiliarisation’.                     
Rethinking the Cinematic Institution  
Brecht’s critique of the cinematic institution became very popular during the 1970s and 
especially in the wake of the popularity of Louis Althusser’s writings on ideology. 
Althusser’s writings inspired many critics, who discussed the cinematic institution from a 
Brechtian angle. Althusser’s theory of ideology has many similarities with Brecht’s 
understanding of social relationships and structures. Brecht’s privileging of human history 
over nature seeks to demystify social relations and demonstrate that what appears as 
natural/fixed is socially constructed. Similarly, Althusser’s theory of ideology is busy 
exploring the ways that capitalist reality reproduces itself in non-forceful ways. 
Accordingly, key terms in his theory are ‘the real’ and ‘the imaginary’. Ideology is a 
representational system that reproduces the current relations of production and normalises 
structures in ways that appear to be self-evident.38 
The currency of Althusserian Marxism led critics to rethink the cinematic 
institution. The crux of the argument was that failure to criticise the medium’s reliance on 
the capitalist means of production would uncritically reproduce the dominant ideology. A 
major example of this tendency can be seen in Fargier’s essay that I discussed earlier. 
Fargier discusses cinema as an institution that naturalises social relationships and 
conditions. As he explains, cinema’s dependence on economics turns it into a medium 
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that reproduces the current relations of capitalist production and presents them as ‘real’ 
and unchangeable. Film industry depends on a capitalist productive process, which affects 
the finished product in an indirect way. Thus, the medium unconsciously reproduces the 
capitalist ideology and the ideology of the visible as ‘real’. Fargier sets as an example the 
working classes’ ability to consume images that justify their position in social reality and 
make them complicit in a process that ‘presents the existing ‘abnormal’ relations of 
production as natural and right’.39  
Fargier’s analysis puts forward the conjecture that any serious film analysis cannot 
refrain from analysing the medium’s capitalist means of production. This argument 
echoes Brecht’s critique of the cinematic institution, which proposed that criticising the 
industry’s modus operandi can be a way of changing the medium’s social function. More 
detailed contextualisation of Brecht’s argument can be seen in an essay published by 
Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni in 1969. The writers discuss how the production 
process of a film determines its content. According to Comolli and Narboni, film is a 
commodity and thus a material product of capitalism. Consequently, it is not solely the 
film’s reproduction of stories that can reproduce the dominant ideology, but also the way 
one uses the very tools and materials of filmmaking production. As Comolli and Narboni 
write:  
Clearly, the cinema reproduces reality: this is what cinema and film stock are for 
– so says the ideology. But the tools and techniques of filmmaking are part of 
reality themselves, and furthermore ‘reality’ is nothing but an expression of the 
prevailing ideology. Seen in this light, the classic theory of cinema that the 
camera is an impartial instrument which grasps, or rather is impregnated by the 
world in its ‘concrete reality’ is an eminently reactionary one. What the camera 
in fact registers is the vague, unformulated, untheorized, unthought-out world of 
the dominant ideology.40 
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The writers conclude that it is the ‘nature’ of capitalism to turn cinema into an instrument 
of the dominant ideology. On this basis, one has to manifest the relation between 
economics, ideology and filmmaking production, in order to challenge the view of the 
medium as a candid reflection of reality.  
This essay expresses a utopian belief that can be identified in Brecht’s film 
writings too. The demonstration of the commodified aspects of the industry can be a 
means of doing away with the bourgeois ideology. In revealing the capitalist aspect of the 
medium, one can disclose the social aspect of the technological apparatus and bring to 
light cinema’s relation to ideology. Similarly, Brecht’s view of modernity celebrated the 
very forces that produced commodification and alienation.41 According to Brecht, the 
exposition of the film as a commodity could become a means of debunking bourgeois 
values that appear as natural.  
Brecht’s discussion of the cinematic institution intended to emphasise cinema’s 
reliance on social and economic factors, with the purpose of showing that the medium’s 
technological means of production are primarily social. Echoing this argument, Jean-
Louis Baudry’s essay ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’, 
published in 1970, places emphasis on the social aspect of cinema’s technical base, with 
the view to showing that film practice is not simply a neutral process of recording. Thus, 
the manifestation of the medium’s technical base refutes the idealist perception of the 
medium as a reflection of an objective reality. As Baudry says: 
 
In which case, concealment of the technical base will also bring about an 
inevitable ideological effect. Its inscription, its manifestation as such, on the 
other hand, would produce a knowledge effect, as actualisation of the work 
process, as denunciation of ideology, and as a critique of idealism.42  
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What Baudry condemns as idealist is the pure reproduction of the visible. On this basis, 
the manifestation of the technological apparatus denies the synthetic unity that the film 
industry strives for. The aim is the exposition of the apparatuses involved in our 
perception of social life as opposed to the cinematic institution’s embracement of the 
ideology of the visible. His argument clearly recalls Brecht’s cinematic writings, in which 
he compares the process of making social realities visible to the process of producing a 
picture from a photographic negative.43  
All the aforementioned essays embody a willingness to draw attention to the 
apparatuses involved in the reproduction of reality. The arguments combine a Brechtian 
critique of the perception of the image as a self-sufficient projection of reality with an 
Althusserian conviction that the visible reality involves ideological apparatuses that 
cannot be easily discerned. The common vantage point was that the effacement of the 
film’s process of production entails an ideological motive, which is the objectification of 
the surface reality. However, none of these essays discusses the institutionalisation of 
cinema in the former socialist countries which produced socialist realist narratives for 
consumption. Socialist realist films of the time followed the same closed system of 
meaning that one can see in the western dominant cinema and did not really challenge the 
film as medium or the cinematic institution.  
The aforementioned essays follow Brecht’s argument that representations of 
reality have to show the apparatuses that insert themselves between reality and the images 
they produce. 44 Brecht’s interest in showing the capitalist foundations of the cinema was 
combined with a belief that technology can be used in radical ways, which might disrupt 
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the public’s perception of the world as ‘natural’. The exposition of cinema as an 
institution and the demonstration of the process of commodification and consumption can 
be still a valid way of showing that film technology produces images that correspond to a 
specific social reality. Brecht’s inference that the technological advancement of capitalism 
has inserted more processes of mechanical reproduction between reality and our 
perception of it is germane to the postmodern reality, in which image production is 
practically the same as commodity production. When looking back at these essays, one 
can keep their strong commitment to a film practice that prioritises processes over a 
mimetic reproduction of actions. However, one needs to consider that capitalist processes 
have become much more intricate rather than being expressions of the dominant class.  
Jean Baudrillard’s well-known discussion of the simulacra has eloquently shown 
that in our contemporary reality simulations of reality and real historical conditions 
merge. The effect is that the distinction between facts and simulations becomes 
problematic and any sense of knowing reality by means of representation is called into 
question.45 Partially, this shift can be attributed to the hegemonic presence of the media 
that transmit replications of the real and render the act of communication one-
dimensional. Baudrillard suggests that ‘the revolution lies in restoring the possibility of 
response’.46 However, such a ‘responsible’ spectatorship is not predicated upon the 
audience’s confirmation of some pre-existing theoretical ideas that run the risk of 
institutionalisation. The restoration of responses can be rather achieved by a process that 
calls attention to form as a means of aligning contradictions that make the audience more 
productive.  
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 It is this restoration of ‘responsible’ spectatorship that is crucial to understand von 
Trier’s politicised aesthetics that concerns me in this thesis. In his films, he employs a 
series of practices that play with cinematic clichés and call attention to the artifice of 
representation so as to demonstrate how much artifice is involved in our perception of the 
real. As I explain in chapter two and three, his preference for a loose dramaturgy and his 
post-Dogme strategy of allowing unpredictable and anti-systematic moments to enter the 
films’ narrative offer a degree of imprecision which is essential for the very restoration of 
responses that Baudrillard speaks of.  
Following Baudrillard’s comments, one can state that the Brechtian and 
Althusserian understanding of representation as science which goes beyond the dominant 
ideology is obsolete. What I see important in Brecht’s theory and pertaining to my 
discussion of von Trier is the preference for a representational strategy based upon formal 
abstraction, which is aware of its own incompleteness. The issue at hand, therefore, when 
dealing with politics and representation requires a rethinking of the dominant film 
language. Otherwise, cinema runs the risk of reducing complex issues to clear-cut 
polarities and of propagating the reality that it negates.  
 Defining Post-Brechtian Cinema.   
So far I have discussed Brecht’s writings on film and his reception in film theory. In this 
section I intend to offer a definition of the very term post-Brechtian cinema, so as to 
clarify the ways that we can understand politics and representation in the current historical 
circumstances. Very schematically, the term post-Brechtian describes a postmodern 
rethinking of Brecht which shares his preference for a fragmented representation and 
formal abstraction but not his political certainties. In order to clarify things further, I want 
to consider Roland Barthes’ analysis which elucidates the basic aspects of Brecht’s work 
and foresees a post-Brechtian aesthetics.  
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Barthes argues that in Brecht’s theatre and in Eisenstein’s cinema the meaning lies 
in the instant rather than the whole. Each scene does not necessarily complement each 
other, but proceeds to contradict or question the preceding one. Therefore, Barthes 
explains that the tableaux in Brecht and Eisenstein are infused with meaning but not a 
final one. Meaning is produced by a series of fragments and not through dramatic 
development. Brecht’s tableaux operate as a means of bringing together different 
materials that the audience is asked to assemble. For Barthes, this aesthetics is concerned 
with the production of knowledge effects.47 Barthes’ essay envisages the possibility of a 
post-Brechtian and post-Eisensteinian aesthetics, which is grounded in the withholding of 
a precise political meaning. As Barthes says: 
 
Doubtless there would be no difficulty in finding in post-Brechtian theatre and 
post-Eisensteinian cinema mises en scène marked by the dispersion of the 
tableau, the pulling to pieces of the ‘composition’ the setting in movement of the 
‘partial organs’ of the human figure, in short the holding in check of the 
metaphysical meaning of the work – but then also of its political meaning; or, at 
least, the carrying over of this meaning towards another politics.48 
  
Thus, the ideal would be a disturbance of the relation between the visual representations 
and their meaning. Instead of an imposed reified meaning, a series of interpretations are 
produced, which do not form an organic unity and what Eisenstein named a ‘synthesis of 
art and science’.49 In effect, a film’s epistemology is not grounded in the communication 
of a certain degree of knowledge, but in the very questioning of the ways that cinema 
produces a certain understanding of the world.  
The question that arises is how such an aesthetics produces political effects. A 
pertinent starting point would be that a film interested in questioning current political 
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reality should follow Brecht’s modus operandi, according to which challenging the 
audience’s perceptual abilities by means of formal abstraction can make one question 
aspects of reality that one takes for granted. In valorising points of tension and 
contradictions, a post-Brechtian aesthetics is not interested in the reproduction of a 
political content to be consumed. Brecht’s conviction that the medium needs to enter into 
self-criticism is still valid; what the post-Brechtian questions is his certainty that the 
complication of representation can result in precise enlightening effects and in social 
change based upon the socialist doctrine.  
The collapse of a socialist alternative that led to the globalisation of the market as 
well as the de-radicalisation of the working class have redefined the political polarities 
that characterised the world in which Brecht worked. Then again, the current economic 
crisis, the resurfacing of political extremism and the emergence of a new sub-proletariat 
class –‘the precariat’ – living on the border of working insecurity and destitution question 
the outward ‘triumph of the market’.50 Dialectical analysis becomes the prerequisite for 
those dissatisfied with the current political circumstances. Brecht’s theory can be a way of 
questioning the ‘naturalisation’ of capitalism but in ways that can deal with the different 
historical conditions.51  
The transition from modernism to postmodernism is integral to our understanding 
of the different ways that one can understand politics and representation.  In his often 
cited discussion of postmodernity, David Harvey argues that the establishment of late 
capitalism and the new forms of production aided by the development of the new 
technologies have created a time-space compression that has led to a crisis of 
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representation.52 According to Harvey, this continual process of compression has rendered 
yesterday’s representations of reality inoperative. Postmodernist art follows the modernist 
aesthetics of the fragment without sharing the former’s epistemology. Modernism 
employed the fragment in an utterly different way, aiming at the discovery of a concrete 
reality. As Harvey says: 
 
Understanding had to be constructed through the exploration of multiple 
perspectives. Modernism, in short, took on multiple perspectivism and 
relativism as its epistemology for revealing what it still took to be the true nature 
of a unified though complex underlying reality.53  
  
Unlike modernism, postmodernism takes uncertainty as a given element. The construction 
of reality and identity are very much based upon a process of image construction, which 
intensifies the ephemerality of experience and the de-materialisation of reality.54 
Consequently, politicising perception does not solely rely on uncovering processes that 
give us an insight into ‘the real’ historical/social conditions. It is rather a matter of 
valorising processes and contradictions but not as a means of reaching a conclusive end-
point. One has to deal with this challenge when trying to identify Brecht’s relevance in 
late capitalist societies.    
Along these lines, a post-Brechtian aesthetics follows Brecht and places the 
audience at the centre of the action. Martin Brady suggests that a post-Brechtian film can 
be broadly defined as the deployment of ‘Brechtian devices in films which no longer 
adhere to the principles of ideology or leftist political modernism’.55 Brady’s brief 
definition is accompanied by two examples amongst which are von Trier’s Dogville and 
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Michael Verhoeven’s The Nasty Girl [Das Schreckliche Mädchen: 1988].56 While this 
definition has some validity, it does not address dialectics as a constitutive element of 
post-Brechtian cinema. I suggest that dialectics – the use of the fragment as a means of 
producing a collision of theses and antitheses – is still the principal method, but not as a 
means of subordinating the contradictions to a totalised meta-narrative, but as a way of 
reflecting its very motion and the very inadequacy of the medium of its own articulation. 
A more precise definition is offered by Alexander Kluge. Kluge gave me a short 
interview and when I asked him about his views on the shift from the Brechtian to the 
post-Brechtian, and the role of the fragment in his films, he responded: 
 
We are only giving you comments when we make a film or write a piece of 
literature. We do not guide you to a counter-reality. We only give you hints. We 
are like scouts. Take as an example my last film News from Ideological 
Antiquity: Marx, Eisenstein, The Capital [Nachrichten aus Der Ideologischen 
Antike - Marx – Eisenstein – Das Kapital, 2008]. This is a new film and shows 
the ways I employ Brechtian practices in the present. The author does not take 
any decisions. The author analyses or counter-analyses, or repeats, or makes 
comments.57  
 
Kluge’s point suggests that the dialectics between the medium and interpretation is not a 
matter of an agitational call for change. Conversely, the role of dialectics is to turn the 
medium inside out so as to pose the problem of interpretation itself. The produced 
interpretations play against themselves and aim at undoing a stable relationship between 
ideas and representations.  
Jacques Rancière’s contribution to the exploration of a ‘politicized art’ can also 
illuminate the previous points and help us bracket the very idea of the post-Brechtian. 
Rancière considers Brecht’s theatre to be the archetypal form of a ‘politicized art’. In his 
investigation of a contemporary politicized aesthetics, Rancière draws upon the notion of 
‘heterology’. As he says:  
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The notion of ‘heterology’ refers to the way in which the meaningful fabric of 
the sensible is disturbed: a spectacle does not fit within the sensible framework 
defined by a network of meanings, an expression does not find its place in the 
system of visible coordinates where it appears. The dream of a suitable political 
work of art is in fact the dream of disrupting the relationship between the visible, 
the sayable and the thinkable without having to use the terms of a message as a 
vehicle. It is the dream of an art that would transmit meanings in the form of a 
rupture with the very logic of meaningful situations. As a matter of fact, political 
art cannot work in the form of a meaningful spectacle that would lead to an 
‘awareness’ of the state of the world. Suitable political art would ensure, at one 
and the same time, the production of a double effect: the readability of a political 
signification, and a sensible or perceptual shock caused by the uncanny, by that 
which resists signification. 58   
 
 
Particularly productive in Rancière’s comments is his point that art attains its political 
function not by way of ‘messages’ and concrete moral polarisations, but through a process 
of disturbance that intends to shock and disorientate the audience. This understanding of 
politicized art is congruent with my perception of post-Brechtian cinema as a cinema that 
presents the audience with dialectical conflicts that defy synthesis.  
 Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder: Two Different Tendencies  
Let us now discuss post-Brechtian cinema with reference to some concrete examples. A 
variety of directors have been discussed as part of a counter-cinematic tradition that drew 
on Brecht’s theatre and film aesthetics. Certain works of Jean-Luc Godard, the films of 
Straub/Huillet, Alexander Kluge, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Volker Schlöndorff and 
Theo Angelopoulos have been seen as products of Brecht’s legacy. In this section, I 
intend to focus on Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder so as to address both formal and 
institutional issues that can prepare the ground for my discussion of Lars von Trier as a 
post-Brechtian director. Unlike previous discussions so far, I argue that the body of work 
of these directors can help us identify the shift from a Brechtian to a post-Brechtian 
aesthetics. The essential concern of this section is to look at Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder 
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as precedents for cinematic practices that combine the representation of history with 
Brechtian concerns/strategies. Furthermore, I focus on the ways they employ the actors’ 
performances as a process of exploration/discovery and not as a reproduction of a fixed 
script. I analyse these key issues that pertain to my discussion of von Trier’s 
representation of history in chapter two and his employment of performativity and 
theatricality in chapter three and four. On this basis and given the vast filmography of 
these directors, I restrict my discussion to specific films that give us an insight into these 
ideas.     
Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder represent two different tendencies in filmmaking. 
The first one is strongly committed to an austere/experimental formal practice that intends 
to challenge subject matter, habitual film-viewing and the very cinematic institution. 
Fassbinder had the same ambitions, but the fundamental difference between him and 
Straub/Huillet was his interest in commercial genres and patterns from the mainstream 
cinema, whereas Straub’s/Huillet’s work positions itself in direct resistance to popular 
cinema. Thomas Elsaesser makes a very accurate distinction between these two 
tendencies and asserts that Fassbinder manipulates the industrial products of the cinema, 
while Straub/Huillet understand their works as ‘resistance of their materials to the filmic 
process’.59  
Yet both paradigms oppose the institution of cinema and proceed to produce 
distancing effects that alter the subject and object relationships. Straub/Huillet achieve 
this through a film practice which reduces the actors to linguistic quotations, separates the 
acoustic and the visual elements and resists diegetic flow. On the other hand, Fassbinder 
makes use of extreme affect and emotionality, which foreground an excess of artifice in 
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the acting and the mise-en-scène. This excess creates a hyperbolic gap between reality and 
representation and produces a sense of critical distance and detachment. 
Of particular interest in both paradigms is the way they portray history. History in 
their films becomes a subject of investigation and not a reproduction of historical events. 
In Straub’s/Huillet’s case, history is portrayed as a problem and not as a linear narrative 
with a beginning, middle and end. The narrative downplays the characters’ personal 
stories so as to demonstrate that personal relationships are historically defined. This effect 
is achieved through a division of the diegesis into segments that do not follow a 
discernible chronological order and blur the boundaries between past and present. Prime 
examples are their films Machorka-Muff (1963) and Not Reconciled [Nicht Versöhnt Oder 
Es Hilft Nur Gewalt Wo Gewalt Herrscht: 1965].  
In the first film, Straub/Huillet depict the life of Machorka-Muff (Erich Kuby) – a 
former Nazi colonel – in post-war West-Germany during the years of the military 
rearmament. The directors follow Brecht’s axiom that individuals and social relationships 
can be understood through the study of history and not through unchangeable 
psychological characteristics. However, in contrast to Brecht’s preference for typage, 
Machorka-Muff is portrayed as a normal individual and not as person, whose external 
characteristics indicate his politics.60 The pseudo-documentary form heightens the 
directors’ intention to de-individuate the narrative and to explore the West-German 
historical past and present. The voice-over creates temporal ellipses that blur the 
boundaries between past and present and make one rethink West-Germany’s movement 
towards historical progress.  
In avoiding the chronological succession of the narrated events, the film aimed at 
showing that fascism is a historical problem that cannot be simply reduced to the past. 
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Straub’s/Huillet’s aspiration is to explore the historical evidence of the remaining traumas 
of fascism and not to personify fascism, a practice employed by Hollywood films 
concerned with history. As Martin Walsh says, ‘impersonality is the key note in the film’s 
form’.61 This ‘impersonality’ is made evident by the directors’ employment of the camera, 
which does not simply register the moments that serve a concrete dramatic function. The 
camera lingers persistently on space, to explore its materiality, and assumes an 
investigative rather than a reproductive role.   
Straub’s/Huillet’s treatment of history becomes even more complex in their next 
film Not Reconciled. Again, the directors refuse to reproduce history as a narrative that 
follows a clear-cut chronological sequence and the characters are deprived of any 
psychological traits. Based on Heinrich Böll’s novel Billiards at Half Past Nine, the story 
focuses on a German middle class family and consists of narrative segments that show the 
characters during the beginning of the century, the Nazi Germany and the years of the re-
armament. The succession of montage sequences leads to an episodic diegesis that 
complicates narrative temporality. As such, history is shown as dialectical in the literal 
sense, that is, as a problem that needs to be solved by the audience. Quotation plays a very 
important role in the film. The term quotation refers to the acting style employed, which 
manifests the fact that the actors quote their lines, and the pseudo-documentary form that 
reduces the narrative to quoted material and not to a dramatic reproduction. As Barton 
Byg says:  
 
For Straub/Huillet documentary is fundamental to all film art. Even the fictional 
drama contained in Not Reconciled is documentary on one level: a documentary 
of its (re) enactment; its quotation from the novel. Just as the words of the novel 
do not openly express emotion, neither does the style with which Straub/Huillet 
                                                          
61
 Walsh, p.44.  
57 
 
present them. The texts are offered as documents, facts, placed in a context but 
not interpreted.62  
 
 
Thus, the cinematic elements are used as material given to the audience, which is asked to 
assemble them and assume a more productive role. For Straub/Huillet this practice serves 
a dual role, which is to redefine the way form solidifies into content, as well as to 
challenge the cinematic institution.  
The lack of formal unity conjectures that to understand history one should avoid 
looking at it as a logical sequence of events. The argument clearly recalls the Marxist 
belief that the phenomenological manifestation of the historical phenomena cannot give 
us an insight into the workings of history. In this way, Not Reconciled presents its 
materials in a ‘mechanical’ way, so as to make the audience go beyond the surface 
presentation of the story and understand history in its complexity. This ‘mechanical’ 
approach concentrates on the presentation of the fragments without adding any feelings 
that compel the audience to perceive the material in a specific way.63 This is a very 
important observation that can help us understand the passage from a Brechtian to a post-
Brechtian aesthetics.  
This shift was not clarified in the 1970s analyses of Straub’s/Huillet’s films.64 
Straub’s/Huillet’s formal elaboration of their material draws on Brecht’s valorisation of 
the fragment, but their films resist a unifying political interpretation. They are offered to 
the audience as materials to be worked out, but they do not produce specific knowledge 
effects. Consequently, their aesthetics of fragmentation and the separation of the elements 
of film narration denounce the understanding of the final object as the repository of 
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authorial power. This formal elaboration of the material operates as a means of 
questioning the cinematic institution too. For instance, the detached portrayal of the 
subject-matter of history in Not Reconciled constitutes an attack on the audience’s 
habitual consumption of images. The depiction of the characters as objects in the hands of 
history serves the purpose of criticising the audience’s voyeurism and their complicity in 
the formation of history too. In criticising the audience’s passivity, the filmmakers make 
an allegorical parallel between passive spectatorship and passive acceptance of the 
historical reality. In this way, Straub/Huillet challenge the institution of cinema, to show 
that the reduction of the audience to consumers of dramatised stories with a self-evident 
meaning is analogous to capitalism’s relegation of the collective to voyeurs of history.  
While in Straub/Huillet the dissolution of the dramatis personae is used as a 
means of problematising historical narratives, Fassbinder focuses on the individual, with 
the intention of showing the political/historical aspects of personal life stories. The 
traumas of fascism in the post-war West-German society play an important role in his 
narratives and, like Straub/Huillet, he does not see fascism as a historical phenomenon 
that has come to an end, but as something that pervades social and personal relationships. 
The Marriage of Maria Braun [Die Ehe der Maria Braun: 1979] constitutes one of the 
major examples of a film, in which a personal story operates as a way of raising historical 
questions. Following the life of a young woman (Hanna Schygulla) in the years after the 
end of World War II, the film demonstrates the signs of connection between the years of 
the German economic miracle and the fascist past.  
Maria’s pursuit of career success reflects the very capitalist ethic of individualism 
and social apathy. Fassbinder compares this lack of social cohesion to the silent 
acceptance of fascism on the part of the German populace, in exchange for individual 
self-preservation. Maria silently accepts the male-dominated business world in exchange 
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for personal prosperity that will reunite her with her imprisoned husband. But this reunion 
remains incomplete throughout the film. Her wedding starts with a bombing and finishes 
with an explosion in her house, an allegory that intends to problematise the distinctions 
between past and present and the very notion of historical progress.  
Unlike Straub/Huillet, Fassbinder allows for a certain amount of identification 
with his characters. Yet his treatment of the material combines a pseudo-documentary 
form with excessive melodramatic moments that look like intentional exercises in bad 
taste. In effect, quotation figures importantly in his works too. In its semi-documentary 
moments it appears as a quotation of its own dramatisation, while the moments of 
excessive affect intentionally foreground their artificiality and the references to the genre 
of melodrama. This incorporation of antithetical formal elements does not simply serve 
the role of reminding the audience that what they see is just a film. This extreme antithesis 
opens out questions with respect to the very crisis of referentiality. The film manifestly 
visualises its dialogue with the film industry, but as Elsaesser suggests, this dialogue is 
not just a way of pronouncing the directors’ cinéphilia. What this dialogue puts forward is 
also Fassbinder’s ‘deconstructionist view of the vanishing historical reality’.65 
In effect, Fassbinder uses Brechtian techniques in his narrative, to show the 
prevalence of history in personal and social relationships, but he does not share Brecht’s 
adoption of revolutionary models embodied in the Enlightenment tradition. What the film 
questions is the view of history as an additive series of events that mark out precise 
boundaries between the mistakes of the past and the present historical reality. At times, 
Fassbinder uses unmotivated references to the past, such as stories from Maria’s mother 
or from strangers she meets, along with radio extracts that reproduce the character as an 
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observer of the larger historical narrative of Germany.66 As a result, these references elicit 
an awareness of the co-existence of heterogeneous stories and memories that call into 
question historical reference and the medium’s capacity to deal with history.  
Fassbinder’s scepticism expands to criticise the whole image and sound making 
production and thus, to reconsider cinema as an institution. Towards the end of the film 
we hear the sport announcer’s celebration for West-Germany’s victory at the World Cup 
Final, a year before the nation’s rearmament. Here, Fassbinder manipulates one of the 
major aspects of popular culture, namely the sports entertainment industry, to imply that 
the very image and sound consumption can make the public complicit in the production of 
historical mistakes. In Lili Marleen (1981) he does something similar and compares the 
mass entertainment industry with fascism. What he proposes is a reading of fascism as an 
imaginary commodity of fetish objects and sexual desires, something directly linked to 
cinema’s ability to create desire for image consumption.67  
Fassbinder’s paradigm demonstrates clearly how one can manipulate aspects of 
commercial cinema and retain its narrative function in ways that challenge film form and 
the very cinematic institution. Consequently, like Straub/Huillet he is not solely 
concerned with the production of narratives but with the very questioning of the 
audiovisual materials. Unlike Straub/Huillet, however, Fassbinder does not intend to 
abolish any sense of the pleasure principle that characterises the film-viewing process. 
Despite their initial friendship and collaboration both sides expressed their reservations 
for each other’s work. Fassbinder, regardless of his initial enthusiasm for Straub/Huillet’s 
work, rejected their films as ‘too intellectualist’ and unable to reach a mass-audience.68 
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Straub/Huillet, on the other hand, have repeatedly accused Fassbinder of being an 
‘unpolitical’ and ‘irresponsible’ director.69  
Regardless of this dispute, both paradigms are an emblematic illustration of a post-
Brechtian aesthetics. Moreover, their engagement with the art of theatre has influenced 
their filmic products, something that can be seen in certain films, in which they proceed to 
a radical separation of elements, a practice that has informed contemporary performance 
art. In Straub/Huillet’s case, this aspect is visible in a film like Class Relations 
[Klassenverhältnisse] (1984). Based on Kafka’s posthumously published novel – widely 
known as Amerika – the film tells the story of a German boy, Karl Rossmann (Christian 
Heinisch) who moves to the USA with the intention of starting a new life after some 
family problems in his home country. Straub/Huillet employ a shooting process structured 
upon a careful and calculated designing of the physical portrayal of the characters. 
Together with the use of the text as raw material, the film proceeds to create a radical gap 
between the actors and their lines, with the view to using performance as an investigative 
tool and not as a hermeneutic one. As Byg says: 
 
Straub/Huillet, however, use their film to explore their relations between the 
figure of Karl and the narratives within which he is placed. They do so solely on 
the basis of the pared-down utterances they have selected from the novel 
fragment, in a manner of speech that Wolfram Schütte has called “an arena 
where struggles of power and class take place”.70  
 
 
The static camera draws attention to the actors’ recital of their lines and the movement of 
the bodies within the restricted diegetic space. The filmmakers avoid establishing shots 
and shot-reverse-shots, in order to place emphasis on the contradictions deriving from the 
radical distance between the speaking subjects and language, and from the actors’ stylised 
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movement within the frames. Thus, the prioritisation of physical movement leads to a 
stylised anti-naturalism that does not reduce the performers to mere agents of a script.  
Straub/Huillet use the extracts from the novel as an object of exploration and not 
as a script to be mimetically reproduced.71 In undermining narrative coherence, they 
intend to explore the contradictions that are flattened in classical film narratives. The 
script becomes material for performance that voids secure hermeneutic solutions. By 
focusing on the character’s bodies and by renouncing the reproduction of concrete 
emotional states, they portray the shifting relationships and the power dynamics between 
Karl, Delamarche (Harun Farocki) and Robinson (Manfred Blank). Along with the use of 
the script as words devoid of any emotion, Class Relations employs performance as 
uninterpreted material, which avoids the closed dramatic form of mainstream cinema. The 
raison d'etre of this aesthetics is similar to what Hans-Thies Lehmann’s discussion of 
post-dramatic theatre defines as an aesthetics of ‘“meaning in retreat”’.72  
Straub’s/Huillet’s form follows Brecht’s demands for placing emphasis on the act 
of quoting a performance rather than on the imitation of dramatic stories. Yet unlike 
Brecht, their radical separation of elements produces contradictions that problematise the 
audience’s decision-making process. The reason for this effect is that despite their striving 
for achieving calculated gestures on the part of their actors, performance is not reduced to 
a secondary status that communicates a concrete amount of information. Their 
employment of a static camera emphasises the process of recording the actors’ 
performances; in this way, performativity is valorised at the expense of dramatisation. 
Their emphasis is on the performative process itself and not on the dramatic intentions of 
the characters. My understanding of the term performative and performativity is informed 
                                                          
71
 The employment of the text as ‘material’ is a practice that characterises post-Brechtian performance 
too. See David Barnett, ‘When is a Play Not a Drama? Two Examples of Postdramatic Theatre Texts’, in 
New Theatre Quarterly, 24:1(2008), pp.14-23, here p.15. 
72
 See Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. by Karen Jürs-Munby (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p.88.  
63 
 
by Jacques Derrida’s reading of John Langshaw Austin’s writings on the speech act. 
Derrida interprets the term ‘performative speech act’ as a practice that is not solely 
referential and does not simply communicate the intentionality of the speaking subject. It 
is rather a transformative process, not concerned with the communication of ‘a semantic 
content’.73  
Within this framework offered by Derrida, one can define performativity in the 
cinema as the camera’s interaction with the actors’ performances in ways that the 
communication of content is not prioritised. The camera interacts with the performing 
body in space for reasons that exceed narrative coherence and representational 
consistency. In many respects, performativity refers to a process in which the act of 
showing an action is privileged over the action itself and these are some points I shall 
return to in the third and the fourth chapter. In this context, Straub’s/Huillet’s employment 
of performativity as opposed to concrete dramatic tropes aspires to reveal the tension 
between language, the body and the speaking subject, so as to render the act of 
interpretation problematic. This valorisation of performativity explores the irreconcilable 
words, gestures and actions which do not lead to a monocausal thesis but explore the 
political dimension of the every-day relationships.  
A closer look at certain films by Fassbinder can make one draw similar 
conclusions regarding his treatment of language and the performing body. For instance, 
the film adaptation of his play The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant [Die Bitteren Tränen 
der Petra von Kant: 1973] is a prime example of a film which employs excessive 
theatricality and performativity so as to draw attention to the transformation of the 
cinema’s raw materials into performance. Here, the act of showing/quoting the 
representation is privileged over dramatic action, something that can be attributed to the 
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film’s reproduction of a space that consciously resembles a theatre stage. The film 
narrates the recurrent play of domination and submission in the bourgeois household of a 
fashion designer, Petra von Kant (Margit Carstensen). Petra falls in love with Karin 
(Hanna Schygulla), a woman of a lower class background. The film observes the changes 
in the power dynamics in their relationship. The allusions to the art of theatre and the 
employment of excessive colours make us perceive the film as a performance of its own 
making and not simply as a reproduced narrative. Like Straub’s/Huillet’s Class Relations, 
the film employs static camera movement and places emphasis on the performing body 
and the reduction of dialogue to performative utterances. Neither the actors nor the 
camera conceal the fact that they quote.  
Fassbinder’s aim is to use the performing body and the actors’ utterances as a 
means of investigating the social and political aspect of every-day relationships, without 
resorting to a typage that flattens out the social contradictions. Elena Del Rio suggests that 
Fassbinder’s use of the performing body brings together Brecht’s concept of the social 
gestus with a performative excess that characterises Antonin Artaud’s theatre of cruelty. 
As she writes: 
 
Brecht’s legacy is instrumental in enabling Fassbinder’s films to produce a 
‘shock to thought’. However, Fassbinder conceives of this shock as a fully 
corporeal and performative process rather than a purely mental construct. Insofar 
as the image in Fassbinder is no longer attached to a stable referent, it ceases to 
reflect ‘external happenings’, becoming instead a sensuous surface that is 
nonetheless intense in its affective provocations.74  
 
 
This ‘corporeal shock’ described by Del Rio derives also from the fact that the body in 
conjunction with the spare dialogue does not mirror the characters’ emotions. On the 
contrary, the bodies are subject to an artificial/calculated movement. The combination of 
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artificiality with a stylised use of language shifts the interest from the reproduction of 
dramatic action motivated by psychology to the production of impersonal gestures that 
suspend the cause and effect linkage of the episodes.    
In The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant in particular, one can notice this effect in 
moments when the camera captures materials, such as Petra’s mannequin dolls and 
paintings that add a sense of cinematic excess and reinforce the film’s self-exhibitionistic 
aesthetics. There are moments that the resulting vignettes show nothing that promotes 
dramatic plot per se and are concerned with the investigation of corporeal connections and 
not with the presentation of linear dramatic actions. One should also notice the main 
character’s perception of her life as too tragic, an effect that heightens the film’s staging 
of itself as a performance. Theatricality, thus, permeates and destabilises the narrative 
and, as Elsaesser observes, the film creates a distance between the excessive mise-en-
scène that reflects the characters’ state of minds and the objective mise-en-scène of the 
camera.75 Thus, the camera does not function as an invisible observer of actions but 
becomes performative too, in the sense that it treats its captions as materials for 
exploration and not solely as events of dramatic importance. By analysing body language 
and verbal communication, the film turns upon itself and blurs the distinctions between 
life and performance, self and world, and develops a film narrative which stages itself as 
theatre and performance.  
Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder show eloquently the shift from a Brechtian to a 
post-Brechtian aesthetics. Their treatment of history follows Brecht’s valorisation of 
processes but in ways that do not lead to a dialectical maturation. Similarly, their 
emphasis on performativity and their use of the script as material in certain films leads to 
a radical separation of elements that asks us to rethink the way we watch films. Story 
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development and characterisation are downplayed in favour of a performative excess that 
favours the production of ruptures in the films’ narratives. Consequently, the articulated 
contradictions do not invite the audience to respond within a demarcated realm of 
signification.  
Locating von Trier in Post-Brechtian Cinema 
Similar to the aforementioned filmmakers, Von Trier’s films employ a representational 
strategy, which is not simply concerned with reproducing dramatic actions. What is 
notable is that some of his films, such as The Element of Crime (1984) and Europa 
(1991), The Antichrist (2009) follow Fassbinder and manipulate the spectacular aspects of 
the medium. Yet films, such as Epidemic (1987), The Idiots (1998) Dogville (2003) and 
Manderlay (2005) show a preference for cinematic austerity, while Dancer in the Dark 
(2000) combines austerity with spectacular musical scenes that interrupt the narrative. All 
his films use the cinematic elements to call the medium into question and open out the site 
of the films’ construction. In the next chapters, I suggest that like Brecht, he valorises the 
process over the finished product, with the view to instigating questions that cannot be 
answered within the limits of the films’ dramaturgy. The point of rupture is that he 
presents the audience with dialectical contradictions without pointing to any particular 
directions. This is something that I elaborate on in chapter two and four in which I 
compare von Trier’s narrative openness with Brecht’s and discuss the different political 
effects of this practice. The lack of narrative closure that characterises all of his films 
encourages the audience to become co-producers of meaning. In this way, the films 
become material thrown to the audience to be sorted out.  
This argument can be supported by the fact that von Trier leaves his films open to 
a variety of interpretations without claiming hermeneutical mastery of the objects. When I 
asked him about the lack of political correctness in his films, he responded that the aim of 
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his work is to avoid ‘the obvious’. As he says: ‘I think that people who see a film should 
have an opinion about it and form their own views and even protest against it’.76 Thus, 
von Trier’s work follows Brecht and proceeds to problematise the self-evident not only in 
dramaturgy but in the whole film-viewing experience. However, unlike Brecht, he does 
not share the former’s realist epistemology and the perception of the author/director as 
someone being in a privileged position of knowledge.  
Such an authorial uncertainty is communicated by means of a filmmaking process 
that privileges a visual rather than a text-bound dramaturgy. This is something that 
characterises the whole corpus of his filmography. In his first filmmaking attempts he 
strived for absolute control and precision in the filmmaking production. However, this 
absolute control did not favour the making of images that simply reproduced a script, 
while the relationship between sound and image was not necessarily harmonious. This is 
something that I explore in detail in the next chapter in which I discuss the Europa 
trilogy. In these films, the voice-over is used in a radical way that creates a disjunction 
between the speaking subject and language. Furthermore, this disjunction complicates 
chronotopical reality and the boundaries between past and present.  
Images of Relief [Befrielsesbilleder: 1982], his graduate film, is a prime example 
of an aesthetics that separates the voice from the speaking subject, a separation that casts 
doubt on the idea of the speaker being the originator of the spoken material. The film is 
the progenitor of the Europa trilogy and tells the story of a Nazi soldier betrayed by his 
Danish girlfriend the first day after the liberation of Copenhagen. Documented images of 
humiliation and violence towards suspected Nazi collaborators are followed by dream-like 
images accompanied by the German soldier’s voice-over. The effect is that the object 
appears as a quotation of antithetical materials that point to the limitations of 
representation. Consequently, the variety of stimuli has its effects on the portrayal of 
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history, which is not shown as a photographic reproduction of events, but as fragments 
that need to be assembled by the audience.  
This aesthetics of quotation interests me in this thesis and I am going to explore it 
in detail in the chapters that follow. In the Europa trilogy, which I discuss in the next 
chapter, this quotation of materials aims at provoking questions with respect to the 
opposition between the official history and aspects of it that have been overlooked. In The 
Element of Crime (1984), von Trier self-consciously quotes the film noir genre to produce 
a failed mystery story that defies any sense of linear development. The narrative consists 
of decomposed fragments that bring together historical references torn out of context with 
quotations from prominent films and literature verses. These references function as 
historical indices with which the audience is expected to interact.  
In Epidemic (1987), von Trier advances a representational strategy that 
incorporates the filmmaking process in the film’s fabula. The film appears as a quotation 
of its own making and this has its corollary on the portrayal of history, which appears as 
non-chronologically ordered material. Hence, Europa (1991), which deals explicitly with 
history and in particular with the post-war West-Germany, adopts formal strategies such 
as overt back-projections and superimpositions that express a dramaturgical scepticism 
regarding the medium’s ability to portray history. 
In the chapters that follow I intend to show that von Trier’s films are not simply 
concerned with the reduplication of actions, but hold in check the very limits of 
representation. The way he employs performativity is also particularly telling and can 
strengthen the understanding of von Trier as a post-Brechtian director. A careful 
examination of his camera-work since Breaking the Waves (1996) can illustrate this point 
more clearly. The careful and calculated composition of images is replaced by an interest 
in using the camera as an investigative tool. The intention, as he says, is to use the camera 
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as a means of finding things instead of framing material.77 One should also consider his 
preference for avoiding detailed rehearsals and allowing the actors to improvise while 
performing a character. Representation shifts from the reproduction of actions to an 
aesthetics of ‘showing’ the process of making a scene; the script turns into material for 
exploration, while the camera becomes a performative tool rather than a neutral agent. 
Again, this practice demonstrates von Trier’s indifference to treat the story as an end in 
itself.   
The reader may recall my aforementioned discussion of Straub’s/Huillet’s and 
Fassbinder’s use of the static camera to valorise the contradictions deriving from the 
performance of the actors. In the third chapter, I elaborate on this in detail and I discuss 
how von Trier uses the camera in a performative way that combines theatrical and 
aleatory material. Unlike Straub/Huillet and Fassbinder, von Trier is not interested in the 
production of calculated and over-rehearsed performances, but he allows his actors a 
certain degree of performative freedom. This objective is aided by his preference for a 
hand-held camera that restricts absolute control over the captured objects. By implication, 
emphasis is not placed solely on the outcome of the filming process, but on the very 
process of turning the material into a filmic object. With all the aforementioned points in 
mind, in the next chapters I proceed to discuss von Trier as a post-Brechtian director in 
order to reveal the dialectical aspect of his films. 
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Chapter 2 – Historical Fragments in the Europa Trilogy 
 
Introduction  
 
The main reason why the Europa trilogy should be the first of von Trier’s works I discuss 
is the fact that these films occur early in Lars von Trier’s oeuvre and open up new ways of 
representing the historical past and present. These films employ certain formal elements, 
such as loose dramaturgy, segmented plot and meta-filmic effects that can be identified in 
the rest of von Trier’s filmography. In this chapter, I am interested in analysing the ways 
that form complicates historical representation. I want to draw attention to the films’ 
interest in the European traumas of the past and identify the political implications of 
certain formal elements, such as the weak causal nexus of the portrayed events, the 
ambiguous temporality, and the films’ preference for a fragmented representation. On this 
basis, this chapter discusses the ways in which the films problematise narrative agency 
and historical time so as to generate defamiliarising effects that challenge the notion of the 
unified individual and the view of history as an ordered series of events. I suggest that the 
method is dialectical but defies the Hegelian perception of history as a completed whole. 
Teleological stories and linear patterns are abandoned in favour of non-chronologically 
ordered fragments that do not follow the strict narrative laws of dramatic cinema. As I 
proceed to show, this modus operandi may help us identify a historical portrayal that 
retains Brecht’s favouring of portraying history as transitional without sharing his 
forward-looking politics.   
Let us now offer a brief outline of the films. The first movie, The Element of 
Crime (1984) borrows stylistic elements from German Expressionism and the film noir 
genre. Epidemic (1987), a black and white film shot on location in Denmark and in 
Germany, plays a lot with the tension between documented and fictional material. Europa 
(1991) – like the first film of the trilogy – draws upon the cinematic tradition of film noir 
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and German Expressionism. In The Element of Crime, a police officer, Fisher (Michael 
Elphick), is hypnotised by a psychiatrist to go back to Europe, in order to reconstruct the 
facts of a case that he was in charge of, in which an unidentified person named Harry 
Grey committed murders of girls selling lotto tickets. The location is unspecified, but the 
names of the cities, some of the characters’ surnames and certain words, such as polizei 
instead of police, are in German. Furthermore, some allusions are made to German 
history, for example the appearance of a bunch of skinheads conducting a collective ritual 
and sporadic references to Auschwitz. 
References to German history and culture appear also in Epidemic, in which von 
Trier and his collaborator Niels Vørsel impersonate themselves in the process of making a 
film inspired by the plague that took place in Europe during the 14th century. Along with 
all the information that they collect from archives and museums, the characters decide to 
visit Cologne, in order to get material from contemporary history related to the bombing 
of Germany on the part of the allies. Throughout the film, images of their work in process 
appear on the screen without prior notice. The film within the film tells the story of Dr 
Mesmer an idealist (played by von Trier himself again), who wants to cure Europe from 
the plague and turns out to realise that he is the carrier of the disease. Finally, Europa 
deals explicitly with German history and in particular with the post-war period. Max von 
Sydow’s hypnotic voice-over addresses Leopold Kessler (Jean-Marc Barr) to go back into 
Europa, that is, Germany in 1945. Leo goes to post-War Germany and gets a job in 
Zentropa, a railway company owned by Max Hartmann, a former Nazi collaborator. After 
falling in love with Katarina Hartmann (Barbara Sukowa), Leo is embroiled in a Nazi 
terrorist conspiracy and faces Germany’s inability to erase its past.  
One has to acknowledge Niels Vørsel’s contribution to the trilogy, who has acted 
as a co-writer of the scripts. The films’ thematic interest in the traumas of the European 
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past reflect Vørsel’s interest in German history and art, which permeates his own writings, 
such as his radio play Transistor (1977), in which one of the characters says: ‘Jeg er ved 
at være forpulet træt af Europa’ [I am getting fucking tired of Europe].1 The fundamental 
idea of the Europa trilogy is that Europe is in a state of crisis. As von Trier says, ‘the 
three films are like a sketch painting of Europe that tells us much about the continent’.2 
The first film places emphasis on images of the ‘European’ (the exact location is 
unknown) landscape. The film has many references to Germany that can be identified in 
the expressionist aesthetics and the unmotivated allusions to the fascist past. In Epidemic, 
the narrative starts in Copenhagen but the characters have to return to the German space. 
With Europa, von Trier concludes the trilogy and locates the narrative in Germany year 
zero.  
As Peter Schepelern points out, for von Trier the word Europa stands for 
Germany. Germany is a repository of cultural elements and historical memories that have 
influenced contemporary Europe. As he says: ‘the central theme of the trilogy is first and 
foremost Europe that points to Germany and Nazi culture’.3 Elsewhere, von Trier explains 
that both he and Vørsel see Germany as Europe and states that their interest in Germany 
stems from the fact that German history and culture is both ‘dangerous’ and ‘beautiful’.4 
Von Trier’s equation of Europe with Germany is a very bold decision that has to do with 
the view of Germany as a country whose history and culture has produced visuals that are 
as powerful as a ‘drug’.5 In a way, Germany appears as the ‘crime scene’ where one is 
repeatedly asked to return, in order to understand the European past and present. 
Intertextuality plays an important role as well, since the films reference many films 
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 Play quoted in Peter Schepelern, Lars von Triers Film Tvang Og Befrielse (Rosinante: København, 
2000), p.126. 
2
 Ibid., p.126.  
3
 Ibid., p.126.  
4
 Ibid., p.127.  
5
 Ibid., p.124.  
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dealing with German history and Nazi culture. Another quotation by Schepelern can 
illuminate things further. 
 
The Europa trilogy is one of the great feats of European cinema in the so-called 
postmodern phase. These films are full of quotations from other films, from 
history and other ideas. It’s a fantastic cinematographic, historical and 
ideological puzzle, full of references.6 
 
The films also share some key thematic elements. In all of them, an idealist embarks on a 
trip to ‘save’ Europe and ends up causing a catastrophe. In this chapter, I discuss all the 
films but, unlike previous writings, I am very much interested in intensifying the 
historical dimension of the first two films. 
Let us now see the trilogy’s critical reception. Peter Schepelern, Caroline 
Bainbridge, Jan Simons and Linda Badley are amongst the critics that have discussed the 
three films in connection with each other. Schepelern has underscored the importance of 
seeing the films as part of a trilogy. He identifies similarities between the films and 
certain modernist writers such as Georges Perec, Ernst Jünger and James Joyce. He also 
discusses certain meta-effects, such as the back projections in Europa, and the appearance 
of the film’s title in Epidemic, as Brechtian devices. His analysis is very crucial for our 
understanding of the films.7  
Bainbridge is committed to an analysis of the films’ content rather than their form. 
She discusses issues of identity, ethics and ideology merging different authority figures, 
such as Althusser and Gramsci, to examine themes of power and hegemony as they 
appear in the films’ plot. Her focus on issues of plot makes her linger on the sphere of 
psychology, failing to connect her arguments with her overall discussions of politics and 
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 Ibid., pp.126-127. 
7
 Ibid., pp.58-60, p.104 and p.128.  
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ideology.8 Similarly, Linda Badley is more interested in issues of content and her formal 
discussion is mainly restricted to an analysis of the films’ intertextuality, something that 
has already been covered by Schepelern’s and Bainbridge’s books. Furthermore, her 
discussion of The Element and Epidemic does not strengthen the films’ historical 
dimension, while her analysis of Europa reduces the film’s politics to issues related to 
America’s imperialist role in the post-war Europe.9 
Conversely, Jan Simons develops a formal analysis comparing the unstable spatial 
and temporal relations in the films to the virtual reality of the video games. He is more 
focused on a postmodern investigation of the material emphasising the importance of the 
pastiche and eclectic quotation. What is not made clear in his analysis is the interrelation 
between aesthetics and politics. In a way, Simons connects the films’ unrepresentability 
with von Trier’s creativity, a line of argument that contradicts his postmodern rhetoric. 10  
This chapter argues that these three films have to be discussed in relation to one-
another, since they raise a set of questions regarding history and the medium’s relation to 
it. I suggest that von Trier stockpiles material from different historical temporalities so as 
to challenge the continuum of history. Moreover, the films problematise characterisation 
and present the individual as a product of forces that cannot be understood by psychology. 
In this way, both history and the individual are depicted in a dialectical way, but dialectics 
eschews synthesis. This line of argument will clarify my perception of the films under the 
rubric of the post-Brechtian. Before proceeding to an analysis of the films, I map out the 
difficulties in representing the past and investigate the ways in which history can be 
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 See Caroline Bainbridge, The Cinema of Lars Von Trier: Authenticity and Artifice (London, New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2007), pp.46-59.  
9
 See Linda Badley, Lars von Trier (Urbana, Chicago, Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 
pp.21-36 and pp.40-43.   
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represented politically. My intention is to lay out some important Brechtian ideas that are 
pushed further in the films under discussion.   
As I indicated in the previous chapter, directors such as Straub/Huillet and 
Fassbinder, who have consciously adopted a Brechtian aesthetics, intended to re-write 
history through the film medium, and go against the predominant historical hermeneutics. 
This understanding of representation as productivity, that is, as a destabilisation of 
tradition, is a pivotal aspect of Brechtian theory and practice. Brecht proposes 
estrangement as a means of overcoming the ‘naturalisation’ of social phenomena, and 
eliciting their historical function. Such a modus operandi acknowledges two very 
important factors. The first one lies in the Marxist belief that the appearance of the 
historical phenomena does not provide us with an understanding of the workings of 
history. It is only by means of a theoretical reconstruction and re-viewing of the facts that 
historical effects can be appreciated and understood. The second one is based upon the 
notion of the historical past and present being nothing but an established narrative. Thus, 
viewed from a different angle, it can offer a different assessment and understanding of the 
workings of history. Hence, the representation of history becomes a matter of praxis, of 
transformation of the solidified narrative and in the utopian dimension of Brecht’s theory 
a transformation of the audience’s historical consciousness.  
Brecht’s refusal to reduce historical phenomena to ‘mere presence’, that is, to offer 
an additive reconstruction of historical events is indicative of his view of history as an 
active process and not as an authentic background. As he says: 
 
The field has to be defined in historically relative terms. In other words we must 
drop our habit of taking the different social structures of past periods, then 
stripping them of everything that makes them different; so that they all look 
more or less like our own, which then acquires from this process a certain air of 
having been there all along, in other words of permanence pure and simple. 
Instead we must leave them their distinguishing marks and keep their 
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impermanence always before our eyes, so that our own period can be seen to be 
impermanent too.11 
 
  
The impermanence of history is put forward through the representation of historical 
conditions, which, as Brecht suggests, are not mysterious forces in the background, but 
are manifested in the relations between individuals. In other words, history and the social 
state of affairs can be brought to the surface via a constant questioning of the individual 
and its place in it. Instead of showing characters operating in an authentic historical 
background, emphasis should be placed on posing questions that reveal the very 
historicity of human relationships.12 This feature does not treat history as a reflection of 
reality, but as a host of possibilities and an instigator for action. In other words, there is a 
sense of uncertainty/unrepresentability in Brecht’s work that aims at undermining the 
older certainties and showing historical reality as transitory.  
As I mentioned in the first chapter, the transition from modernism to 
postmodernism has complicated Brecht’s certainties and our ability to represent history. 
One important consequence of this crisis of representation is the complication of the 
distinction between historical facts and fiction. As Jean-Francois Lyotard explains, the 
spreading out of the media has reformulated the understanding of historical memory. The 
vast amount of information transmitted shapes the collective perception of the historical 
past and present. Yet the paradox is that in the last analysis, collective memory is 
nobody’s memory. ‘But ‘“nobody”’ here means that the body supporting that memory is 
not an earth-bound body’.13 Postmodernism, therefore, takes uncertainty as a given 
element of contemporary reality and the dialectic between the individual and history is 
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 Bertolt Brecht, ‘A Short Organum for the Theatre’, in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an 
Aesthetic, ed. and trans. by John Willet (New York, London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 179-205, here p. 190.  
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 Ibid, p. 191.  
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 See Jean- François Lyotard, ‘Time Today’, in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoffrey 
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp.58-77, here p.64.  
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complicated, since history appears as an impersonal structure, which cannot be explained 
by means of human agency.  
 The dialectic between the individual and history constitutes one of the major 
tenets of Brecht’s Marxist view of history and his critique of historical transcendence. 
Historical reality and the individual are not shown as given but as subject to constant 
change. This stress on changeability serves the purpose of revealing the possibility of 
transforming the established political reality. The fundamental condition is that human 
beings have to perceive themselves as products and producers of history. Historical reality 
appears as self-evident and, as Marx says, individuals need to realise their potential to 
become active participants in the making of history.14 For Brecht, the Marxist dialectic 
operates as a means of investigating human relationships and revealing their dependence 
on structures and forces that are not visible. Brecht’s view of history as Marxist science is 
founded upon the principle that capitalism produces the historical conditions for its own 
defeat.  
In other words, Brecht’s epistemology is grounded in the belief that by 
understanding the world dialectically, one can comprehend history and change social 
reality. This is the point of rupture between von Trier’s depiction of history and Brecht’s. 
I argue that von Trier follows Brecht’s refusal to offer an ‘additive method’ in the 
portrayal of history and prioritises historical/social forces over the view of subjects as the 
sole historical agents. On the other hand, the Europa trilogy aspires to think history in 
terms of Benjaminian constellations that do not share Brecht’s understanding of history as 
the route to human emancipation and progress. I argue that these constellations offer a 
materialist view of history that negates the conformist understanding of the past historical 
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 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, trans. by W. Lough, ed. by C.J. Arthur 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p.48.  
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catastrophes as aberrations. The concept of history as a heterogeneous temporality which 
resists teleological progress has been theorised by Walter Benjamin. As he says: 
 
The concept of the historical progress of the mankind cannot be sundered from 
the concept of its progression through a homogeneous empty time. A critique of 
the concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the 
concept of progress itself.15 
  
Benjamin’s argument is in line with a dialectical view of history that is not restricted by 
Marxist teleology, something that characterises the work of certain post-Brechtian 
practitioners in film and theatre. The works of Straub/Huillet, Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, 
Alexander Kluge and Heiner Müller are some important pieces of evidence of such a 
representation of history, which does not propose any unambiguous solution for human 
emancipation. These directors follow Brecht’s favouring of discontinuity and 
fragmentation but they deny the logic of the Brechtian Fabel, which strives to produce a 
unified meaning out of the collision of different fragments. The Fabel is no longer the 
central driving element; productivity emanates from the production of shock-effects that 
intend to reveal how the historical present is saturated with practices and conventions 
from the past. In light of the aforementioned thoughts, I proceed to discuss the Europa 
trilogy under the rubric of the post-Brechtian. I suggest that the films employ the 
‘presentational’ mode of narration, and in particular Brecht’s preference for quoting 
cinematic materials, gestures and genres. Furthermore, all films complicate the 
representation of the individual and its relation to history. My argument sets out to sketch 
how the films’ complication of historical reference discloses the epistemological break 
between representation and history and goes beyond Brecht’s view of history as a positive 
movement.  
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Accumulation of Visual and Narrative Materials  
One important starting point regarding the first film of the trilogy is the way it fuses a 
variety of voices and images that do not necessarily have a precise story-telling function. 
Moreover, the film’s dialogue with various films and genres, which allude to the 
European legacy of fascism, downplays dramaturgy and favours images at the expense of 
plot. On a narrative level, stories interlock within stories and render narrative agency 
problematic. Thus, the audience is confronted with a multiplicity of perspectives that 
prevent the viewer from being anchored to a character’s point of view. In this manner, the 
film refuses to subordinate historical representation to a synecdochic articulation of the 
narrative, that is, to a duplication of an individual story that reflects history in its entirety. 
The film accumulates visual and acoustic materials that dispute the linear and self-
sufficient cinematic representation of history. This aesthetics produces a variety of voices 
and incompatible materials. The valorisation of disintegration over unity questions not 
only the unity of the fictive world but of the extra-filmic reality too. 
Let us first see how many filmic materials resonate polyphonically within the 
film’s narrative. In The Element of Crime action takes place somewhere in Europe which 
appears as a locus of traumatic memories. The film offers glimpses of history that do not 
solidify into a coherent narrative. There is no precise temporal and geographical 
specificity, while the narration consists of intertextual references and images that allude to 
the European legacy of fascism. During the shooting of the film, von Trier discussed the 
film’s Brechtian presentational mode of narration. He stated that the film is like a ‘picture 
book film’, which places emphasis on the act of ‘showing’, as if telling the audience: 
‘here you see a house’.16 As I stated in the first chapter, the act of ‘showing’/quoting an 
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 Von Trier quoted in, Ennenstadt Europa Uncredited director (Petra Film and Hasner TV and Film, 
1984) on [DVD]. 
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action instead of imitating it, as well as the exposition of the devices of fiction, is 
Brechtian per se. This emphasis on a type of narration which privileges ‘showing’ over 
‘telling’ minimises psychological motivation, since as Seymour Chatman explains what 
interests the narrator is the presentation of conflicts and of the narrating devices instead of 
narrative causality.17 In this film, von Trier employs this strategy so as to go beyond a 
mimetic representation of history. As he says: 
 
We are trying to get the most out of the pictures we are showing. We are trying 
to incorporate as much history into them as possible. We’ve employed a 
futuristic set which is very patinated. And everything in the film has a history 
which is also patinated. A chair tells you how it’s used through its patina. If you 
transfer the idea to the landscape you can tell how the landscape has been used 
through its patina. The same goes for the people. Their patina will tell you how 
they’ve lived their lives.18  
 
 
History, therefore, does not emerge solely out of the script but through certain metaphors 
and allegories created by means of visual effects and intertextual references. Amongst 
them one can identify Resnais’ Last Year at Marienband (1961), Godard’s Alphaville 
(1965) and Tarkowsky’s Stalker (1979). These references are used as a set of historical 
materials and are not simply part of a postmodern pastiche aesthetics. 19 In other words, 
von Trier treats these intertextual references as materials which merit historical 
reassessment and re-evaluation, and not as recycled ‘dead styles’ and objects. Far from 
the postmodern view that the historical referents have vanished altogether, the 
employment of these references as historical materials suggests that by going back to the 
historical/cinematic past we can get a better understanding of the contemporary present.20  
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As von Trier admits, in many respects the film ‘is a film about film’.21 The 
manipulation of German Expressionism and film noir results in a sort of apocalyptic 
decay that at a first viewing can lead someone to see the film as an aestheticisation of 
desolation.22 In my estimation, this aesthetics is interested in producing temporal and 
geographical defamiliarisation, opening old wounds from the past and reflecting on the 
contemporary seemingly ahistorical reality. The genres that the film manipulates are well-
known for their association with the traumas of fascism. Siegfried Kracauer’s famous 
treatise suggested that German Expressionism’s interest in the madness that permeates 
authority reflected the collective German soul in the years that preceded fascism.23 Film 
noir, on the other hand, draws on the post-war traumas of fascism, showing a predilection 
for fatalistic narratives that frustrate the characters’ best intentions.24 Moreover, film 
noir’s critique of the capitalist social imaginary has been seen as a radical negation of the 
commodity culture and of the post-war narrative of historical progress.25  
Von Trier’s manipulation of these genres draws upon common clichés and 
stereotypes of authority, such as the police officer Kramer (Jerold Wells) who stands for a 
pro-Nazi image, which is suggestive of an authoritarian figure. Moreover, the story of 
Fisher, who goes back to Europe with the best intentions and turns out to become part of 
the reality he negates, is evocative of film noir’s fatalistic narrative patterns. The crisis of 
individual freedom preoccupies von Trier’s film and the collision of different narrative 
levels goes against the very notion of the monadic subject. Previous readings of the film 
have not highlighted this point. For instance, Badley suggests that the film’s stylisation is 
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not interested in historical representation, but in the depiction of the central character’s 
‘subjective vision’.26 Yet the film employs narrative and visual tropes that contradict the 
very idea of the autonomous individual.  
Critical here is the emphasis on the European landscape at the expense of 
dramatisation. The landscape acquires a voice of its own and fuses contradictory voices 
and images. As von Trier admits, people appear as part of the scenography and not as 
characters.27 The European landscape becomes a canvas, in which von Trier combines 
cultural stereotypes with inconclusive images that allude to the European history. Thus, 
the landscape becomes a dehumanised place, which interlocks visual fragments from 
nature, history and culture. This visual pre-eminence of the landscape leaves little room 
for a unified subjectivity and puts forward the primacy of historical forces. On this basis, 
the emphasis on debris and natural disaster points to a post-Enlightenment era, in which 
the mythologies that accompanied the age of reason have been invalidated in the course of 
history.  
The employment of ‘landscape images’ as a means of putting forward the primacy 
of historical forces has been utilized by post-Brechtian directors in film and theatre too. 
Syberberg in his film Hitler: a Film for Germany [Hitler – Ein Film Aus Deutschland, 
1977] uses the landscape as a theatre of history, in which images and figures from the past 
and the present are amalgamated. Certain critics understand this formal element as part of 
a ‘post-histoire’ culture. 28 Unlike this reading, I suggest that the use of the European 
landscape as a canvas that accumulates antithetical materials does not imply that history 
‘has disappeared’. It is rather a different understanding of historical representation which 
denies the use of history as a backdrop for dramatic purposes. The purpose of such a 
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method is not the establishment of ‘historical truth’, but the proliferation of visual and 
aural constellations that reveal the discontinuity between past and present. This 
discontinuity exposes history as an active process but not as epistemology. 
The same applies to the theatre of Heiner Müller, in which the landscape does not 
function as a concrete historical background but as the locus, in which ‘“the nightmare of 
history’ emerges’”.29 Unattributed voices meet with figures from the European 
historiography and mythology offering an ever shifting perspective. This emphasis on the 
landscape draws upon the Marxist approach, according to which historical events can be 
seen in the light of conflicting forces and broader collective institutions and not as actions 
instigated by autonomous subjects. By implication, the landscape brings to the surface 
questions regarding the relationship between self and world, going beyond an 
anthropocentric view of history. Characters lose their pre-eminence and dissolve into 
linguistic and visual fragments. One is asked to consider whether the subject is thrown 
into history rather than being an active agent.  
The landscape in The Element of Crime has a similar function. It appears as a non-
place of cultural and historical fusion somewhere in Europe, in which characters speak 
English in accented language. An atmosphere of solipsistic withdrawal overrides dramatic 
forms of story development (figure 1). The result regarding the portrayal of characters is 
complicated given that the seemingly ahistorical depiction of Europe gives the impression 
that subjects are abolished altogether. Furthermore, the self-conscious incorporation of 
genre figures and the inter-textual references make the actors look as if they quote cultural 
stereotypes instead of embodying dramatic figures. This practice reinforces the 
questioning of individuality in relation to history, and the historical reality outside the 
world of images.   
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The most conspicuous example can be drawn from a scene in which Fisher meets 
Kramer. Here the landscape predominates over story development. As Fisher informs us, 
‘Europe lies dormant and everything seems very peaceful’. In the midst of a lengthy 
camera movement, the camera focuses on the natural environment, which is dilapidated – 
an effect that is heightened by the semi-sepia colour. Later on, a scene of police violence 
is followed by an image of a horse sinking inside the water. As Fisher and Kramer are 
walking to the scene of the crime, we see images of wretched people placed in beds, 
hammocks, and rooms that are surrounded by water. Another image of a dead horse sunk 
into the water emerges (figure 2) and the camera ends up in a sand hill that looks 
completely dissociated from the previous images (figure 3).  
Yet the voice-over constantly informs us that the place is Europe and the portrayed 
European landscape cannot be dissociated from the crime scenes. Europe appears as a 
permanent locus of crime and apathy. Following Fisher’s and Kramer’s visit into the 
crime scene, the ensuing frame heightens the sense of temporal and spatial uncertainty 
(figure 4). People are shown running in various directions and more images of dead 
horses are interlocked, while the extra-diegetic music intensifies the dream-style 
narration. Multiple fragments are attached and the audience’s eye cannot absorb them at 
once. What is particularly suggestive for the viewer is that the uncertainty communicated 
by the landscape intimates the film’s lack of interest in dramatic realism, showing 
preference for constellations infused with history instead of a historical accurate mise-en-
scène.  
Rosalind Galt’s study of contemporary European cinema refers to certain Italian 
films concerned with history, which have employed landscape images to suggest 
historical specificity, evoke a past historical period and trigger audience emotivity. She 
argues that films such as Cinema Paradiso (Tornatore: 1988), Mediterraneo (Salvatores: 
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1991) and Il Postino (Radford: 1994) employ landscape images to construct narratives of 
mourning and historical loss, which come as a response to the failure of the left 
aspirations of modernity.30 Galt argues that these films cannot be simply seen as 
‘nostalgia films’. However, their treatment of the Italian landscape as well as their 
employment of period film tropes communicate a feeling of nostalgia for a bygone era. 
Contrary to these nostalgic films, the landscape in The Element of Crime plays a different 
function, since its appearance is not simply narratively motivated and it does not provoke 
questions of national identity and specificity. Unlike period films that employ landscape 
images to erase any contradictions between nature, culture and history, von Trier creates a 
‘landscape effect’ which conveys a feeling of historical and cultural failure.  
Subsequently, the European landscape is not just a dramatic setting, but carries a 
meaning that exceeds character interiority and action. Despite Fisher’s attempts to solidify 
his memories into a concrete narrative, his view of Europe as a locus of traumatic 
memories predominates and infuriates his therapist (Ahmed El Shenawi), who repeatedly 
asks him to stay focused on the story. In this landscape, von Trier fuses cinematic and 
historical references, so as to voice a historical anxiety regarding the medium’s 
relationship to an ever-changing historical environment. Thus, one can understand von 
Trier’s predilection for visuals at the expense of plot as a means of addressing the crisis of 
referentiality.  
This crisis of referentiality can be brought to the surface via an examination of the 
accumulation of different narrative levels, which result in a collision of materials that fail 
to integrate into a concrete narrative structure. Questions of story development are 
minimised in favour of questions of narrative agency. In other words, the film’s unfolding 
leaves unanswered questions with respect to who is narrating to whom. Subjective 
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memory, textual/filmic references and collective historical memories overlap, 
problematising the main character’s capacity to map the world around him. That is why I 
propose a post-Brechtian reading and not a psychoanalytic one.31  
On the surface, The Element appears as a narrative that addresses individual 
memories. The film starts in Egypt and the main character Fisher is hypnotized by an 
Egyptian psychiatrist to go back into the past and assemble the pieces of a traumatic 
experience. In the frame story, Fisher is always absent and the therapist gazes at the 
camera addressing him and the audience simultaneously. As the therapist implies, what 
follows is the recounting of a subjective experience on the part of the main character. 
Fisher’s voice-over interjects the reality of the story-time with its recounting. The time of 
the story and the time of its narrating are intertwined. In effect, the relationship between 
individual and story becomes problematic. Fisher is a character in the story and an 
observer at the same time, something that is equivalent to Brecht’s understanding of 
acting. As I discuss later on, von Trier pushes things further to the extent that there are 
moments when one senses a radical separation between voice and body. As a result, 
voices are privileged over a unified identity.  
Fisher the narrator is the person who is asked to go back to Europe by means of 
hypnosis so as to clarify the traumatic past events and refamiliarise himself with the 
memories that cause him pain. In the film-within-the film, which is the re-visualisation of 
these memories, Fisher is the character whose pursuit of the serial killer Harry Grey 
becomes the film’s plot. Within the story another story intervenes, which is the theory of 
The Element of Crime, a book written by Fisher’s mentor, Osborne (Esmond Knight). 
According to the book, crimes can occur in a certain element and environment. Thus, the 
prerequisite for a successful discovery of a criminal is the pursuer’s identification with 
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her/him. In the end, a puzzling switching of identities takes place, since Fisher kills a girl 
he uses as a decoy to lay the killer in ambush. He turns out to assume the identity of the 
murderer and later on the identity of his mentor, who commits suicide having taken the 
responsibility for the killings.   
The switching of identities and the clash between different narrative levels creates 
a disjuncture between individual experience and pictorial representation, something that 
defies the films’ ostentatious narrative as the recounting of a subjective story. While 
Fisher is hypnotised in the frame story, a dream-style narration characterises for the most 
part the film’s narrative, in which von Trier presents many narrative layers. In his 
explanation, the reason for this is that ‘it’s all about trying to convey the fact that the 
world is so much more than a trite little story that’s inside the head of the film’s 
protagonist’.32  
The different story layers emanate from an aesthetics that polarises action and 
narrative voice. A prime example can be seen in the beginning of Fisher’s recollection, in 
which there is a disjunction between the image-track and the sound-track. Fisher says that 
he visits Europe again, but instead of a clearly identifiable and recognisable location we 
see images of dead horses (figure 5). What is clear beyond doubt is that these durational 
images are not establishing shots. Uncertainty is heightened by the voice-over, which 
does not aim at clarifying the visuals. Both the voice-over narration and the images play 
with the dialectic between ‘showing an action’ and telling, something that does not render 
the story-teller reliable.33 The disjunction between image and sound creates an audio-
visual collage that does not have a story-telling function. The figures of the dead horses 
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are accompanied by a quotation from The Rime of the Ancient Mariner on the part of the 
main character: ‘water, water everywhere and not a drop to drink’. Fisher’s quotation is 
interrupted by the therapist’s reprimand to stay focused on the story.  
Obviously, there is dissociation between the speaking utterances and the body of 
the narrator. In this regard, the role of hypnosis that provides a dream-style narration is 
crucial to our understanding of the disconnection between subject and language. The 
recounting of Fisher’s traumatic experience in Europe by means of hypnosis accords the 
narrative an element of artificiality, since the aesthetics of the dream is not based upon the 
experience of a concrete story. Conversely, the dream is always a quoted narrative, which 
cannot be attributed to a unified subject. As Michael Lambek explains: 
 
The experience of dreaming is not based upon a concrete, bounded narrative or 
image that we can then repeat verbatim; instead the telling replaces the dream. In 
other words, it is impossible to know where the images perceived or originating 
in sleep break off and those in waking life, elicited in what is ostensibly a 
reproduction but becomes its own creative process, begin. Once formulated in 
words, it is this version we remember, the representation, not the original 
experience. What we call the dream is actually the highly mediated retelling.34 
 
In light of these comments, one can perceive the film’s complex narrative as a 
representation revolving around quotation. The act of recollection replaces the 
authoritative narrative and refutes the notion of a unified identity. Another element that 
heightens ambiguity regarding the identity of the narrator is that, despite the fact that the 
film purports to be a subjective-flashback, the origin in the frame story is not Fisher, who 
is absent, but the therapist.  
Thus, the world that is narrated collides with the narrating process itself. At times, 
Fisher’s suspended critical abilities, which are the outcome of hypnosis, are transferred to 
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the main story and the very act of ‘witnessing’ is problematised. Fisher’s function as a 
narrative agent is called into question and the boundaries between the metadiegetic and 
the diegetic world are not clearly defined. As a result, different voices and stories overlap 
making the film look like an accumulation of materials that are not complete and clash 
with each other, consistently voiding them of their narrativistic function. Fisher’s voice-
over in the frame story is dissociated from the projected events and gives the impression 
that it is the instigator of movement, as if the character is reading a script, which is 
actualised on the screen. There are moments that the voice-over blends the frame story 
with his re-visualised memories making it hard to discern the character’s identity. Flash-
backs inside of flashbacks join together and the authority of a sovereign point of view is 
undermined. This formula de-individualises the narration, since flashbacks are used in 
such a way that access to character psychology is denied. Their function is not restorative 
or explanatory, as it is the case in a type of narration structured upon a cause and effect 
chain.  
Pam Cook explains the flashbacks’ function within a narrative, in which action 
springs from characters as causal agents. 
 
Flashback is a common way of articulating memory in classic cinema and its 
most usual form is a close-up on a character’s face or eyes, suggesting that we 
are entering their head or thoughts, followed by a scene that represents their 
recollection of something that happened to them in the past.35 
 
 
Recollection becomes a form of exorcism. The past is left behind and the individual is 
asked to move on, a formal choice that implies progress. One senses the difference 
between the paradigm described by Cook and The Element. Von Trier’s employment of 
recollection does not place the narrator in a superior position of knowledge. The act of 
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recollection is questioned and instead of re-enacting an inner subjective moment, it is the 
very act of narration that is rendered unreliable. This formulation is telling because von 
Trier adopts the mode of the art cinema as a historical material – one senses similarities 
with Alain Resnais – and proposes that the art cinema meditation on issues of historical 
reference is potentially as suspect as any mode of representation. 
Indicative of this practice is a scene in which Fisher re-enacts Grey’s trip to 
Friedingen. The camera remains stationary focusing on his girlfriend Kim (Me Me Lai). 
Meanwhile, Fisher’s voice-over is delivered in the third person and informs us about 
Grey’s trip and Kim’s (Grey’s former mistress) decision to join him. Here, the voice-over, 
and the voice on run concurrently. The audience is not aware whether it is the hypnotised 
Fisher in the frame story or the character in the main narrative who is speaking. The 
camera then moves away and captures Fisher, who is wearing different clothes and a hat 
with the initials H.G. Fisher looks at the lens saying: ‘Harry Grey’, making us assume that 
he is re-staging Grey’s trip that took place three years ago. From then on, the voice-over is 
delivered in the first person. ‘I have waited half an hour for you. The bus is late’. When he 
asks Kim whether she has missed him, she responds ‘you know I like to see you’. Fisher 
corrects her ‘you know I like to see you Harry’ something that she is asked to repeat. 
Subsequently, the characters look as if they are quoting a script and the 
temporality of the plot is radically undermined. These transpositions from the third person 
voice-over narration to the first one and then back to the plot line, where the narrative 
seems to be a self-conscious restaging of Grey’s experiences, create a disjunction between 
the image-track and the soundtrack. The scene creates a distance between actors and 
characters, since the roles that they perform are complicated. Agency is problematised and 
one cannot ascertain whether it is Fisher or Grey who is the narrative agent. Here, von 
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Trier prioritises voices and images over concrete characterisation and narrative, a formal 
choice that can be identified in postmodern ‘memory’ plays.36  
The fact that the characters give the impression of quoting a script confounds 
matters more. The topos of reading from scripts when they purport to illuminate the 
fictional characters’ experiences raises questions with respect to identity and authorship. 
The characters speak as if their words are reported by someone else and given that the 
film deals with recollection, one is asked to consider whether there is such a thing as a 
unified subject that can act as the locus of recall. On this account, the voice-over does not 
follow the logic of the omniscient narrator of the 19th century novel, who can address a 
series of clearly composed events. When it comes to authorship, the audience is asked to 
re-think the validity of the text as a means of addressing the historical trauma and the role 
of the director as the person in the seat of knowledge.  
Epistemological Uncertainty 
Not surprisingly, the crisis of authorship is a theme that preoccupies the film thematically. 
Osborne’s text, The Element of Crime, appears quite often on screen, while Osborne 
himself is shown in televisual images advocating a scientific explanation of crime. In one 
of those moments, Osborne is accompanied by two men dressed in SS uniforms, a 
stylistic element that alludes to the European history of fascism. In a press-conference he 
proceeds to provide a scientific explanation of crime (figure 6) and explains that ‘The 
Element of Crime is a method based on a reconstruction of a known part of a criminal’s 
life’. The role of this commentary seems to be dual: it addresses the character Fisher and 
the audience at the same time, providing a tip-off for the film’s interpretation. However, 
the unfolding of the narrative contradicts Osborne’s scientific account and his text fails to 
provide an accurate explanation. 
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The crime that Osborne’s method aspires to comprehend is an allegory for the 
European historical traumas. It is not difficult to intimate the parallels between the crime 
and the wounds of the past. Evidence of this association is offered by the visual 
paraphernalia that refer to the Nazi culture and the unmotivated references to Auschwitz 
that appear in the film, and in particular at one point that Fisher visits a forensic surgeon 
to get evidence from the post-mortem results. But it is mainly the idea of Europe being a 
locus of traumatic memories which confirms the link between the crime and history. To 
return to Osborne’s theory, the text’s (The Element of Crime’s) failure opens up issues of 
representation and demonstrates the epistemological break between fiction and history. In 
the same way that Osborne’s book fails to help Fisher understand and find Grey, the hints 
given by the story line are unable to connect with its visual actualisation. In the end, the 
merging of the identity of the policeman with the criminal and the scientist point to an 
historical era of epistemological uncertainty. Science and authoritarianism are not shown 
as antithetical but as the two sides of the same coin. Out of all the perspectives that have 
appeared throughout the film’s narrative, none of them is vested with validity. Fisher’s 
humanism, Osborne’s scientific reasoning, and Kramer’s authoritarianism clash and are 
shown as equally problematic.   
The result is that various levels of meaning and associations coexist, while none of 
them is privileged by the director. It is fair to conjecture that the failure of The Element of 
Crime – the text within the film – to provide an accurate explanation for the European 
trauma becomes a self-reflexive comment on von Trier’s modus operandi. Fisher follows 
Osborne’s method until the end, but the text and its scientific rhetoric do not succeed in 
offering a unified interpretation of the series of crimes. On one occasion, we see Fisher 
contemplating while the pages of the text are scattered around the landscape. The text in 
the film’s narrative demonstrates scepticism regarding the understanding of the text – and 
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as an extension of the author and the script – as the repository of truth. This point raises 
issues of authorial and epistemological uncertainty.  
A narrative that intends to communicate a certain amount of knowledge to the 
audience is structured upon the basis that the spectator absorbs and imitates certain ideas 
transmitted by someone who is placed in a privileged position of knowledge. As Edward 
Branigan explains:  
 
In a communication theory of narrative the narration of a story assumes a literal 
sense. An author translates knowing into telling followed by a spectator who 
reconverts the telling into knowing. The attitude or the viewpoint of the author 
or at least some species of narrator is transmitted with minimal resistance 
(lessened by the critic) to the viewer. The outcome of the quasi-conversation is 
knowledge about reality, inflected by the author’s or narrator’s view of it. 37 
 
 
Branigan’s comments can help us identify the difference between the metaphysical 
perception of the artist, who is in a privileged position of knowledge compared to his 
audience, and von Trier’s epistemological uncertainty. Von Trier’s aesthetics of 
fragmentation does not communicate knowledge and this can clarify my argument that his 
representation of history can be seen under the rubric of the post-Brechtian. Unlike 
Brecht, the fragments are not used as a means of leading the audience to a reformed view 
of reality that is structured upon a specific doctrine of knowledge. The fragments 
crystallise antithetical elements that do not follow each other with dialectical precision. 
The audience is confronted with a dialectical plenitude devoid of a pregiven 
hermeneutical designation. The various levels of narration do not cohere, a formal choice 
that demonstrates an inability to deal adequately with the trauma of history.  
It is fair to suggest that the plot in the film comes as an afterthought, something 
that can be seen in some scenes that we expect an illumination of the events. Instead, the 
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characters seem to quote lines without a story-telling function; one senses a complete 
dissociation between the speakers and their utterances. For instance, when Fisher goes to 
the crime scene to get information for the first murder, he meets with a bunch of kids that 
start reciting ‘Oranges and Lemons’. This nursery rhyme is used in George Orwell’s 
famous novel 1984 as a reference to issues of historical amnesia. This intertextual 
reference is not accidental and indicates the film’s interest in issues of memory and the 
collective European history. Later, when Fisher meets Kim for the first time she starts 
reciting ‘The House that Jack Built’ instead of introducing herself, making the 
relationship between sound and image quite perplexed.  
Consequently, language does not emerge in a verisimilar way from the story. 
Given that the film is concerned with Europe as a locus of traumatic memories, the 
outcome of the accumulation of disconnected materials demonstrates a preference for 
avoiding a unified historical narrative.38 What appears instead is fragments that subvert 
the storyline and fuse different temporalities. Therefore, the clashes between images and 
words do not simply refer to the limits of the character’s memory but to the inadequacy of 
representation to express the trauma of European history. History intrudes in the film’s 
narration in the form of flashes, and one example can be drawn from a scene, in which, 
while Fisher is laying the murderer in ambush, we hear someone whistling Lili Marleen, 
the German song that became popular during the World War II. The song is also an 
indirect reference to Fassbinder’s homonymous film and demonstrates von Trier’s 
hyperawareness of the European arthouse cinema tradition concerned with history.  
Such a fragmented manifestation of history is firmly professed in a scene towards 
the end of the film. When Fisher assumes the identity of Grey and murders the girl, the 
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camera exhibits its indifference to the professed narrative resolution and captures a 
narratively unmotivated suicidal ritual conducted by a group of skinheads. In the 
beginning of the sequence, this group is shown in a pool singing a military song. Later on, 
we see them being brutally attacked by a policeman (figure 7). Meanwhile, a skinhead 
performs the suicidal ritual (figure 8, 9). Here, the outwardly important story development 
is deliberately shifted into the margins, and the ritual performs a deliberate pause in the 
narrative, which has a shock-effect on the audience. 
This ritual does not develop the storyline nor does it follow the rules of narrative 
continuity. The skinheads’ appearance operates as an intrusion of the traumatic past, as 
hallucinatory fragments of European history. What makes the scene more problematic is 
that the arrangement of the images does not suggest historical reconstruction; rather 
chaotic memory seems to be at work here. The images refer to the wounds of the fascist 
past. They are placed in a non-specific landscape and are left to the audience to construct 
meaning out of them. At this point, the camera ignores Fisher’s point of view, despite the 
fact that we are given the impression that the mystery has been resolved. What occurs is a 
disturbance in the plot and once again the viewer is asked to reconsider who is the 
narrative agent.  
Thus, the film’s treatment of the public sphere of history builds upon Brecht’s 
distrust of the ideology of the visible. The difference lies in the fact that history does not 
appear as a concrete material reality but as an arrangement of antithetical signs. The 
appearance of history as non-chronologically ordered images is interconnected with a 
historical reality, in which a systematic all-encompassing method, including the Marxist 
meta-narrative (in the form of historical determinism), cannot account for the historical 
past and present. History is presented as an accumulation of fragments and heterogeneous 
elements that resist systematisation and narrative order. In this context, the emergence of 
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fragments that allude to the historical past in The Element are in line with Benjamin’s 
understanding of the dialectical image as ‘“involuntary memory”’ that does not perceive 
history in a chronological arrangement. For Benjamin, the dialectical image valorises 
sequential ‘“disorder”’ so as to change the way the past has been inherited and its relation 
to the contemporary present. Benjamin’s stress on historical discontinuity intended to 
clarify the revolutionary potential of the present. In The Element, von Trier does not 
pronounce such a potential clearly, but what one shall retain from Benjamin when looking 
at the film, is the understanding of the historical fragment as ‘“a precise dialectical 
problem that the present is called upon to resolve”’.39 
The aesthetics of the fragments that resist unity and coherence poses problems in 
relation to issues of representation and spectatorship. In its proliferation of visual and 
aural signs The Element requires a new mode of perception in which the audience is no 
longer required to reconfirm a predetermined theory, or a specific scientific conclusion. 
They are asked to concentrate on the film’s production of images, signs and intricate 
constellations, which do not converge at a single point. Fisher’s recounting of ‘the facts’ 
fails, since neither he nor the audience manage to acquire specific information that leads 
to narrative closure. The plurality of voices and the intrusion of history in the form of 
disjunctive images and references deprive the narrative of an authoritative point of view.  
The film exhibits a postmodern suspicion towards the ideology of presence, but 
this aspect does not necessarily set off an apolitical postmodern hermeneutics. In the first 
chapter, I developed Brecht’s idea that photographic realism works out to naturalise one’s 
perception of social reality. Brecht did not see any merit in representing history as a 
closed series of events, because he was not concerned with offering a detailed portrayal of 
what happened in the past. He was rather more concerned with asking what could have 
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happened in the past under different circumstances and how the past can be seen as 
historically specific, so as to make the audience explore the ways that the present can be 
changed.  
In The Element, von Trier shares Brecht’s mistrust of an empirical historical 
reproduction. The accumulation of different voices and unconnected images from the 
European past, which are torn out of context, refutes the illusion of a self-contained 
historical world. Von Trier is aware of the medium’s limited capacity to exhibit the 
historical and social processes that take place at the level of the masses. Thus, in its 
refusal to reduce the traumatic European past to an ordered narrative, the film goes 
beyond the Orthodox Marxist approach to historical evolution, which linked the 
representation of the past to human-knowledge and emancipation.40 The audience is asked 
to co-produce so as to place the shown images in the present and work through collective 
repressed memories that cannot be enclosed within the fictive cosmos.  
The determining question here is whether von Trier’s treatment of history 
proposes a post-histoire reading, or whether the film’s valorisation of uncertainty can be 
understood dialectically. I have been arguing in favour of the latter hermeneutics, but in 
order to elucidate this line of argument, one needs to explain that the abandonment of the 
view of history as a completed whole does not necessarily imply a postmodern 
disappearance of history. History persists throughout the film but not as a drama. The 
relegation of history to a dramatic narrative implies teleology, reconciliation and historical 
determinism, which are the opposite of a dialectical view of history as an active process of 
perpetual transitions. On this basis, von Trier organises the film’s diegesis upon visual 
fragments that stockpile points of tension which put forward the persistence of history. 
The film’s formal abstraction and its radical portrayal of different historical sequences 
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propose that the trauma of history persists and without practical activity our contemporary 
present appears as the compulsive repetition of past events.  
Epidemic: Literalization of the Medium. The Essay as Film Form 
Epidemic, the second part of the trilogy, is also concerned with the chasm between history 
and its representation. This chasm is heightened by the film’s quotation of its own 
making, which makes one rethink the relationship between history and dramaturgy. The 
film was shot without a crew and for the most part von Trier and Vørsel acted in front of 
an ‘unmanned’ camera. The initial script was one page long and in a way the film 
foreshadows von Trier’s fondness for a more ascetic aesthetics. As Schepelern explains, 
‘Epidemic’s interest in delivering art of limited financial means and non-complex film 
technique anticipates von Trier’s ascetic Dogme project’.41 This preference for cinematic 
austerity is also strengthened by the Manifesto that accompanied the film’s release, in 
which von Trier argues in favour of a naïve cinematic style that he equates with the 
bagatelle. ‘The bagatelle is humble and all-encompassing. It reveals creativity without 
making a secret for eternity. Its frame is limited but magnanimous, and therefore leaves 
space for life’.42 What one needs to point out is the linkage between naiveté and 
experimentation, something that brings us back to Brecht. For Brecht, a naïve attitude is 
the synonym for an experimental approach towards art and reality which aims at 
rendering the ‘obvious’ and the ‘self-evident’ problematic.43 To return to Epidemic, the 
film’s dramaturgical simplicity inaugurates von Trier’s new approach towards dramaturgy 
and his preference for simple and less-complicated narratives.  
This section discusses how the film’s combination of dramaturgy with the process 
of its own making reveals the means by which the filmmakers employ historical materials 
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and anecdotes as a means of complicating historical representation. The film starts with 
von Trier and Vørsel realising that the script for The Cop and the Whore (reference to The 
Element of Crime), which they want to propose for funding, has been lost. From their 
dialogue, we get to know that they perform themselves and not fictional characters. After 
having mutually agreed that they prefer to make something more ‘dynamic’, they decide 
to write a new screenplay called Epidemic, which deals with the Black Death that ravaged 
Europe during the 14th century. Thus, the filmmakers impersonate themselves. In this 
way, they are split in two. They act as characters in the story and perform themselves in 
the process of their filming. 
The effects are dual regarding the narrative agents and the story. The characters 
fluctuate between being and not being the filmmakers, whereas the process of the 
filmmaking merges with the process of the filmmakers’ quotation of themselves.44 This 
contradiction pushes forward Brecht’s understanding of acting, in which a historical 
subject plays an actor, playing a character. Here, the emphasis is on an acting ‘that shows’ 
rather than on the actor’s disappearance into the character (figure 10). But there are 
moments in which it is impossible to determine whether the pauses in the action, which 
show the characters thinking about their project, are acted or real. The defamiliarising 
effect is heightened by the fact that von Trier performs Dr. Mesmer, the central character 
of the film-within-the-film. Certainly there are moments in the film, such as the 
employment of extra-diegetic music or the appearance of the film’s title in the screen, 
which destabilise authenticity.  
In effect, the meta-level and the diegetic one collide. When it comes to the story, 
the effect is that the story development and the process of the film’s construction are 
given equal weight. The interjection of the film-within-the-film – the filmmakers’ 
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visualisation of their work in progress – complicates matters more, since the ‘imagined’ 
film appears without any introduction. Subsequently, the process of the film-within-the 
film production is blended with fragments of its actualisation on screen. What we have is 
not a concrete fictive cosmos but an exploration of the ways in which the very act of 
representation takes place. We are clearly dealing here with what Gérard Genette defines 
as ‘narrative metalepsis’, which plays on the temporality of the story and the narrating at 
the same time.45 The film’s emphasis on the process of its making reflects its treatment of 
history too. The illusion that we are able to formulate the question of historical 
representation objectively and from a superior position of knowledge is denied.  
A closer look at a sequence in the beginning of the film can clarify this argument. 
While researching for material regarding the 14th century epidemic, the two filmmakers 
visit a museum, in which a Danish historian gives them some information regarding the 
specific historical period. Initially, the camera pans on the library shelves, while the 
historian’s voice is heard saying: 
 
Fathers left their children. Wives left husbands. Brother left brother. For the 
disease attacked both through breathing and sight. Thus they all died. No one 
would bury them at any price. Family members dragged their dead to open 
graves without benefit of clergy, eulogy or tolling of bells. Throughout Siena 
mass graves were buried with victims. I Agnolo di Tura called the Fat one 
buried my five own children with my own hands. Some were covered with such 
a thin layer of dirt that dogs dug up their bodies and fed on them. 
 
 
While the camera focuses on the library shelves, we can hear the historian’s voice in the 
background and later on the camera establishes a connection with the speaking subject 
through a close-up of his face (figure 11). At this point, we come to realise that the 
historian is reading a letter written by one of the victims of the plague, therefore, he is 
quoting. The letter is read by the historian in a very detached and de-dramatised way 
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without however weakening the intensity of the delivered lines. This de-dramatisation 
synopsises the film’s interest in avoiding a fetishisation of history. Agency is again 
problematised, since the collection of historical witnessing and material becomes part of 
the film’s thematic preoccupations. Correspondingly, Epidemic consists of many 
heterogeneous stories that join with the filmmakers’ thinking process regarding their 
project.   
The film’s complex narrative structure defies dramatisation in a manner, which is 
analogous to Brecht’s suspicion of the reconstruction of historical events for dramatic 
ends. As I mentioned in the opening of this chapter, Brecht’s distrust of reconstructing 
historical events for the sake of dramatic purposes was predicated on the basis that such a 
practice separates the portrayed event from the audience’s reception of it. Brecht’s 
intention was to force the audience to think about ‘a subject’ and not ‘within the confines 
of the subject’.46 If we have a look at contemporary scholarship concerned with cinematic 
portrayals of history, we can see that there is a tendency to suspect any productive effect 
from a dramatisation of historical events and in particular of events that raise ethical 
questions, such as the Holocaust. As Hayden White says: 
 
Telling a story, however truthful about such traumatic events might very well 
provide a kind of ‘intellectual mastery’ of the anxiety which memory of their 
occurrence may incite in an individual or a community. But precisely insofar as 
the story is identifiable as a story, it can provide no lasting psychic mastery of 
such events.47 
 
 
White explains that the portrayal of problematic historical events by means of linear 
narrative reconstruction produces a fetishisation of the event and gives a totalising sense 
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of ‘“intactness”’. The historical incidents are not historicised and the drama is given more 
prominence rather than any attempt to unveil historical processes and contradictions.  
In its structuring of the diegesis as a work-in-progress, Epidemic avoids placing 
emphasis on the dramatic narrative, and the film is concerned with the medium itself and 
the ways that history can be portrayed. Most critics considered the film’s interest in the 
process of its own making as uncinematic. The Danish Press suggested that Epidemic 
looks more like a ‘study’ than a film, or like ‘style exercises’.48 To a large extent, these 
responses can be attributed to the fact that the film avoids the reconstruction of a realistic 
mise-en-scène in which all the episodes solidify. Even at the moments that the narrative 
moves from the story to the film-within-the-film, von Trier denies a photographic 
reproduction of the horror caused by the epidemic.  
For instance, the first scene of the film-in-process shows Dr. Mesmer, facing 
animosity on the part of the scientific intelligentsia due to his decision to leave the 
fortified town so as to try to find a cure for the epidemic. The scene is very stylised and 
the actors deliver their lines in a very theatricalised way that point to the film’s 
construction. Through this scene, we get to know the basic outline of the film within the 
film, which is the story of an idealist doctor who wants to help Europe find a cure for the 
epidemic, but he turns out to be the carrier of the disease. What is important for the 
audience is the contrast between the main story and the film in process. The first one is 
characterised by formal austerity, while the latter by excessive artificiality. This first shift 
from the main story to the film-within-the-film is also important because the director’s 
historical research is followed by dramatisation. In effect, the gap between the researched 
material and its dramatisation is heightened, and one cannot avoid noticing the medium’s 
limited ability to deal with traumatic historical memories.  
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The narrative of the film-within-the-film story remains incomplete and it is by no 
means privileged in relation to the process of the film’s construction. The filmmakers are 
not hesitant to capture themselves thinking about the making of their film. In one of the 
most provocative scenes, we see them discussing their project and von Trier recommends 
that at some point they should add some drama, because the audience will consider 
leaving the auditorium. Here, this comment makes one consider the relations between 
dramaturgy and history, and whether dramatisation serves the purpose of historical 
understanding.  
The aforementioned scene brings profoundly into question issues of 
representation. The incorporation of the filmmakers’ thinking process about the film in-
process invites the audience to think beyond the confines of the story and to adopt a more 
critical stance. The effect is that a certain ‘literalization’ of the medium takes place. 
Brecht introduced the idea of ‘literalizing the theatre’, a process committed to changing 
the apparatus. This ‘literalization’ intends to prioritise the changing of the institution of 
theatre over its story-telling function. For Brecht, this change was of vital importance 
because, as he says, ‘theatre theatres all down’ to serve economic reasons, that is, to 
preserve an established apparatus.49    
The process of ‘literalization’ becomes a means of taking issue with the medium 
itself rather than with the very story-telling process. Brecht justifies this shift of interest 
on the grounds that the audience will be able to think beyond the limits of the story. To 
achieve this effect, Brecht advocated a play-writing that would resort to ‘footnotes and the 
habit of turning back in order to check a point’.50 His aim was to encourage a reading 
attitude in the auditorium, which would prevent the audience from being completely 
absorbed by dramatic action. In Epidemic, an analogous process occurs, because the 
                                                          
49
 Brecht, ‘The Literalization of Theatre’, p.44.  
50
 Ibid., p.44.  
104 
 
discussions about the medium and von Trier’s and Vørsel’s commentaries on the 
filmmaking process are given the same importance as the visual elements. Here the 
filmmakers seem to take Brecht’s suggestion word for word, since the structure of the 
film does not allow the audience to follow the story without considering how dramaturgy 
is constructed. Therefore, the minimisation of dramaturgy makes the film medium and 
history the very subjects that the audience is asked to dwell on.  
Brecht’s ideas on the ‘literalization’ of the medium have found their expression in 
the essay film genre. This category of films is associated with directors, such as 
Straub/Huillet, Alexander Kluge and Harun Farocki, who have consciously adopted an 
aesthetics of resistance. As Anton Kaes observes, these directors blend different materials, 
such as sounds, images, dialogue, and acting without integrating them into a coherent 
narrative that effaces the signs of its production.51 Following the Brechtian topos of self-
reflexivity, these films complicate the cause and effect linkage of the episodes with the 
view to introducing a level of imprecision that characterises literary language. As Kluge 
says, this practice aspires ‘to use language and film in an uncertain and open way’.52  
Film theory has adopted many definitions of the essay film genre. Despite the 
different interpretations, the common argument is that this genre intends to go beyond the 
established film grammar, and to downplay the rules of dramatic development in favour 
of questions that are addressed to the audience. The theoretical formulations of the essay 
film have been largely influenced by Theodor Adorno’s view of the essay-writing as an 
antisystematic form of writing that refutes the doubling of the existing reality. Adorno 
suggests that the essay is an incomplete artefact structured upon self-reflection. As 
Adorno says: 
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Even in its manner of delivery, the essay refuses to behave as though it had 
deduced its object and had exhausted the topic. Self-relativisation is immanent 
in its form; it must be constructed in such a way that it could always and at any 
point, break off. It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its 
unity only by moving through fissures, rather than by smoothing them over.53 
 
 
What Adorno sees as dialectical in the essay-writing is its emphasis on discontinuity that 
rejects any sense of absolute knowledge and totality. The essayistic writing is 
experimental and aims at viewing the object from various perspectives. This 
understanding of the essay as a form of writing that incorporates formal and thematic 
uncertainty has been strengthened by Lyotard’s famous statement that ‘the essay 
(Montaigne) is postmodern while the fragment is modern’.54 In fact, Lyotard’s and 
Adorno’s points that the essay is antisystematic are grounded upon the very idea of 
fragmentation. However, as opposed to the modernist employments of the fragment (such 
as in the cinema of Eisenstein that I discussed in the first chapter), the essay does not 
strive for dialectical synthesis, but places emphasis on the process of assembling materials 
that defy compositional precision.  
  With Adorno’s and Lyotard’s comments in mind, I want to look at some 
definitions of the essay film genre, so as to relate these findings to my discussion of 
Epidemic. Noël Burch understands the essay film to be the dialectical fusion of fiction and 
non-fiction, something one can identify in Epidemic too. For Burch, the essay film takes 
its theme as the basis for the exploration of a set of ideas and not as a means of producing 
dramatic events. Thus, the minimisation of story-development by means of direct address 
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to the audience, intertitles, and a self-reflexive mixing of the filmic and the extra-filmic 
cosmos intend to draw equal attention to the filming process and to the final object.55  
Structuring the film as an essay serves also the purpose of changing one’s 
perspective with respect to the past’s relation to the present and of putting together 
different voices that challenge the narrative homogenisation of a historical event. The 
result is a collage of different voices and agents. Michael Renov understands this multiple 
diegesis to be the outcome of a practice not concerned with dramatising the phenomenal 
world. For Renov, the essay film is interested in representing the world and interrogating 
it too, and this practice results in a ‘pluralization of voices’ which challenge every 
certainty and the director’s authority.56 
This collage makes the audience acquire a distance from the portrayed events. 
Moreover, the essay film thematises the very act of representation questioning the 
author’s and the audience’s positions and the medium of its own articulation. As Nora M. 
Alter explains:  
 
Like ‘heresy’ in the Adornian literary essay, the essay film disrespects 
traditional boundaries, is transgressive both structurally and conceptually, it is 
self-reflective and self-reflexive. It also questions the subject positions of the 
filmmaker and audience as well as the audiovisual medium itself- whether film, 
video or digital electronic. The essay film is as international as it is 
interdisciplinary. The essay film can be grasped as an audiovisual performance 
of theory and criticism executed within and by the filmic text, thus producing a 
productive and/or inhibiting resistance to scholarly discourse, since it appears to 
have done the latter’s work for it. Doubtless all films requires us to resist 
becoming a mere Sprachrohr for the filmmaker’s own positions (even or 
especially when we are in ideological agreement), but this resistance becomes 
essentially crucial with the essay film because – almost by definition – it offers 
the appearance of its own self-criticism, threatening to silence the critic’s voice 
in advance. 57 
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From Alter’s definition of the essay film, it is important to keep her understanding of it as 
a way of working that problematises the production of image and sound and questions the 
director’s superior position over her/his audience. The essay film collates a plurality of 
voices and arguments that expose specific tensions and not an authoritative voice that the 
viewer can identify with. As Farocki explains, the aim of this practice is ‘that the 
sequences and the elements of the film are to be considered as material and not as 
something finished’.58 The film’s elements do not relate clearly to one another, producing 
a deliberate disunity and the production of ‘unfinished material’ introduces a hermeneutic 
imprecision that activates the audience’s productivity.    
In Epidemic, the Adornian understanding of the essayistic writing as 
experimentation is strengthened by the film’s antisystematic form that incorporates 
fragments, which go beyond a goal-orientated dramaturgy and offer multiple perspectives 
on the historical past. For instance, in the third chapter of the film, the two filmmakers go 
to Germany to get some inspiration for their research. In the midst of a long-shot taking 
place in von Trier’s car, the camera focuses on the landscape, without serving a strictly 
narrative function (figure 12). The ‘unmanned camera’ captures images of factories, toxic 
waste, and of the motorway. These images of the European landscape are torn out of 
dramatic context and the audience is asked to make its own associations.  
At one point, Vørsel starts listing the various cities they drive through. His voice 
accompanies the visual material captured by the ‘unmanned camera’ and heightens the 
film’s imprecision: ‘We are driving through Dortmund and Essen. Then Duisburg, 
Krefeld, Neuss, Dusseldorf. We will also be going through Remscheid, Solingen and 
Leverkusen’. There is sense of fascination with the acoustic associations stemming from 
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the pronunciation of those names.59 The succession of these names connotes an interest in 
the historical past and present and the cities’ names act as signifiers that allude to 
collective memories that go beyond the speaking subject. Von Trier justifies his interest in 
the names of the cities on the grounds of the visual associations they create.  
 
When you see or hear the names of these cities, they summon up images. It’s a 
very visual thing talking about cities, because a lot of cities have some sort of 
soul attached to them, whether or not you’ve actually been there.60  
 
 
Elsewhere, von Trier explains that the names of these cities produce historical allusions 
and a quasi-mythological effect with a Teutonic cultural reality about them.61 The 
historical allusions are revealed in another scene that follows, in which the characters visit 
Udo Kier in Cologne. The visit in Kier’s house makes clear the film’s and the trilogy’s 
interest in the traumas of fascism, since Kier will tell them a story about the bombing of 
Cologne during the World War II.  
Again here a complete separation between art and reality is denied, since Kier 
performs himself. Moreover, the film’s privileging of multiple diegeses and voices is 
intensified. One can also identify similarities with the tradition of Marxist filmmakers of 
the past, such as Godard, Straub/Huillet and Kluge, who incorporated material not 
motivated by the diegesis as a means of splintering the narrative continuum. As Anton 
Kaes explains, the reason for these interventions was the portrayal of history as a problem. 
 
History in this view no longer unfolds as a neat, self-contained narrative; instead 
we find a gigantic collection of heterogeneous texts, images, life stories, songs, 
statistics, and anecdotes, a plethora of fragments and scraps, without center and 
without internal coherence. As a “bricoleur”, the author picks up fragments, 
selecting them and assembling them. Here art is no longer the expression or 
confession of a creator but a technique based on reflection and combination.62 
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In this episode, Kier informs them that his mother has died and in her deathbed she 
confessed him some details about his day of birth, in which the allies bombed Germany 
with phosphorus bombs (figure 13). In his description of the facts we identify an indirect 
reference to the genre of horror movies. ‘My mother told me horrible things, one hand 
was sticking out of the water, it was only flesh, because the skin was burned.’ At one 
point, the camera ignores Kier and captures Raphael’s and Raimondi’s painting The 
Massacre of the Innocents in Bethlehem (1509) and invites the audience to make its own 
associations (figure 14). Kier finishes saying that all these people were not necessarily 
Nazis. In the beginning of his monologue, Kier remains emotionally detached, whereas 
towards the end he starts crying. Perhaps, this is the most emotionally intense moment of 
the film, which entails an ironic aspect if we consider that the story is fabricated.  
However, there is nothing that indicates the fictionality of the scene. The material 
here makes the audience identify with Kier’s fabricated story, which complicates apparent 
authenticity with unacknowledged artifice and multiplies the perspective on the historical 
events that followed the German defeat in the World War II. The specific episode has an 
unfinished/open character and forces the audience to rethink the historical past and 
present beyond the ideological blinders of victims and perpetrators. Kier brings to the 
surface repressed memories on the part of the defeated and establishes a dialogic relation 
between himself as an agent and the audience. The scene remains incomplete and nothing 
connects it causally with the previous material and the scenes that follow.  
The material thus depends on the disposition of the recipient and if we see the 
film’s form in its totality, we end up realising that it does not conform to the logic of 
causal narrative continuity. Instead of a reproduction of a historical period, we are faced 
with fragments from different historical events that the audience is asked to assemble. 
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This aspect of the film’s form exhibits a valorisation of the fragment as a means of formal 
experimentation. Von Trier juxtaposes different materials/anecdotes from European 
history, so as to view the object from different angles and to resist any all-embracing 
conclusions. Short scenes that reflect on the ways a film can dramatise history are not tied 
to a straightforward plotline. Thus, Epidemic aligns antithetical materials and 
contradictions so as to expose the mechanics of filmmaking process. This modus operandi 
denies the idea of film as the repository of authorial power and the director’s function is 
that of the ‘researcher’ and not of the ‘teacher’.  
I would like to support the last point with reference to David Barnett’s analysis of 
the transition from a Brechtian to a post-Brechtian aesthetics in the theatre. Barnett 
elucidates the difference between a writer/director, such as Heiner Müller who can be 
situated in the latter paradigm, and the orthodox Brechtian approach. As he says, the 
director’s attitude is more that of the ‘seeker’ rather than the ‘teacher’ a shift that 
exemplifies the basic principle of a materialist aesthetics, which is not limited by an 
adherence to a political belief.63 Similarly, Von Trier and Vørsel do not hesitate to show 
themselves as ‘seekers’ as opposed to ‘teachers’, something that is intensified by 
Epidemic’s meta-filmic dialectic, which deconstructs the process by which the filmmakers 
transform their historical research into filmic representation.    
The film’s foregrounding of the process of its own making, along with its episodic 
construction, the narrative digressions, which spring from the complication of diegetic 
and meta-diegetic levels, and the capturing of documented material that seems unrelated 
to the story’s progression, go against the dominant understanding of cinema as a 
construction of a clear sequence of events. As such, there is a sense of an anti-style 
aesthetics that assigns value to the very process of exploration of the problems posed by 
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the European historical past, rather than on a subordination of the contradictions to a 
unifying principle. Similar to The Element’s depiction of history, Epidemic treats the 
European historical traumas as constellations that do not solidify.  
In many respects, history in Epidemic is shown as a question in the same manner 
as in Brecht. Von Trier’s refusal to simulate images of the historical past is in line with 
Brecht’s mistrust of the photographic reproduction of historical events. If a crucial aspect 
of the dialectical thinking lies in the uncovering of contradictions and the revealing of 
historical processes, then one needs to challenge the tautological perception of history 
according to which ‘the facts’ are taken to be the meaning of a historical event. Hayden 
White’s following comments are illuminating from this perspective: 
 
The distinction between facts and meanings is usually taken to be the basis of 
historical relativism. This is because in conventional historical inquiry, “the 
facts” established about a specific “event” are taken to be the meaning of that 
event. But the facts are a function of the meaning assigned to events, not some 
primitive data that determine what meanings an event can have.64 
 
 
White’s comments need to be seen in a broader historical context. Much discussion has 
been placed on the fact that human experiences have been transformed to visual 
commodities. From Guy Debord’s excursus that social life has been replaced by the 
consumption of images to Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum as a copy that 
does not have an original, the common ground lies in the belief that contemporary citizens 
have been reduced to the status of being spectators of history.65 The circulation of images 
of historical catastrophes on the part of the mass media and the simulation of history in 
films interested in the reproduction of historical facts lead to a separation of the portrayed 
events from the perception of the events shown. What renders these representations 
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problematic is the fact that they strive for representational solidity and stability when it 
comes to issues that are multifaceted.66 In their striving for unity and closure these 
representations fail to implicate the viewers’ role in the formation of history.   
The task, therefore, of an oppositional/materialist aesthetics is to challenge the 
understanding of representation as replication of commodities, and to restore spectatorial 
responses towards the objects. The last scene of the film is suggestive of an aesthetics that 
invites further discussion touching on issues of film and historical representation. Having 
finished their script proposal, the two filmmakers invite their producer (Claes Kastholm 
Hansen) for a meal. To persuade him of the value of the project, they invite a medium 
(Gitte Lind), whom they hypnotise and ask her to enter into the film’s-in-process universe 
in order to make a vivid description of the project. The woman starts crying loudly and 
when the filmmakers attempt to calm her down they notice some plague buboes in her 
armpit. Eventually, all in the room realise that they are infected by a real epidemic.  
In the sequence with the medium, what makes the scene more unbearable is that 
we see a woman crying and screaming without being able to get a visualisation of her 
experiences. Unlike classical cinema, in which the cinematic screaming is the culmination 
of a sequence that functions as a machine built to give birth to a scream, here screaming is 
the outcome of a vision that is not accessible to the audience (figure 15). Michel Chion, in 
his analysis of ‘the screaming point’ explains how cinema employs all the means 
available in order to reach that point and produce fascination. Thus, screaming is justified 
by the plot and the film’s action. As he says: ‘The screaming point is where speech is 
suddenly extinct, a black hole, the exit of being’.67 From Chion’s comments we can 
understand that the medium’s screaming in Epidemic does not obey to the dramatic realist 
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rules of classical cinema, since there is no visual material that justifies it. What follows is 
the eruption of the plague and a general collapse. At this point, the horror is visualised and 
all certainties and demarcations disappear. 
The scene with the medium can be seen as an Artaudian attack on the audience 
and the institution of cinema at the same time. Artaud’s writings for a theatre of cruelty 
elaborated on the similarities between the theatre and the plague. The aim was to 
challenge the tradition of good taste and the audience’s passivity, and to make the viewers 
interact with the represented material instead of being passive consumers.68 Similarly, the 
aforementioned scene turns into an act of aggression. Thus, the audience’s desire for 
reproduced images of historical catastrophe and horror is challenged (figure 16). When 
the buboes appear on the screen and the plague is visualised, the film borrows stylistic 
traits from the B-movie horror genre. The initial fright is replaced by an excess of 
artificiality, which is offered through the cheap prosthetics used to suggest that a real 
epidemic takes place. As Howard Hampton explains, the eruption of the plague is a 
caustic comment towards artists, who base their project on people’s suffering. Here, the 
auteurs’ sense of immunity is dissolved, and the audience’s and the producer’s wish for 
explicit images is satisfied, ‘instead of talking heads a bloodbath’.69  
Subsequently, the unmotivated visualisation of horror acts as a way of returning 
the gaze to the spectators with the view to shaking them off from their passivity. What is 
called into question here is dominant cinema’s reduction of the audience to consumers of 
images, which seem to be separated from their social life, and the very security granted to 
the viewers by cinema’s protected zone. In particular, period films’ treatment of the 
historical past as a consumable commodity transforms the portrayed events to objects 
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dissociated from the historical present.70 As a result, the audience is in a comforting 
position and feels unaffected, knowing that it can always return back to its security. The 
viewer is always aware that no matter how horrific the portrayed events are, she/he will 
always remain invulnerable. Thus, the act of communication, which involves a sender and 
a receiver, reduces the latter to the status of the consumer. The implication of this passive 
spectatorship is that the audience is conditioned to a specific way of thinking, feeling that 
there is no room for intervention in the communicative process. There is certainly a sense 
that this spectatorial attitude expands into social life too. Consequently, civic life is not 
much differentiated from the act of spectatorship.71  
The aforementioned observations can make us see the most problematic scene of 
the film as a synopsis of its interest in evading the portrayal of history as a mimetic 
mirroring of actions. This scene also gives us the chance to unpack the Brechtian 
connection regarding spectatorship. Brecht favoured a type of representation that would 
represent human relationships historically. His argument is founded on the assumption 
that this practice could make the audience question the dominant narratives of the past and 
their current historical circumstances.72 Similarly, Epidemic’s essayistic form challenges 
the tropes employed by contemporary period films, which reduce history to a museum 
piece for consumption. Epidemic’s gesture is Brechtian, since the minimisation of 
dramaturgy and the valorisation of the fragment entail an interest in making the audience 
question the historical narratives of the past and the peoples’ role outside the cinematic 
world. 
The film’s favouring of disorientation and its placing of the audience at the centre 
of the action does not serve a transparent thematic purpose. Herein lies the difference with 
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the ‘orthodox Brechtian’ tradition. Brecht’s fondness for the fragment at the expense of 
plot is concerned with reanimating the audience’s reception as a cognitive process. Unlike 
Brecht’s relentless wrestling to establish a central meaning out of fragmentation, 
Epidemic offers the audience fragments liberated from an ideological totality. The 
practice remains dialectical given that the interjection of historical material stemming 
from von Trier’s and Vørsel’s research, and its transformation into drama in the film-
within-the-film, make visible the functions that insert themselves between historically 
formed reality and its representations. This method shifts the audience’s attention from 
the imitation of actions to the film’s assembly of materials that question the homogeneity 
of the fictive cosmos, and the view of history as a homogeneous series of events.   
History as Transition 
In all three films that comprise the Europa trilogy von Trier’s treatment of historical time 
posits history very much as a dialectical question rather than a deterministic answer. 
Different time sequences mix together undermining the narrative temporality and 
dramatic linearity. In this section, I intend to see these temporal disturbances in Epidemic 
and Europa along the lines of Brecht’s Historisierung. While the former film employs a 
complex narrative structure that piles up fragments from the European history of violence, 
Europa has a more discernible narrative. Yet I suggest that both films problematise the 
linear understanding of historical time so as to transform our understanding of the 
European present.  
Let us now unpack Brecht’s concept of the Historisierung, before discussing the 
films’ treatment of historical time. Brecht in his theoretical articulation of the 
Historisierung is hugely influenced by the fluid shifts of historical time in epic poetry. 
Epic poetry’s prioritisation of narrative over plot gives the author the possibility to blend 
different time sequences and move from a historical period to another. One of the most 
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influential examples of the interplay between past and present and the perception of the 
future as a call for action has been referenced by Hans Kellner. Kellner discusses the 
image of Aeneas as presented by Virgil in his second book, arguing that it foreshadows 
the Western philosophy of action. During Troy’s fall, Aeneas manages to escape carrying 
his father on his back, while leading his little boy by hand. Kellner explains that this 
image indicates the present as defined by the past, while the future is shown as a promise 
that can inspire action and change even during historical times of despair and 
hopelessness. At this point, the present is shown as threefold – ‘the present of the past as 
memory, the present as the experience of history and the future as expectation’.73  
The intermixing of past and present as a means of revealing the potential for 
change in the future is characteristic of Brecht’s use of the Historisierung. For Brecht, the 
Historisierung and the Verfremdungseffekt aim at revealing the historicity of human 
relationships.  
 
Historical incidents are unique, transitory incidents associated with particular 
periods. The conduct of the persons involved in them is not fixed and 
universally human; it includes elements that have been or may be overtaken by 
the course of history, and is subject to criticism from the immediately following 
period’s point of view. The conduct of those born before us is alienated from us 
by an incessant evolution.74 
 
 
Brecht’s raison d’être is based on the Marxist idea that analysing the historical forces of 
the past can show the present as changeable. In this sense, the intermingling of different 
time sequences evokes the impermanence of human relations and of the social structure 
too.    
In theatre, the historicising effects rely upon acting techniques that estrange the 
portrayed actions. Paradigmatic of these acting techniques are the actors’ transposition 
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into the third person, which dissociates them from the characters and their actions, the 
reversal into the past and the quoting of the stage directions.75As Fredric Jameson 
explains, the aim of such a defamiliarised acting is to reveal the positive effects that might 
occur by training people to think historically. ‘What history has solidified into an illusion 
of stability and substantiality can now be dissolved again, and reconstructed, replaced, 
improved, ‘“umfunctioniert”’.76 For Brecht, therefore, the Historisierung reflects a 
modernist anticipatory hope of radical revolution. The intersection of the different time 
sequences operates as prolepsis. As I proceed to discuss, cinematic treatments of the 
Historisierung have proved that the materialist treatment of historical time can be treated 
in a way that does not necessarily take progress for granted.  
 Firstly, it is important to explain that the production of historicising effects in 
cinema does not rely solely on the actors’ performances. A usual method is the production 
of temporal ellipses that cannot be easily noticed within the film’s narrative. The major 
example of such a methodology is a film that I briefly discussed in the first chapter, 
Straub/Huillet’s Not Reconciled [Nicht Versoehnt Oder Es Hilft Nur Gewalt, Wo Gewalt 
Herrsch1965]. Here the temporal ellipses connect different private stories saturated with 
historical memories. The shifts in historical time are so rapid that the audience is 
disorientated and cannot easily distinguish between the pre-war years that refer to the 
main character’s childhood and the post-war ones. Straub’s/Huillet’s intention was to 
analyse the continuum of history, so as to indicate that the fascist experience in Germany 
cannot be dissociated from the present, and the remnants of fascism can be observed in 
the post-war capitalist reality. 
The reason for referencing Straub/Huillet once again is because I want to propose 
that Brecht’s concept of the Historisierung can be used in such a way that the dialectical 
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tensions pointed by the historical transitions may eschew the political modernist 
anticipation of radical change. Straub/Huillet’s film uses the Historisierung to disclose the 
historical transitions and exhibit at the same time the historical present’s reliance upon the 
past historically formed relations. The aforementioned paradigm indicates that Brecht’s 
Historisierung can be used in a way that does not necessarily imply a positive resolution 
of the contradictions. As an heir of the Enlightenment, Brecht shares with the 
Enlightenment thought certain ideas regarding what counts as truth, reason and most 
importantly political progress. Keeping these in mind, the aim of this section is to analyse 
the production of historicising effects in Epidemic and Europa, with the view to 
demonstrating how the films’ merging of the past with the present negate the 
Enlightenment narrative of progress.  
In Epidemic, historicising effects are created by the film’s complex narrative 
structure, in which the present state of Europe is contrasted to wisps of historical 
narratives of the past. These narratives derive from the filmmakers’ collection of 
historical material, the appearance of the meta-film into the main narrative and the 
insertion of unrelated material into the story line (for instance Kier’s personal recounting). 
A very crucial moment in the film is when Von Trier and Vørsel travel in Europe and 
discuss the future project. They agree to add a dramatic moment, in which the first person 
to die of the plague will be Dr Mesmer’s girlfriend (Cæcilia Holbek Trier). Her death 
shall follow the fate of other victims of the plague, who were thought to be dead and were 
buried alive. At this point, the film cross-cuts to the film-within-the-film and we see 
Mesmer’s girlfriend waking up inside her grave and trying to escape (figure 17). The 
plague here becomes the metaphor, in the literal meaning of the word, namely transition, 
for the repeatable history of violence in Europe. Later on, the filmmakers visit Kier in 
Cologne and here the linkage with the fascist past becomes evident. Bainbridge mentions 
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for example, the parallel between the Black Death of the 14th century and the debauchery 
of Jews, who were accused of having plotted the epidemic. Bainbridge, explains how this 
moment of European history is linked with Kier’s recounting of his ‘experiences’ that 
unfolded in a historical context that another massive persecution of Jews took place.77 
Thus, the bombardment of the audience with material stemming from the 
European vicious circle of violence leads to an interrogation of the contemporary 
historical reality. What is placed into doubt is the perception of history as an evolutionary 
process leading to progress and prosperity. The progressivist philosophy of history 
characterises Western thought from the very first historiographical attempts until the 
Enlightenment optimism. What this tendency introduces is the usefulness and the telos 
that sensible individuals can attribute to history. According to it, individuals can learn 
from the mistakes of the past and deal with analogous situations that confront them in the 
present.78  
Such a perception of historical maturity deriving from the knowledge of the past 
permeates the classical Marxist theory and Brecht himself, as someone committed to it. 
Von Trier’s treatment of historical time in Epidemic creates clashes between the past and 
the present that expose the historical transition in a manner similar to Brecht. These 
clashes seek to redeem European history as a nightmare, a vision of history similar to 
Benjamin’s conception of it as a catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage. 
On this account, the cross-cutting from the main story to the film-within-the-film presents 
us with incomplete stories from the past and the present, offering a Benjaminian moment 
of recognition, in which past and present illuminate each other. 
Evidently, Epidemic’s mixing of different historical temporalities illuminates 
connections and interweaves images and narratives from different centuries. The result is 
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a dialectical critique of the narrative of progress itself. The conflict between the European 
past and present shows the transitory nature of history. What is disputed is that the 
mistakes of the past have reformulated the present for the better. 
Similarly, Europa defies the post-1989 neo-liberal thought, according to which 
history is a narrative of progress, liberty, prosperity and equality. The film is engaged in a 
critical project of providing images that challenge such a liberal optimism. Europa 
provides a view of history, which is counter to European and Hollywood portrayals of it 
at the risk of appearing Nazi-friendly.79 The role of the allies in the post-War West-
Germany is demystified to the point that there is a sense of reversibility of roles between 
victims and perpetrators. Former Nazis collaborate with the Americans, a Jew (von Trier) 
testifies in favour of Max Hartmann (Jørgen Reenberg) –  an ex-member of the Nazi Party 
– and Leopold Kessler, an American visiting Germany with the best intentions ends up 
causing a massive disaster.   
The film’s indifference towards historical authenticity is evidenced by the fact that 
back projections and superimpositions replace authentic images of the German space. 
Rosalind Galt citing Elsaesser’s discussion of the importance of the ruin in post-War 
German films argues that the absence of ruins and rubble betrays the film’s mistrust 
towards the West-German de-Nazification and historical progress.80 Moreover, the use of 
back projections transmits an intentional feeling of uneasiness with respect to the 
characters’ relationship to the diegetic space. This uneasiness gives the impression that 
the characters do not belong to the temporal reality under which they operate. The 
difficulty in distinguishing the borders between the past and the present is heightened by 
the fact that the film starts with a voice-over asking an unidentified ‘you’ to go back to 
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Europa. When the story starts and we see Leo in the post-war Germany, we cannot easily 
determine the diegetic from the metadiegetic level. Given that the voice-over constantly 
intervenes to interrupt the action, which is meant to take place in the past, one notes that 
temporal demarcations are quite slippery.  
The voice-over connects the viewer with the contemporary historical reality from 
which the past events are seen. Leo’s story motivates the enactment of fragmented stories 
that appear within the film’s narrative and refer to the past. On his first journey, Leo 
comes across a German Jew, who asks him to calm his wife down and ensure her that 
Wöldstat has not been inflicted by the bombings. When Leo enters the compartment he 
meets the Jewish woman who cries ‘Palestine’. This is followed by the man’s frustrating 
response: ‘We are Jewish, but we are German, but we are Jewish’. During a dinner party 
in Max Hartmann’s house he witnesses through a window the demolition of the German 
cranes in Westhafen on the part of the allies. Larry Hartmann (Udo Kier) questions the 
motives of the allies explaining to him that many companies that flourished during the 
war were owned by Americans. 
Thus, Leo acts as the link that connects many heterogeneous stories. The past 
appears in the form of unmotivated references to it, which connect his story to the broader 
historical reality of the fascist and the post-war West-Germany. But the most problematic 
withholding of temporal orientation in the film happens in a scene where Leo walks 
towards the train’s exit and reaches a compartment full of emaciated people who are 
reminiscent of familiar pictures from the concentration camps (figure 18). Here a radical 
break occurs in the chronological order of events. Suddenly, there is a feeling that we 
have returned to the reality of the World War II. 
However, the scene does not function as a temporal ellipsis. Its role is the 
production of collision and not that of narrative transition, something that can be 
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understood by the fact that it does not have any effect in the articulation of the plot. After, 
exiting the carriage, Leo follows Larry Hartmann (Udo Kier) and the story unfolds as if 
nothing has happened. As Serge Gruzinski says: 
 
This destabilisation of the imaginary is all the more unsettling in that it applies 
to bits of the past that are sufficiently vital to be easily reactivated. As it plows 
across the Germany of the post-war years, the train of Europa transports visions 
stolen from the world of the concentration camp: skeletons in convicts’ rags, 
piled up on pallets. The post-war and Nazi parts are articulated like the 
compartments of the train. They confuse the spectator about the meaning to be 
given to these false archive scenes.81 
 
 
Gruzinski’s puzzlement can be understood if we dissect the different temporalities that 
intermingle in the particular scene. The voice-over speaks from the contemporary 
historical time and addresses Leo saying: ‘you are led through carriages you never knew 
existed’. The images that Leo sees belong to the fascist past, while Leo himself 
participates in the narrative actions that take place in the post-war German reality. The 
result is that this scene fails to affirm a logical, spatial and temporal connection with the 
narrative content.  
This linkage of heterogeneous elements creates historicising effects that call into 
question the homogeneity of historical time. The distinction between Brecht’s use of the 
Historisierung and the effect created here is more than apparent, since the presentation of 
historical discontinuity defies the evolutionary resolution of historical conflict. Even so, 
what is Brechtian here is von Trier’s concern with the richness emanating from the 
opposition between unrelated historical materials. A reference to Hans Kellner’s 
understanding of the importance of the historicising effects may illuminate this point. 
Kellner citing Jameson’s dictum ‘“always historicise”’ explains that the scope of this 
motto is to force the individual to assume a stance with respect to the historical events, a 
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stance that will help her/him perceive her/his own historical responsibility.82 This 
interpretation is not far from Brecht’s call for a responsible spectatorship, which aimed at 
revealing the audience’s role in the making of history. To relate this point to the 
aforementioned scene, of particular interest is that the voice-over’s lines respond to Leo 
and the audience simultaneously. Evidently, it is not simply Leo who is accused of being 
ignorant but the collective in the extra-filmic reality too.   
The audience is challenged on the grounds of its ability to consume and objectify 
such an image. Crucial here is the reproduction of Leo as a spectator, as an observer of the 
largest historical narrative of the post-War reality. His actions do not instigate the 
narrative, but he is shown as simply witnessing events, as if he is a spectator in a film 
instead of a narrative agent, a point that I discuss in detail in the next section. His passive 
status is linked with his decision to remain neutral and choose not to side with anyone. 
Von Trier explains that: 
 
Katarina Hartmann in Europa also illustrates an interesting theory, when she 
suggests that it’s the people who haven’t made up their mind, the neutrals, who 
are the real villains. Looked at in that light, you can see most humanists as 
villains, because of course, they maintain a neutral position.83 
 
 
Von Trier’s comments are important because they establish a link between history and 
political interests, and help us oppose the denunciation of the film on the grounds of 
postmodern relativism. One of the charges levelled at postmodernism lies in the 
subordination of politics to seemingly universal ethics. Thus, a historical event such as the 
Holocaust fascinates the public simply because it is reduced to an ‘excess of evil’, an 
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apolitical crime. The relegation of such a political issue to a matter of ‘radical evil’, serves 
as a way of further depoliticisation of the social sphere.84 
As opposed to such an apolitical treatment of history, von Trier wishes to divide 
the audience by means of dialectical contradictions. These contradictions oppose the 
clear-cut distinctions between right and wrong, historical past and present, and most 
importantly they negate the very notion of historical progress. Like Brecht, the film’s 
treatment of this problematic historical reality does not strive for a collective unity in the 
auditorium ‘on the basis of the common humanity shared by all the spectators alike’.85 
The film invites a more responsible viewing in the literal sense, that is, one that activates 
responses and generates more questions than answers. 
On Film Voyeurism 
All the films that comprise the Europa trilogy thematise the film as medium, in order to 
create a parallel between cinematic voyeurism and historical apathy. In The Element, the 
therapist’s look at the camera in the frame story reproduces our own gaze as cinematic 
voyeurs. The film finishes with a song titled Der Letzte Tourist In Europa (The last 
Tourist in Europe). The lyrics operate as an ironic comment on Fisher, who remains a 
simple observer of the nightmare of history despite returning to Europe with the best 
intentions. In Epidemic, the main characters become voyeurs of their own film in process. 
The effect is more apparent in Europa, a film that starts with a prolonged shot of railway 
tracks that are similar to a film reel (figure 19). In all the films, the question that arises is 
how much the characters are ready to witness, before they act. When asked about the 
connection between voyeurism and history, von Trier responded in a laconic way: ‘Of 
course, being a spectator can be tantamount to being a criminal! If you are a spectator of a 
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crime’.86 Certainly, a parallel here exists between cinematic fascination and historical 
latency.  
This inference can be illuminated with reference to some examples from the film. 
By the time Leo arrives in Germany, the narrative communicates his voyeurism through 
short scenes that demonstrate the character’s interest in witnessing images of history. 
During his first night in Germany he opens the dormitory’s curtains to see what is outside 
the window. Suddenly he is told off by his uncle (Ernst-Hugo Järegård) who prevents him 
from looking through the windows. Later on, while on duty he looks outside the window 
and faces hundreds of wretched people asking for help. Again, his uncle intervenes and 
closes the curtains justifying his act on the basis of the working rules and regulations. But 
Leo throughout the film insists on looking outside the windows. Here the window 
becomes a metaphor for the cinematic screen. As Christian Metz explains: 
 
If characters in a film are watching something from the window they reproduce 
my own situation as a spectator and remind me both of the nature of what is 
going on – a film projection, a vision in a rectangle – and the part I am playing 
in it.87  
 
 
In reducing Leo as a spectator of the larger post-war narrative, von Trier proceeds to 
confront the audience and argue that the mere fact of being a spectator is not enough. Not 
unlike Brecht, the renunciation of spectatorial passivity addresses issues that go beyond 
the film’s universe and in particular issues of historical responsibility. Years ago, Guy 
Debord had warned that the more one acts as a spectator, the less he acts in the social 
sphere.88  
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Nonetheless, von Trier connects spectatorial passivity with historical inactivity 
without resorting to a radical Situationist critique of the spectacle, as we can see in 
Debord’s film version of his book The Society of the Spectacle [La Société du Spectacle, 
1973]. By contrast, von Trier employs the spectacular aspects of the medium to challenge 
spectatorial and historical passivity. At some points, the female body becomes the 
metaphor for the spectacle that distracts the character’s attention from the historically 
loaded environment. This idea is manifested in Leo’s first encounter with Katarina. We 
see Katarina from Leo’s point of view shot, while her image in the foreground is in 
colour, as opposed to the black and white image of Leo in the background. Katarina is 
framed in an extremely aestheticised way that alludes to the femme fatale of the film noir 
genre (figure 21). This antithesis between foreground and background generates a feeling 
of cinematic excess. Leo’s view of Katarina reproduces our situation as spectators and 
Katarina appears more like a self-conscious quotation of cinematic material instead of a 
character in the film’s universe. At this point, we assume Leo’s point-of-view and the 
idealised female image addresses both the character and the audience. The overtly 
dramatic extra-diegetic music in the background becomes ironic and heightens the feeling 
that the image becomes a palpable quotation of materials.  
The connection between the female body and cinematic voyeurism is made more 
evident in a scene that takes place after the burial of Max Hartmann. Leo enters the car of 
a Nazi sympathiser, who blackmails him with Katarina’s safety so as to force him to help 
the Nazi partisans in a terrorist strike. Suddenly, the camera captures Katarina, who 
appears in the foreground, while the background frame is in black and white (figure 22). 
This colour antithesis intensifies Katarina’s depiction as a cinematic material instead of a 
character. Again, very dramatic extra-diegetic music intervenes and the camera cross-cuts 
to Leo, who is framed in black and white. Another cross-cutting from Leo to Katarina 
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follows and when the camera returns to the former he appears in colour, while the German 
next to him is in black and white (figure 23).  
While the image fades out, Leo’s face is still visible in colour and behind him an 
image of railway tracks is superimposed (figure 24). The emergence of the tracks – which 
look like film reels – in the background as well as Leo’s semi-hypnotic state turn the 
image into a meta-filmic comment. Leo has turned to a consumer of illusion and the 
image acts as a commentary on the link between spectacle consumption and social apathy. 
The character’s attention is once again diverted from the historical threat; the scene 
exceeds the limits of the diegesis so as to address the collective in the auditorium.  
One commentator understands the film’s fondness for these multi-layered images 
as a postmodern trope tout court. He argues that von Trier implies that the medium cannot 
deal with history. All we are left is 'layers upon layers of faulty perspectives’.89 Unlike 
this postmodern relativism, I want to discuss Schepelern’s point that ‘Leo is the first 
tourist in the stricken Europe’. 90 To understand his argument, it is useful to consider the 
role of the train and the metaphor of travel, which can be equated with the very cinematic 
experience. Not only because cinema and the steam locomotive are emblems of 
modernity, but also because the allegory of the subject as tourist/observer has preoccupied 
critical theory. The state of being a tourist and a spectacle consumer are comparable 
because in both cases the subject cannot really alter the reality facing her/him.91 
Emblematic from this point, is the scene after the assassination of Ravenstein, a 
German who collaborates with the Western allies. The camera cuts to Leo and stays still. 
His face remains in the foreground retaining the same expression, whereas in the 
background images of railway tracks are superimposed. The background eventually 
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dissolves and then a new layer is attached, which establishes a new spatial connection and 
shifts the narrative to Hartmann’s house. Throughout this spatiotemporal change, Leo’s 
face remains passive and stares at the camera as if he is a spectacle consumer. The 
character remains unaffected, a mere observer of the historical narrative.  
This emphasis on multi-layered images thematises the very act of filmic projection 
and complicates the distinction between the diegetic and the metadiegetic cosmos. Gilles 
Visy has offered an analysis of the three different spatial levels that can be identified in 
the film. The first dimension is the fictional universe, the second one is Leo’s conscience, 
which is extra-diegetic, and the third one is a ‘peridiegetique’, which blurs the boundaries 
between the two previous spaces discussed. According to Visy, the latter dimension aims 
at producing a ‘meta-level’ which simultaneously addresses the audience and the 
character.92 In the ‘peridiegetique’ universe, cinema becomes the metaphor for the role of 
the individual in the formation of history. Passive consumption of spectacular images is 
equated with historical irresponsibility. This ‘meta-level’ manifests itself clearly in the 
last scene of the film, in which we see Leo dead but the voice-over asserts: ‘you want to 
wake up to free yourself of the image of Europa. But it is not possible’. Here, the voice-
over’s function becomes extra-diegetic and addresses the collective in the auditorium and 
not just the character.93 At the same time, the voice-over loses its authoritative function, 
since it denies hermeneutical orientation and follows a formula that could be summed up 
like this: ‘it is all yours now’.94  
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I have been seeking to emphasise the importance of a materialist reading of the 
Europa trilogy through a study of the films’ form. To this effect, I have stressed the 
transformations in Brecht’s theory and practice that may help us comprehend the films’ 
historical dimension. The fatalistic ending of the characters who become mere voyeurs in 
the broader historical narrative raises questions with regard to the audience’s role in the 
formation of history. Thus, by problematising narrative agency, historical temporality and 
clear-cut ethical distinctions the films aim at introducing contradictions that cannot be 
resolved within their diegetic borders. 
As mentioned earlier, von Trier’s interest in the traumas of fascism in this trilogy 
of films has not been discussed with respect to issues of dialectics, cinematic voyeurism 
and the relationship between the individual and history. The Europa trilogy proposes that 
as long as the collective continues to perceive itself as a spectator in the larger historical 
narrative then the remnants of fascism are still strong and omnipresent. In the postmodern 
media-reality, in which the boundaries between historical images and artifice are not quite 
straightforward, the question of fascism and image consumption becomes a matter of 
political importance. Thomas Elsaesser has brilliantly captured this point. As he says: 
 
The question which Nazism raises today is less its relation to material 
production and capitalism or the monstrous scale and consequence of its 
demographic planning, than its astounding ability to create a public sphere, a 
mass audience.95 
 
 
Following Elsaesser’s point, one can see the film’s equal interest in history and the 
medium itself not simply as a postmodern trope, but as a way of pointing that historical 
responsibility requires that subjects perceive themselves as producers of history and not as 
voyeurs. In this context, the Europa trilogy challenges the institution of cinema and the 
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audience, so as to bring to the fore a set of questions dealing with the dialectics between 
the individual and history. Not unlike Brecht, formal complexity aspires to transform the 
audience and its position towards the object as well as to make them question the current 
historical circumstances.  
I want to conclude the chapter with some reflections on the films’ historicity. In 
one of those lines in the first manuscript that did not find their way into the final film, Leo 
says: ‘I felt old and very tired as Europe’.96 Apart from the trilogy’s interest in Europe’s 
traumatic past, the idea of Europe being in a state of crisis can be seen in its own 
historicity. For instance, The Element was shot during a period that the European political 
environment was altered by the influence of the neoliberal policies of Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK and Ronald Reagan in The United States, while the Soviet Union experienced 
huge transformations that gradually led to its division. The uncertainty that marked the 
period found its cinematic expression in films interested in apocalyptic stories and as von 
Trier explained in an interview during  The Element’s production, ‘the growing interest of 
the time in apocalyptic films can be attributed to the historical insecurity’.97 In Epidemic, 
the fear that nature ‘takes over’ continues this interest in the apocalypse. The metaphor of 
the virus and the plague reflects also the historical anxiety about the increasing symptoms 
of the AIDS epidemic, which was one of the film’s starting points.98  
In Europa, all the exterior scenes were shot in Poland during 1990 and the interior 
ones in Copenhagen.99 The back projections connect the exterior scenes with the interior 
ones and this choice is not just a formalist trickery but reflects the changing European 
environment and the two different realities of the Eastern and Western Europe. The 
exterior scenes that include a vast amount of Polish extras become problematic given that 
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these people perform the unfortunate German population after the end of the war (figure 
27 and 28). Yet these people are indices of a country, which leaves behind the failed 
socialist project, while the prospects of its integration into the Western European 
capitalism are not ideal. Europa then completes the trilogy at a time when socialism was 
no longer a tangible alternative, while the European nations’ optimism for an integrated 
Europe signalled a new era of collaboration. The film’s pessimistic ending does not share 
this optimism and seen under the rubric of the current problems within the European 
Union, the film acquires a renewed historical significance.  
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Chapter 3 ― Rethinking Realism: Dogme 95 and The Idiots.  
 Dogme  95: Ascetic Realism and Anti-Illusionism 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the ways von Trier’s Europa trilogy raises questions 
regarding historical representation. In this section, I am interested in placing von Trier’s 
and Dogme’s ascetic aesthetics in a historical context. One of my aims is to rethink the 
1970s debate about realist and Brechtian cinema through an analysis of the Dogme 95 
Manifesto and through a case study of von Trier’s film The Idiots (1998).1 I want to 
demonstrate that certain aspects of realism are not necessarily antithetical with a type of 
cinema that consciously builds on Brecht’s predilection for representations that 
incorporate the process and the product within the film’s dramaturgy. Primarily, the 
chapter proceeds to explore Dogme’s employment of a realist aesthetics as a form of 
‘anti-illusionism’ and sets out to offer a historical interpretation of Dogme’s return to the 
cinematic debates of the past. Then, I want to discuss the ways von Trier’s film merges a 
long-take realist tradition with an investigative attitude that generates tensions between 
the scripted referents and the filmmaking process.  
The first chapter of this thesis discussed the debate between the two different 
critical traditions, that is, the phenomenological one, influenced by the writings of André 
Bazin, and the Brechtian one. As I explained, the 1970s opposition between Bazin and 
Brecht was formulated by critics, who considered that a materialist cinema based upon 
Brecht’s critique of empiricism could not be reconciled with realism. The basis of this 
argument was that realism gave an illusionist view of the world, that is, a static and 
unchangeable one, which was not in line with Brecht’s call for representations that could 
demonstrate the historicity of human relationships. 
                                                          
1
 I use the word Dogme instead of Dogma and the reason is that this was the word mentioned in the 
original Manifesto. Some of the texts I quote use the word Dogma and for copyright reasons I keep it 
unchanged.  
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One important contradiction merits attention here. These critics conducted an 
exploration of a Brechtian/materialist cinema against the Hollywood paradigm, which 
they rejected on the grounds of being illusionist. Yet, as Thomas Elsaesser has pointed 
out, European Cinema has always distinguished itself from Hollywood ‘on the basis of its 
greater realism’.2 Thus, the association of realism with illusionism during the 1970s did 
not make a distinction between dramatic realism and realism as a filmmaking process that 
clings into indexicality – the material connection of representation with its referent – in 
order to incorporate unforeseen incidents and materials within the film’s narrative. 
From the term dramatic realism – which one tends to link with Hollywood – I 
understand the causal linkage of a sequence of events, which consist of a series of 
coherent psychological motivations. This emphasis on psychology as the motivating 
element of actions is busy portraying changes in moral and psychological attitudes and 
fails to show individuals as part of a larger socio-political frame. On the other hand, 
realism as a filmic process that registers physical reality and interacts with the captured 
environment allowing for unpredictable moments to enter a film’s dramaturgy, is a modus 
operandi that has marked the practice of European art cinema. Such a practice does not 
simply reproduce the external environment, but interacts with it so as to question it. For 
instance, Neorealism’s interest in the concrete historical reality of the post-War Italy and 
the Nouvelle Vague’s semi-documentary form are some major examples of a European art 
cinema aesthetics that clings into indexicality.  
Dogme 95 constitutes a cinematic movement that holds onto a realist filmmaking 
process. I suggest that a study of its theoretical and formal principles may help us 
overcome the distinction between realism and materialism as formulated during the 
1970s. I argue that a close examination of the Manifesto as a text demonstrates that 
                                                          
2
 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘World Cinema: Realism, Evidence, Presence’, in Realism and the Audiovisual 
Media, ed. by Lúcia Nagib, Cecíllia Mello (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.3-19, here p.3.   
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Dogme’s realist filmmaking method is not tantamount to pure mimesis and can help us 
place the movement in a historical context. Dogme started as a collective of four 
filmmakers – Lars von Trier, Thomas Vinterberg, Søren Kragh-Jacobsen and Kristian 
Levring – who shared the belief that cinema could be resuscitated by establishing certain 
rules and restrictions that would determine the operations of the filmmakers and their 
crew. However, the films that were the outcome of this Manifesto were quite different and 
it would be risky to approach them from a totalising perspective.  
For instance films, such as Italian for Beginners [Italiensk for Begyndere 
(Scherfig: 2000)] and Mifune (Jacobsen: 1999) obey the Dogme rules in order to narrate a 
story and adhere to the classical cinema’s convention of characterisation and narrative 
agency. Others, such as Festen (Vinterberg: 1998), The Idiots (von Trier: 1998) and Julien 
Donkey Boy (Korin: 1999), adopt a more playful narrative structure that reflects the 
process of the films’ genesis and the restrictions imposed upon them. Furthermore, 
despite the movement’s collective character, the Manifesto was written solely by von 
Trier and Vinterberg, whose films were probably the most committed ones to Dogme. Of 
course, the Dogme Manifesto incorporates some anxieties and thoughts about the future 
of the cinema, but the films shot under the particular rules are not characterised by formal 
or thematic uniformity. The rules impose certain restrictions on the filmmaking and the 
post-production process, but they do not intend to produce similar types of films.  
Let us now summarise the basic tenets of the Manifesto. In the opening paragraph, 
the Manifesto distinguishes itself from the 1960s and the Nouvelle Vague and explains 
that the objectives were correct but not the means. The concept of the auteur cinema is 
dismissed as ‘bourgeois’, while it is stated quite emphatically that ‘to Dogme 95 cinema is 
not individual’.3 Dogme presents itself as a counter-strategy to the individual film and 
expresses a belief in the productive potential of the new technologies, which can lead to 
                                                          
3
 See the Dogme 95 Manifesto in the appendix, p.285.   
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‘the ultimate democratization of cinema’.4 Thus, Dogme proposes a set of strategies that 
resist the illusionist filmmaking and the predictability deriving from dramaturgical 
clichés. The rules proposed by Dogme are location shooting, direct sound and hand-held 
cameras. Furthermore, postproduction manipulation is prohibited, while genre films and 
the director’s crediting are not allowed. Finally, the Manifesto asserts that for Dogme ‘the 
instant is more important than the whole’ and the director’s ultimate aim is to ‘force the 
truth out of the characters and settings’.5 
The Manifesto itself constitutes an important piece of writing that voices some 
significant anxieties regarding the medium’s radical aspirations in the current historical 
circumstances. The Manifesto, as a form of writing, attaches itself to the earlier cinematic 
avant-gardes and their furious production of texts and pronunciations, and demonstrates 
an awareness of the importance of theory as a means of exploring the possibilities for the 
foundation of political cinema. The point that I put forward is that Brecht and political 
modernism can enrich our understanding of the movement and help us answer a set of 
questions regarding Dogme’s anachronistic language. Such a reading can make us 
appreciate Dogme beyond the conventional perception, which sees the movement as a 
postmodern parody. When reading the Manifesto, one recognises that Dogme engages 
self-consciously with the political modernist film-making rhetoric to the point that one 
senses a self-mockery of the project’s originality. The work of D.N. Rodowick illuminates 
the term political modernism. Rodowick explains that: 
 
Political modernism is the expression of a desire to combine semiotic and 
ideological analysis with the development of an avant-garde aesthetic practice 
dedicated to the production of radical social effects.6 
 
  
                                                          
4
 Ibid., p.285.   
5
 Ibid., p.287.  
6
 David Norman Rodowick, The Crisis of Political Modernism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1998), p.1.  
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Elsewhere, Rodowick explains that political modernism is dedicated to the production of 
radical/political objects that emphasise the material aspects of their representation and 
assume the form of an ‘auto-critique’.7 Rodowick’s definition refers to a variety of 
filmmakers, such as Eisenstein, Vertov and Godard.  
Dogme’s rhetoric echoes mainly early political modernist practices, such as 
Vertov’s and Brecht’s. Both expressed their enthusiasm over the film medium and 
equated technology with productivity, something that I discuss later on. As noted in the 
first chapter, Brecht’s theory and practice, which centres on the distance between reality 
and representation was influential in the formation of a political modernist filmmaking. 
The production of radical/knowledge effects was predicated upon the changing of the 
established cinematic tropes. In questioning the dominant cinematic language, a film 
could modify the audience’s habitual spectatorship and offer the audience an alternative 
view of social reality.  
In the Dogme Manifesto, one can identify a polemical language, which aims at 
changing the habitual spectatorship, but there is a troubling paradox too. The political 
modernist rhetoric is accompanied by a call for ascetic realism and a disciplined ‘avant-
garde’. By implication, the Manifesto itself seems to go beyond the 1970s binarisms –
dialectical versus realist cinema. The rules that advocate location shooting, direct sound, 
ban on extra-diegetic music, hand-held camera, and avoidance of gratuitous action clearly 
articulate a preference for a realist aesthetics. Yet the Manifesto’s belief in the new 
technological means of production, the rejection of predictable dramaturgy and the 
dismissal of the concept of the auteur cinema resonate with a political modernist rhetoric.  
Let us first single out the equivalences to a European art cinema realist aesthetics. 
The rules imposed by Dogme are redolent of Italian Neorealism’s preference for real 
locations rather than studio settings, unaffectionate acting, and for an aesthetics of reality 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., p.12. 
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that undermines the role of the script in favour of the presentation of fragments of 
concrete reality. As Bazin says in his discussion of Neorealism, the script and the plot of 
the Neorealist films are of less importance. For it is the script’s adherence to an aesthetics 
which offers fragments of the historical reality that renders the films unique, and not their 
dramaturgy, which, as he explains, does not differ from ‘moralising melodramas’.8 
Bazin’s reading of Neorealism as a movement that undermines the role of the script for 
the fragments of concrete reality, as well as his conviction that the Neorealist aesthetics 
leads to the disappearance of dramaturgy, can help us understand Dogme’s reconciliation 
of a raw realist aesthetics with an anti-illusionist one.  
By dramaturgy, I understand the selection and composition of a sequence of 
events for the production of dramatic conflict and action. The predictable dramaturgy that 
Dogme rejects is mainly the Hollywood one, which structures goal-orientated narratives 
in which the actions justify the characters and the other way around. Dogme’s rejection of 
predictable dramaturgical tricks and its preference for the ‘instant rather than the whole’ 
foreground the movement’s interest in an episodic, paratactic style, in which each scene 
does not necessarily move smoothly from and towards the scenes before and after it. 
Furthermore, the Manifesto’s privileging of the ‘instant’ – the fragment – evokes Brecht’s 
writings on film. Brecht sees film practice as a process of compressing the dramatic 
process into independent scenes that do not necessarily serve dramatic ends. 
 
Their [the independent scenes’] sequencing and combination, arrangement and 
plausibility are contained only implicitly in the original film text. They obey 
their own principles, which are different from those of the verbal drama and 
distinct as well from those of pure stage mime. It is the responsibility of the film 
director not only formally to stage this, but also, in a certain sense, to transpose 
all of these indispensable things into reality.9  
 
                                                          
8
 See André Bazin, ‘An Aesthetic of Reality: Neorealism’, in What is Cinema? Vol. II, ed. and trans. by 
Hugh Gray (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971), pp.16-40, here p.21.   
9
 Bertolt Brecht, ‘The Threepenny Lawsuit: A Sociological Experiment’, in Bertolt Brecht on Film and 
Radio, ed. and trans. by Marc Silberman (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.147-199, here p.186.  
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Brecht’s privileging of a fragmented film form aims at focusing on the exposition of 
arguments and counter-arguments instead of establishing dramatic situations. The 
camera’s investigative attitude is the prerequisite for the formation of an anti-illusionist 
aesthetics, which is not interested in reproduction but in the presentation of a set of 
contradictions. Such an emphasis on the fragment rather than the whole, serves also the 
purpose of overcoming the bourgeois notion of art as mimesis and the perception of the 
artist as the creative ‘genius’.  
The devaluation of the role of the artist is part of an aesthetics concerned with 
assigning a more productive role to the audience. This devaluation figures importantly in 
the Manifesto. Particularly, the rejection of the auteur cinema and the rule that forbids the 
crediting of the director clearly recall the political modernist arguments of the past, 
according to which the author/director is not in a privileged position over her/his 
audience. From Brecht’s understanding of the author as a person who produces work 
‘from the materials of history’ to the Dziga Vertov group’s mockery of the director’s 
individuality, the common argument is that the value of artistic practice does not rely on 
the communication of an ‘individual vision’.10 In Dogme’s case, this devaluation of the 
director coincides with a technological development that leads to the ‘democratization of 
the medium’. Again, this view of technology as productivity aligns Dogme with political 
modernism, something that I discuss below. 
Technology and Productivity 
Before I go further with my discussion of Dogme’s view of technology and its references 
to political modernism, I intend to see the critical responses to the Manifesto. After its 
publication, the Dogme Manifesto attracted the interest of the academic scholarship and 
                                                          
10
 Brecht quoted in, Elisabeth Wright, Postmodern Brecht (London, New York:  Routledge 1989), p.17. 
See also Peter Wollen, ‘Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent d’Est’, in Readings and Writings: Semiotic 
Counter Strategies (London: Verso, 1982), pp.79-91, here p.83. Originally published in Afterimage, 4:1 
(1972).  
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there have been numerous articles which discuss the movement’s popularity and 
significance. One of the most popular explanations is offered by Mette Hjort who 
understands Dogme to be Denmark’s response to globalisation. Her analysis enriches our 
understanding of the movement and the challenges that small nations have to face in a 
globalised cultural environment. However, Hjort sees Dogme as a movement that 
privileges content over form, placing emphasis on characterisation and psychological 
depth. What she does not specify is the ways that the formal restrictions liberate film form 
and challenge the cinematic institution.11  
Berys Gaut argues that the Manifesto’s commitment to the discovery of truth 
negates any Brechtian reading. For Gaut, the illusionist film is not opposed by Dogme in 
favour of a self-reflexive strategy, and nothing in the Manifesto states that Dogme’s goal 
is to draw attention to the film as film.12 A closer look at the Manifesto’s principles and 
its set of rules can negate this argument. After all, Dogme’s anti-illusionist rhetoric along 
with its ascetic realism synopsises an interest in exploring different ways of representation 
as opposed to the hegemonic ones. As such, Dogme is not solely concerned with the 
relation between film and reality, but with the very dialogue between different modes of 
filmmaking, a gesture which calls attention to film as film. 
A concrete analysis of the Dogme Manifesto’s dialogue with political modernism 
has not been established on the part of the scholars. Scott MacKenzie has identified 
similarities with previous film Manifestos. Then again, his discussion is mainly concerned 
with issues regarding the future of European Art Cinema in the age of Hollywood 
hegemony.13 Similarly, John Roberts identifies similarities with film manifestoes of the 
20th century, but he concludes that the technical and formal restrictions have no political 
                                                          
11
 See Mette Hjort ‘Dogma 95: A Small Nation’s Response to Globalisation’, in Purity and Provocation: 
Dogma 95, ed. by Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie (London: BFI, 2000), pp.31-47, here p.41. 
12
 See Berys Gaut, ‘Naked Film: Dogma and its Limits’, in the same book as above, pp.89-101, here p.93.  
13
 See Scott MacKenzie, ‘Manifest Destinies: Dogma 95 and the Future of the Film Manifesto’, in the 
same book as above, pp.48-57, here pp.49-52.  
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aspirations and effects. In his estimation, Dogme is a call for cheap films for ‘aspirant 
amateurs’.14 Peter Schepelern, on the other hand, asserts that the Dogme project originates 
from ‘von Trier’s works and artistic expressions’.15 Elsewhere, Schepelern indicates the 
correspondence between Dogme and Vertov’s manifestoes, while he sees Dogme’s 
reference to a Marxist rhetoric and the ideological debates of the 1970s as a parody.16 
What is missing is a historical understanding of the movement’s recourse to a rhetoric that 
clearly recalls the modernist belief in the revolutionary potential of the film medium. 
Furthermore, what commentators have not discussed is Dogme’s combined optimism and 
scepticism towards digital technology.  
In my reading, Dogme proposes an oppositional realist practice that does not 
intend to represent reality as unified and concrete, but oscillates between a documentarist 
approach to the profilmic along with one that signals it as a construct. Thus, the 
movement can be seen as a call for a productive instead of a reproductive use of the new 
technologies. It is this distinction between production and reproduction that clarifies the 
movement’s opposition to the use of digital technology for the production of special 
effects and ‘cosmetics’. This distinction demonstrates the movement’s lack of interest in 
using technology as a means of reproducing a perceptually realistic dramatic cosmos by 
means of post-production manipulation. By contrast, Dogme’s imposition of rules on the 
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 Jon Roberts, ‘Dogme 95’, in New Left Review, 23:8 (1999), pp.141-149, here p.142.  
15
 Peter Schepelern, ‘‘Kill your Darlings’: Lars von Trier and the Origin of Dogma 95’, in Purity and 
Provocation: Dogma 95, pp.58-69, here p.58. 
16
 See Schepelern, ‘Film According to Dogma: Ground Rules, Obstacles and Liberations’, in 
Transnational Cinema in Global North: Nordic Cinema in Transition, ed. by Andrew Nestingen and 
Trevor G. Elkington (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2005), pp.73-107, here p.82 and 
84.  
Numerous people understand the Manifesto as a parody of political modernism. See Linda Badley, 
‘Danish Dogma: Truth and Cultural Politics’, in Traditions in World Cinema, ed. by Linda Badley, R. 
Barton Palmer and Steven Jay Schneider, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp.80-94, here 
p.80.  
See also, Jan Simons, Playing the Waves: Lars Von Trier’s Game Cinema (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2007), pp.11-12.   
See also, Gabriel Giralt, ‘Whatever Happened to Reality: Dogme 95 and the Reality of Fiction’, in 
Kinema: Journal for Film and Audiovisual Media, 12:4 (2003), available online at  
http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php?id=110&feature, accessed 14 February 2011.  
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filmmaking and the post-production process summarises a will to retain the medium’s 
indexical nature.   
Herein lies the main similarity with the political modernist rhetoric and its view of 
technology as productivity. The heightened realism afforded by the developments in 
technology is seen as a motivating element in producing radical effects and renewing the 
audience’s perception. In the first chapter, I lingered on Brecht’s initial enthusiasm about 
the cinema, which is grounded in the belief that the intervention of the machine, that is the 
camera, merges the portrayed reality with the process of copying/reproducing that reality. 
Brecht considered this overlapping between process and product analogous to the 
defamiliarising effects he aimed to achieve in the theatre. This point can be clarified by 
Marc Silberman’s following comment.  
 
Brecht recognizes the specificity of the cinema in the mechanized process of its 
production and exhibition, in its power to make art into a commodity, an insight 
which, soon after, would inform Benjamin’s seminal text on a modernist theory 
of representation. Finally, in the cinema the perception of the image undergoes a 
disintegration of visual perspective with the levelling of difference between the 
image and the original. The privileged centered site of perspective in post-
Renaissance representational forms was guaranteed by a stable representational 
relationship between the sign and the real in the belief that the sign’s referent 
contained a deeper sense. With the collapse of referentiality this centered 
perspective is destroyed, and the world becomes representable in multiple 
segments, realized most fully in the fragmentation of the cinematic montage.17   
 
 
Thus, Brecht saw the revolutionary potential of the medium in its ability to abstract 
concrete images from reality so as to show reality as a construction. In his theoretical 
articulation of the ‘gestic camera’ Brecht says that ‘the camera searches for motives, it is a 
                                                          
17
 Marc Silberman, ‘The Politics of Representation: Brecht and the Media’, in Theatre Journal, 39:4 
(1987), pp.448-460, here pp.451-452.  
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sociologist’.18 This perception of the camera as a sociologist aims at connecting the reality 
of the portrayed actions with the audience’s historical reality.  
Brecht thought that the ‘gestic camera’ produces ‘realism’ in the Marxist sense of 
the world, that is, ‘the portrayal of typical people under typical circumstances’.19 Brecht 
continually referred to his theatre and film practice as realist. His understanding of realism 
comes in contradistinction to what he considered as naïve naturalism, that is, ‘the 
reproduction of natural appearances with embarrassing precision, which however, often 
hides meaningful connections by pedantically accumulating random details’.20 Thus, the 
gestic camera’s role is not that of the invisible observer of actions. By contrast, the 
camera points to the process of constructing a copy of reality and the audience is asked to 
co-produce and not simply to consume a dramatic narrative. 
Brecht’s approach towards cinema invokes the political modernist enthusiasm 
over the medium, which was based upon the latter’s capacity to go against the notion of 
the individual being at the centre of the world. One well-known example is Dziga 
Vertov’s valorisation of the Kino-eye (seeing through the camera) over the human eye. 
Vertov’s argument is grounded in the premise that the Kino-eye can give the audience 
access to processes not visible by the human eye. In many respects, his Marxist 
antihumanism downplays the role of the director in favour of the cameraman. For Vertov, 
the Kinos (the cinematographers working under the principles of the Kino-Eye) are 
primarily constructors and not artists. In his view, the bourgeois artistic cinema is a 
remnant of the ‘old world’ and needs to be replaced by a cinematic practice based on 
                                                          
18
 Brecht quoted in Silberman, ‘Brecht, Realism and the Media’, in Realism and the Audiovisual Media, 
pp.31-46, here p.38.  
19
 Friedrich Engels quoted in, Ruth Berlau, Bertolt Brecht, Claus Hubalek, Peter Palitzsch and Käthe 
Rülicke (eds.), Theaterarbeit: 6 Aufführungen des Berliner Ensembles (Dresden: VVV Dresdner Verlag, 
1952), p. 434. 
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 Brecht quoted, Ibid., p.433.  
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‘coolness and distrust’. As he says: ‘Film Drama is the opium of the people’.21 The 
ultimate aim of the cinema he proposes is the filming of the every-day life, so as to use 
the recorded material to educate the audiences.22  
According to Vertov, the act of filming should not be dissociated from any other 
productive labour. The mediated reality deriving from the intervention of the camera can 
make the audiences discern processes not distinguishable in the empirical reality. To 
achieve this learning effect Vertov denies dramaturgy and the praising of artistic 
individuality.  
 
This departure from authorship by one person or a group of persons to mass 
authorship will, in our view, accelerate the destruction of bourgeois, artistic 
cinema and its attributes: the poser-actor, fairy-tale script, those costly toys-sets, 
and the director high-priest.23 
 
 
Vertov’s downplaying of dramaturgy is predicated upon a preference for an aesthetics that 
refuses to dissociate the recorded objects by the very process of recording itself. The 
crucial aspect of the learning effects he wants to achieve lies in the self-reflexive 
movement of the camera, in which the copy and the original overlap with each other, so as 
to bring to the surface the hidden aspects of reality. Vertov describes this process as 
‘filming life unawares’, in which people are captured by the camera lens without knowing 
it.24 The cameraman observes people’s activities without impeding them. Vertov’s modus 
operandi establishes a linkage of shots deriving from the ontological authenticity of the 
images with dynamic montage sequences that aim at developing constructive effects.25 
The liberated camera advocated by Vertov is equivalent to Brecht’s valorisation of 
the ‘gestic camera’, whose role is explorative and revelatory. These approaches to 
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 Dziga Vertov, ‘Kino-Eye’, in Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, trans. by Kevin O’Brien, ed. by 
Annette Michelson (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press: 1984), pp.60-79, 
here p.71.  
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 Vertov, ‘We Variants of a Manifesto’, in the same book as above, pp.5-9, here p.9.  
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 Vertov, ‘Kino-Eye’, p.71.   
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 Vertov, ‘The Birth of Kino-Eye’, in the same book, pp.40-42, here p.41.  
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 See Vlada Petric, ‘Dziga Vertov as a Theorist’, in Cinema Journal, 18:1 (1978), pp.29-44, here p.34.  
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filmmaking, that is, the privileging of the machine – the camera, over the director’s 
individuality, and over dramaturgy – summarise the political modernist idea that the 
emergence of cinema needs to establish a redefinition of art. Brecht thought the same, and 
his dissatisfaction with the film medium derived from the industry’s understanding of the 
cinema solely as a dramatic medium. Dominant cinema’s employment of character point 
of view shots and its commitment to the creation of dramatic effects led the audience to 
identify with the camera, an effect totally irreconcilable with Brecht’s perception of it as a 
sociologist. This identification with the camera provided the audience with finished 
objects, without giving them access to the process by which the objects were produced.26 
The result is that the camera loses its performative/productive function and the very ideas 
of artistic individuality and dramaturgy, which the new medium wished to oppose, are 
perpetuated.  
For Brecht, these tendencies failed to change the medium of their own articulation, 
and here it is important to recall his argument that it is not enough to produce for a 
medium but to change it too. Walter Benjamin has captured the intent of this argument in 
an essay hugely inspired by Brecht, in which the author is equated with a producer. As 
Benjamin explains, Brecht introduced the term Umfunktionierung [re-functioning] to 
describe ‘certain works that are not so much intended to represent individual experiences 
(to have the character of finished works), as they are aimed at transforming certain 
existing institutes and institutions’.27 Benjamin expands Brecht’s argument and explains 
that technical progress can become the basis for political progress because the writer can 
shift his attention from the products (the finished works) to the very means of production. 
In this context, the author’s/producer’s work becomes a model of ‘an improved 
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 Brecht quoted in Ben Brewster, ‘The Fundamental Reproach (Brecht)’, in Ciné-Tracts, 1:2 (1977), 
pp.44-53, here p.48.  
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  Brecht quoted in Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso, 
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apparatus’, which familiarises the public with the very production process and turns the 
readers or spectators into collaborators.28  
In a similar manner, Dogme equates technological progress with a film practice 
that questions the cinematic institution and the understanding of filmmaking as an 
individual expression. What merits our attention is that this faith in technological 
development clearly references the political modernist axiom that emphasis should not be 
placed solely on the product but on the very means of production too. Von Trier has made 
that quite clear in an interview given after the completion of The Idiots, in which he 
explains that the new technologies give the filmmakers a chance to focus on the very 
filmic process, and to rethink the cinematic rules.   
 
Film has become very much like magic tricks – you’re not supposed to know 
how it’s done, which is also very old-fashioned, especially if you think about the 
new techniques, the new cameras, and how everybody can produce their own 
films, which I think is fantastic. So it’s about time there was a real debate. 
Nobody has really talked about film form or film content, not for many, many 
years, and the arrival of these techniques makes it very good time to have that 
discussion.29  
 
 
The new small cameras that have emerged out of the digital revolution offer filmmakers 
the opportunity to shoot scenes in long-takes without worrying about the price of film 
stock. Von Trier suggests that these cameras can downplay precision in favour of 
indeterminacy. The result is that the director is deprived of absolute control and the final 
cut contains the filmmaking process and the product at the same time. This formulation 
resonates with the Bazinian preference for long-take cinematography and with Brecht’s 
call for a self-reflexive and investigative camera movement. In both tendencies, 
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 Ibid, p.98.  
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 Von Trier quoted in Richard Kelly, The Name of this Book is Dogme 95 (London: Faber and Faber, 
2000), p.144.  
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knowledge about the world and reality is associated with the knowledge about the process 
of capturing that reality on screen. 
The point of rupture between von Trier and the aforementioned modernist and 
realist rhetoric is that the very process of exploration is valorised over any concrete 
educative effects. According to von Trier, there are two different ways of working with 
the camera, framing, and pointing. The framing process involves a passion for 
perfectionism and absolute control, whereas the pointing one privileges realism and loss 
of control. Certainly, this view of realism has little to do with dramaturgical and 
compositional consistency. By contrast, the pointing process opens itself to the contingent 
and encourages the director to discover things from the surroundings instead of imposing 
his/her ideas to the audience.30 Von Trier’s dialectical understanding of the medium’s 
investigative potential can be seen in a quotation below. 
 
To hang a mike up in a tree, to use a couple of toothpicks instead of a gigantic 
technical apparatus, this provides one form of cinematic truth. Or at least it gets 
more real. Truth is about searching an area in order to find something, but if you 
already knew beforehand what you’re looking for, then it is manipulation. 
Maybe truth is finding something you’re not looking for.31 
 
Von Trier’s comments summarise Dogme’s call for an ascetic aesthetics that aims at 
breaking the conventional way of filmmaking and film-viewing. The director and the 
audience have to adopt a more interrogative/productive attitude towards the camera’s 
engagement with the concrete reality. On this basis, Dogme’s idea of unveiling the truth 
does not imply a reductionist revelation of pre-existing ideas, but the restoration of 
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responses of astonishment to the processes of recording and perceiving reality. Evidently, 
all these ideas are not new and one senses that Dogme theatricalises its own belatedness. 
This view of technology as productivity recalls the political modernist anxiety 
regarding the use of technological development in a revolutionary rather than a 
reproductive way. Access to technology was seen as a prerequisite for motivating political 
change. In Brecht’s words: 
 
The technology that triumphs here, and appears to be condemned to nothing 
more than guaranteeing the profits of some dinosaurs and thus of barbarism, can 
achieve very different things in proper hands.32  
 
Brecht’s interest in using technology for the production of radical effects is symptomatic 
of his forward-looking politics, which sees technology as the synonym of change. 
Technology signifies the new and heralds the coming of the new society, which will 
emerge out of the old one. The contradiction that arises with respect to Dogme lies in the 
fact that the movement appeared in a historical moment when there is no such thing as a 
tangible political alternative to accompany the productive use of the new technologies. 
The question that arises then is why Dogme returns to the past to ‘rescue’ cinema 
from its ‘decadence’. I should like to venture a first and schematic explanation. I suggest 
that Dogme’s employment of a political modernist rhetoric, the privileging of austerity 
and the movement’s enigmatic commitment to truth can be seen as a desire for orientation 
in a historical period in which the experience of the world is media constructed. I want to 
illuminate this point in reference to two later Manifestoes written by von Trier, very much 
inspired by the Dogme one. I am talking about the Defocus Manifesto (2000) and the 
Dogumentary one (2002).33 While the former one manifests its commitment to a filmic 
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process that is dedicated to the investigation of something between fact and fiction, the 
latter one is concerned with the exploration of a documentary form that goes beyond the 
established ‘documentary and television reality’. Moreover, the point of convergence 
between these two Manifestoes and the Dogme one is a filmmaking process, in which 
technology is not ‘the goal itself’. All these Manifestoes valorise the process over the 
finished product and set as a prerequisite the use of technology as a means of discovering 
things instead of achieving dramatic perfection. As von Trier says in the Defocus 
Manifesto: 
 
If one discovers or seeks a story, to say nothing of a point that communicates, 
then one suppresses it. By emphasizing a single pattern genuine or artificial; by 
presenting the world a puzzle picture with solutions taken in advance…The 
ultimate challenge of the future – to see without looking: to defocus! In a world 
where the media kneel before the altar of sharpness, draining life out of life in 
the process, the DEFOCUSIST will be the communicators of our era – nothing 
more, nothing less!34 
 
This quotation synopsises an interest in a film language that is not keen on the mere 
duplication of a story. Conversely, it is a call for a film practice that encourages the 
registration of unforeseen incidents and materials not firmly controlled by the film’s 
narrative and the director. Such a process is evidenced in von Trier’s The Idiots, which I 
discuss below; the film’s script is used as a sketch for the production of gestures and 
unforeseen incidents and not as a story that strives for dramatic perfection. 
Von Trier’s call for a film-practice based upon a process of ‘defocusing’ is 
reminiscent of the theory and practice of another post-Brechtian director, namely 
Alexander Kluge. As it has been evidenced in his dialogues with Adorno, Kluge 
advocated a ‘blind shooting’, which is structured upon the idea that a ‘blind film’ can 
avoid the conventions of a pre-planned filmmaking. The filmic apparatus is responsible 
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for the recorded material and downplays the intervention of the director.35 When I asked 
Kluge to clarify this filmmaking process he said: 
 
This is very essential. You have to be blind, that is, without intentions. You 
should respect the object or the subject of what you describe. You are the author, 
but you must not impose anything. Therefore, the object you describe, or the 
person you film are the second author or the third author. It is an anarchic idea. 
The author is as important as the object of representation and the object as 
important as the author. You see, there is a balance between the filmmaker and 
the product. The author in the classical sense does not exist at all. You might 
comment on something but you must not dominate by writing or making a film. 
Heiner Müller, my friend, advocated a blind argumentation and we should never 
forget that the ancient poet Homer was blind.36  
 
 
In light of Kluge’s comments, we can understand the materialist aspect of a filmmaking 
process that is interested in the search for the object and not in the imposition of a 
concrete ‘message’. In a historical period, in which the simulations of the real coexist with 
the reality we experience, the restoration of the investigative aspect of the medium is of 
political importance. It is this employment of film technology as a means of questioning 
the depicted reality that concerns my discussion of The Idiots.  
Nevertheless, how can we place Dogme’s return to the past in a historical context 
and what does the movement’s anxiety regarding cinema’s future indicate? Laura 
Mulvey’s analysis of cinema’s role in a new technological age provides the ground upon 
which to launch an historical explanation of Dogme’s anachronism. Mulvey explains that 
a prospective dialogue between ‘the old celluloid cinema of the past’ and the new digital 
technologies can make us return to the old left visions and the modernist aspirations. 
Through a historical study of the medium and its relation to political radicalism, Mulvey 
describes the modernist belief in cinema coming together with a belief in political change. 
Cinema came to be an important means of promoting left politics in the period of 
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decolonization and in the 1960s. Accordingly, its evolution became tantamount to the 
Marxist belief in progress and the view of time as an evolutionary process of historical 
advancement towards a new society.37  
Mulvey makes the case that this belief in the medium’s radical aspirations 
terminated during the 1980s with the appearance of the neo-right, which ‘captured the 
dynamic of the new’, a gesture that demonstrates its differentiation from the conservative 
right and its insistence on the preservation of the values of the past. Mulvey sees that as 
the crisis of Marxism, which after the historical defeat of socialism and the de-
radicalisation of the working class is forced to seek progress into the past. 
 
The problem of fissure, gap, loss of continuity faces the left. Its failed aspiration 
becomes another corollary to the contemporary sense of separation between 
‘now’ and ‘then’. This imaginary of left history needs to be challenged, in the 
first instance by returning to question the significance of the modernity and left 
politics that seem to have got lost on the other side – the ‘before’, the ‘then’. 
Now that the idea of progress is relegated to the past, it may be time to look 
further back, into what is now history, the past of modernity and the radical 
aspiration.38  
 
 
Mulvey explains that cinema is faced with the same challenge. Returning to past 
cinematic practices and the political modernist debates can help the medium appropriate 
the revolutionary potential of digital technology to radical ends. The prerequisite for 
revolutionising technology is to rethink its function and to go beyond its ability to 
simulate.  
Digital imaging offers the possibility of simulating images of convincing realism, 
whose lack of reference fails to give the audience access to the process of their own 
making.39 This lack of indexical reference annuls one of the political modernist 
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objectives, what Brecht defines as the moment in which the audience recognises itself in 
the film’s reality and becomes conscious of the social reality as a construct.40 In 
opposition to the use of technology as simulation, Dogme rejects accounts of the digital 
that associate it with figuration/painting and non-indexicality and holds onto indexicality 
as a means of registering contingency and the plurality of the real. Correspondingly, 
Dogme’s dialogue with the past is motivated by a will to reinstate the revolutionary aspect 
of the medium, which does not lie in the construction of reality effects, but in the very 
questioning and rethinking of the filmmaking and film-viewing process.  
Dogme 2: The Idiots - The Film’s ‘Performant’ Function 
In the previous section, I discussed the Dogme project as a valorisation of the process 
over the finished product. In this section, I discuss von Trier’s film The Idiots and suggest 
that the film incorporates the process and the product in its narrative by means of an 
emphasis on the actors’ performances. Given the film’s thematic emphasis on 
performance and its back-to-basics modus operandi, my argument is very much informed 
by contemporary post-Brechtian performance. I suggest that the film creates a tension 
between the presence of the actors and the embodiment of their roles. I combine this 
performance analysis with contemporary film studies invested in the discussion of 
‘corporeal cinema’ – a film practice that reduces the narrative to the bodies of the actors. I 
argue that von Trier’s filming strives for a ‘self-transformation’ of the medium and invites 
the audience to question the ways dramaturgy shapes one’s understanding of the ‘real’, 
and the whole idea of ‘reality’ itself.  
The Idiots was the second film shot according to the Dogme rules, preceded by 
Thomas Vinterberg’s Festen. The script was written in four days and retains a simplicity 
that is associated with von Trier’s understanding of the story line as a material for 
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exploration.41 The film tells the story of a group of young people, who pretend to be 
mentally disabled and perform ‘idiotic’ happenings in public spaces. Their provocative 
performances intend to challenge middle-class values and conformity. The film starts in 
media res, showing Karen (Bodil Jørgesen), a working class woman, enjoying herself at a 
fair. This is followed by a scene in an expensive restaurant, where she meets up some 
people who pretend to be mentally handicapped, in order to challenge the clientele and 
avoid paying their bill. When Stoffer (Jens Albinus), the leader of the group, approaches 
her performing the idiot, Karen spontaneously follows them and eventually becomes part 
of the collective.  
The group inhabits an old villa in Søllerød, a wealthy suburban town outside 
Copenhagen, which belongs to Stoffer’s uncle. Despite the collective character of the 
project, Stoffer seems to be the leader of the idiots and the one who challenges them to go 
beyond their limits. At times, he reproaches them when he feels that their performances 
are not genuine and challenges them to explore their ‘inner idiot’. Apart from Karen, all 
of them have the chance to go back to their every-day lives and in the course of the 
narrative it can be seen that most of them are well-functioning and career focused 
individuals.  
The group disintegrates, when they realise that the whole project cannot be 
reconciled with their careers and their private lives. In a last attempt to save the group’s 
integrity, Stoffer challenges them to go over their limits and ‘spass’ in front of their 
families and their career environments, an effort that comes to nought.42  Surprisingly, 
Karen, the only person within the group to explicitly dispute the objectives of the project, 
decides to ‘spass’ facing her family. We come to realise that she has recently lost her 
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child and her appearance at the film’s beginning, in terms of the story order of the film’s 
fabula, had directly followed her disappearance following the child’s funeral.   
My discussion is interested in identifying the moments in the film that complicate 
the boundaries between the actors performing their roles, the characters performing an 
‘idiotic identity’ and the moments when the film hovers between dramatising a story and 
the process of its own making. Evidence of the connection between von Trier’s Dogme 
film practice and performance art is given in a documentary directed by Jesper Jargil, in 
which he follows von Trier’s conceptual project Psychomobile 1 – The World Clock. The 
project started a few months after the publication of the Dogme Manifesto and is a 
combination of cinema, performance and installation art. A mobile camera filmed images 
of an ant colony in New Mexico and the images were broadcasted live in the Art Society 
Building in Copenhagen. The images triggered light changes on a stage, which consisted 
of nineteen rooms and fifty-three actors. Changes in the light were accompanied by 
changes in the actors’/characters’ disposition. The actors’ responses were pretty much 
improvised given that they did not have a script to memorise and they were only given a 
schematic description of their characters’ traits by von Trier. At times, von Trier’s 
collaborator – Morten Arnfred – intervened and asked them to justify their characters and 
their decisions, while the distinctions between actors and characters eventually 
collapsed.43 This emphasis on performance as an object of investigation is integral to our 
understanding of von Trier’s Dogme film practice. 
To return to The Idiots, I suggest that the film stresses its ‘performant’ function 
over the story-telling one. My understanding of the term ‘performant’ function derives 
from Jean Alter’s distinction between, the ‘referential’ and the ‘performant’ function of 
theatre. According to Alter, the referential function of theatre aims at the communicating 
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of signs and the transmission of information, while the ‘performant one’ stresses the event 
itself and the physical aspect of it.44. In light of Alter’s discussion, I discuss the film’s 
‘performant’ function as a process of doing and un-doing the narrative, which blurs the 
boundaries between filmic and non-filmic reality and allows for certain unpredictable and 
anti-systematic moments to enter the film’s universe. The ‘performant’ function of the 
film is also stressed by a shooting style – which I discuss below – according to which 
technology adapts to the acting and not the other way around. The effect is an 
unconventional dramaturgy, which constantly defers unveiling Karen’s enigma and places 
emphasis on the group and its performances. As von Trier stated during the shooting of 
the film: ‘This is the kind of film they teach you not to do in a film school; because the 
point is not revealed until the end. And when it is, we need a violent reaction’.45  
I argue, that this privileging of the ‘performant’ over the story-telling function 
indicates a different understanding of dramaturgy, according to which the film is not a 
stable object that communicates a certain amount of information to the audience. This 
modus operandi downplays dramatic realism in favour of a process that places emphasis 
on the act of quotation as a means of estrangement. The film dramatises a story and the 
process of its own making and activates an acting style in which the characters are in-
between (in and out of character), while the story is based upon the characters’ 
performing of other characters – the idiots.  
So far the critics have mainly discussed performance with respect to the content, 
that is, the characters’ performing of a different identity, and not as a formal element. 
Murray Smith conducts a very straightforward dramaturgical analysis that is incompatible 
with his initial intention to reconcile it with an avant-garde film practice as evoked by the 
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Manifesto and the film’s narrative. He discusses the film as a ‘character driven one’ and 
identifies avant-gardist elements mainly in the content rather than the form. For Smith, it 
is the film’s romanticising of marginal identities and the celebration of ‘idiocy’ ‘as a tool 
of mockery directed at bourgeois hypocrisy’ that connects it with the history of the avant-
garde.46  
The same applies to Linda Badley’s discussion, which focuses on the 
‘performative politics’ of the film’s content and understands the film as ‘a leftist social 
experiment’ that represents von Trier’s ‘youthful radicalism’.47 Similarly, Berys Gaut 
places emphasis on the film’s content; at one point, he suggests that certain formal 
elements such as the interview sequences and the film’s self-reflexivity make it a 
documentary of its own making. However, this point is not consistent with his character-
based analysis.48  
Caroline Bainbridge is also more focused on the content and suggests that the 
film’s semi-documentary aesthetics is more ‘truthful’ as opposed to the contemporary 
narrative cinema. Her discussion merges psychoanalytic theories of trauma with an 
analysis of the film’s rejection of the ‘voyeuristic pleasures’ of dominant cinema. The 
problem with Bainbridge’s argument is the quick shift from a straightforward 
dramaturgical and character-based analysis to a political discussion that is concerned with 
identifying the ways that the film intends to ‘get away with passive looking’.49 
Peter Schepelern has offered some important comments regarding the film’s form. 
Schepelern explains how von Trier employs the camera in ways that the director is 
deprived of absolute control and supports a new ‘liberated and liberating attitude towards 
                                                          
46
 See Murray Smith, ‘Lars von Trier: Sentimental Surrealism’, in Purity and Provocation: Dogma 95, 
pp.111-121, here p.119.  
47
 Linda Bandley, Lars von Trier (Urbana, Chicago, Springfield: University of Illinois Press), p.58 and 
p.60.  
48
 See Gaut, pp., 93-95.  
49
 Caroline Bainbridge, The Cinema of Lars Von Trier: Authenticity and Artifice (London, New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2007), pp.96-97. 
156 
 
acting’. Schepelern explains that this use of the camera derives from von Trier’s eventual 
view of the filmmaking process as a more collective practice. As he says: ‘the 
individualist human being has become a more collective player’.50  
Anne Jerslev has touched some issues that I would like to expand on, such as the 
film’s complication of the very ideas of ‘the real’ and the ‘performative’. Like most of the 
previous commentators, Jerslev omits in her analysis a political interpretation of such a 
complication. For her, the films’ complication of reality and performance creates feelings 
of emotional identification with the characters instead of defamiliarising effects.51 I will 
return to Jerslev later on, because there are some fruitful ideas in her argument that 
contradict this statement and can illuminate my understanding of performance as 
quotation.  
Performative Camera  
A starting point for exploring the film’s privileging of its ‘performant’ function is von 
Trier’s employment of the camera. As noted earlier by Schepelern, Dogme 95 constitutes 
a milestone in von Trier’s career, due to the radical break with his past work that paid 
detailed attention to the visual compositions. This attention to detail denied the films from 
any great measure of spontaneity and aimed at predetermining every movement on the 
part of the actors. For instance, Europa’s (1991) shooting was based on a ‘visual 
storyboard’ that provided a detailed description of the optical connections between the 
scenes.52 In a way, the release of the Dogme Manifesto coincides with von Trier’s 
different approach to filmmaking that shows a preference for a less stylised acting, which 
incorporates filmic and extra-filmic responses. 
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The first film that initiated the new modus operandi was Breaking the Waves 
(1996), a movie that drew upon some of the Dogme rules, such as the hand-held camera, 
location shooting and direct sound. On the other hand, the manipulation of melodrama, 
the use of optical filters and the non-diegetic music are some traits that prevent the film 
from being classified as a Dogme one. I am not going to linger on it, but I consider it 
important to discuss some of the techniques employed that signal von Trier’s interest in 
the unexpected moments stemming from a shooting style that valorises the actors’ 
performances. 
The crucial aspect of the film was the preference for long takes and its disregard 
for conventional editing. According to the cinematographer, Robby Müller, the actors 
were not aware of whether they would be in the shot or not. At the same time, von Trier’s 
preference for protecting the spontaneity of the performances made him skip detailed 
rehearsals and use, in many cases, the first takes so as to avoid artificiality. This way of 
working led to an acting style that foregrounded the very act of performing rather than a 
psychological impersonation of the roles. As Müller explains: 
 
Lars wanted to have this Cinema Scope feeling because it adds an extra 
dimension to people when you are so close to them – studying them in the center 
of your frame, as you would when you are already talking talk to them. But Lars 
wanted to get rid of the compositions you usually see in the widescreen movies. 
There was to be no extra stuff – only the actors. And that was very exciting, 
because it forced us to rediscover looking at things innocently.53     
 
 
The process described by Müller does not favour the enactment of a coherent, 
psychologically complex character but the production of gestures that exploit the split in 
identification between the actor as persona and the embodiment of her/his role. Therefore, 
the actors do not simply concentrate upon emoting specific reactions that justify the 
characters. Quite the opposite, they are captured in the process of embodying their roles 
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and reflecting on them. Von Trier, after the completion of Breaking the Waves, explained 
that this ‘liberated acting’ derived from the fact that the actors were caught unawares and 
given a freedom of movement without having to follow a specific plan.54  
Katrin Cartlidge (Dodo McNeill in the film) explained that von Trier encouraged 
the actors to make mistakes, allowing them a more productive participation in the 
filmmaking process. As she said, ‘Lars wanted the technical machinery of the film to be 
as light as a feather’.55 The latter comment along with the whole process of filming 
employed in Breaking the Waves epitomise in a laconic way, one of the basic interests of 
Dogme, that is, that technology needs to adapt to the acting and not the other way around. 
Accordingly, the role of the script is reassessed, since the director and the crew use it as 
material for investigation rather than reproducing it faithfully in the screen. 
As such, the acting style produces an effect of interruption and not a seamless 
reflection of responses to the stimuli. When I asked von Trier whether this shooting style 
makes the actors acting out of character he responded: 
 
Oh yes. I am very interested in this. I am interested in capturing the actors when 
they are in and out of character. The borderline between the private individual 
and the character is very intriguing. Especially, when it overlaps and you cannot 
tell whether a reaction can be attributed to the actor or the character. That is 
where I try to go very often.56 
 
The connection with Brecht is more than apparent. Brecht argued in favour of an acting 
method that would turn the actor into a demonstrator and an observer at the same time. 
This formula compels the audience to assess the various fragments and reconcile them 
with the preceding and the following ones. Hence, this acting style establishes an 
interruption of action and character and negates steady representational development. The 
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aim is to bring to the surface the contradictions that are smoothed over within a 
framework of representation based upon imitation. As a result, the audience, like the 
actors, is drawn inside the story and pushed away into a critical appreciation at the same 
time.57 
For Brecht, this method aimed at the production of concrete and calculating 
gestures that would create contradictions deriving from the actors’ showing of themselves 
and the event at the same time. On the other hand, von Trier’s valorisation of the actor’s 
relative autonomy to create more than what lies in the script is related to a whole shift 
from acting to performance, which demarcates the Brechtian from the post-Brechtian. As 
Hans-Thies Lehmann observes, for Brecht the act of showing an action and the 
represented action have equal value, whereas in post-Brechtian performance-based 
practice ‘the showing is emphasised over the shown act’.58 To connect this point with von 
Trier, it is important to discuss his camera work. His employment of the hand-held camera 
adds a sense of mobility, which changes the relationship between actor and director along 
with that of actor and character, since the final image is the outcome of material not 
necessarily premeditated. Similarly, post-Brechtian performance art places emphasis on 
the staging of the signs as a means of increasing the gap between text and performance. 
The effect is that the entire process generates variations from the script that transcend 
distinctions between staged and real events.59  
In the same way, von Trier’s use of the hand-held camera poses questions 
regarding the script and its performance, questions that deny the unproblematic fusion of 
the two elements within the film. Jesper Jargil’s behind the scenes documentary, The 
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Humiliated [De Ydmygede: 1999] has captured this tension quite eloquently. The 
documentary shows that von Trier avoided very detailed rehearsals for the majority of the 
scenes. Rehearsals were replaced by collective discussions that aimed at investigating 
how the characters and their ‘idiotic happenings’ could be presented in a more plausible 
way. These discussions transmit a theatre ensemble feeling, which is reminiscent of 
theatre groups of the 1960s, such as The Living Theatre and The Open Theatre.  
Furthermore, Jargil’s documentary shows that despite some moments that required 
a certain degree of perfection (for instance the last scene in Karen’s house), von Trier 
preferred to keep shots that incorporated moments not necessarily scripted, an approach 
that is compatible with his perception of the hand-held camera as a productive rather than 
a reproductive tool. At one point in the documentary, we hear von Trier’s voice referring 
to the scene prior to the orgy one (which I discuss later on). As he says:  
 
It is interesting that there are so many improvisations. Everything we filmed 
today are far from the original idea and the script. Basically these are things the 
actors could have done. They lead up to something and they don’t follow it up 
for some reason.60  
 
 
One of the reasons why von Trier’s practice privileges improvisations over the detailed 
script is that he uses the hand-held camera in a way that neither the director, nor the actors 
know in advance where the camera movement starts and where it ends. Von Trier justifies 
his fondness for using hand-held cameras (he occasionally operates them himself) on the 
grounds that ‘a hand-held camera tells you more, while a camera on the tripod tells you 
less. A hand-held camera is like hand-writing’.61 As mentioned in the first section, the 
effect is not a mere duplication of reality but a simultaneous reflection on the process of 
its construction. This practice is in line with the political modernist interest in revealing 
reality as subject to change and not as permanent and static.    
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Von Trier’s technique relies on the filming of long-take scenes that are not over-
rehearsed. Thus, the camera becomes performative, that is, it takes risks that downplay 
narrative coherence. What is of particular interest here is the merging of a long-take 
realist tradition with an investigative attitude that generates tensions between the scripted 
referents and the process of transforming them into a film. Consequently, the camera 
becomes a provocateur and not a passive recorder of actions. This is a principle that 
characterises the films of American Independent filmmakers, such as John Cassavetes and 
Shirley Clarke. In particular, John Cassavetes’ ability to make virtue out of necessity (and 
here necessity stands for the impoverished conditions of his films’ production) has been 
quite influential in von Trier’s Dogme practice.   
As George Kouvaros rightly points out, in the films of John Cassavetes and 
Shirley Clarke, the camera becomes a provocateur of gestures and responses that blur the 
boundaries between performance and life. Thus, the camera adds a sense of mobility and 
is not concerned solely with the simulation of actions, but is interested in the dialectic 
between the captured actions and the actions generated by the camera itself.62 This 
mobility contributes to an uneven representational aesthetics that demonstrates the 
camera’s ability to construct an image of the real. The notion of the camera as a 
provocateur of actions is key to our understanding of von Trier’s modus operandi in The 
Idiots. The camera is used as a performative tool that foregrounds the performance of the 
actors and highlights the process of transforming the profilmic body into represented 
material.  
Interrupting the Narrative                                           
The Idiots’ privileging of the film’s ‘performant’ function is made evident by the 
interview sequences that offer contradictory and non-clarifying evidence regarding the 
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causal sequence of events. The film’s narrative flow is interrupted by interview sequences 
with the characters, which are conducted by von Trier and aim to clarify the past events. 
Von Trier remains off-screen and it is mainly the Danish audience (and perhaps some art-
house cinéphiles) that can clearly understand the identity of the person conducting the 
questions. The reason is that von Trier enjoys a celebrity status in Denmark and his voice 
can be easily distinguished by the Danish audience. Thus, the meta-effect is much more 
obvious for those who can recognise him as the man behind the camera. However, the fact 
that an interviewer poses questions regarding the value of the project produces ruptures in 
the film’s linearity. These ruptures clearly complicate the boundaries between the diegetic 
and the meta-diegetic universe.   
The only characters that do not appear during the interview sequences are Stoffer 
and Karen. The first interruption of the narrative takes place straight after Karen’s joining 
the group at the beginning of the film. Jeppe (Nikolaj Lie Kaas), Henrik (Troels Lyby), 
Josephine (Louise Mieritz) and Ped (Henrik Prip) comment on Karen and the reason that 
led her to become a member of the idiots. What is important here, is that this first 
interruption does not follow the question and answer format and one cannot ascertain 
whether the characters are being interviewed or whether they address the audience 
reflecting on their past. The effect is very disorientating given that the chronological 
unfolding of actions is suddenly broken down by a shift in time and space.  
During this interview break, all characters set out Karen’s story as an enigma and 
offer contradictory responses that complicate, instead of clarifying the story-line. The 
interviewed individuals succeed one another in a frenetic way, which makes narrative 
orientation problematic. In the first interview sequence, none of the characters manages to 
establish a unanimous agreement over Karen’s participation in the group. Henrik hints 
that she could have joined anything, while Josephine cannot ascertain how Karen turned 
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out to become part of the group. Immediately following Henrik, Ped introduces Karen’s 
scepticism apropos the whole project. 
Despite the fact that the interviews are seemingly interested in establishing a 
causal explanation of the whole project, their function in the narrative becomes more 
complicating. This disorientation can be attributed to the fact that the sequences appear 
randomly and without having a cause and effect linkage with the preceding episodes. The 
second interview sequence, for instance, comes after a scene in Stoffer’s house, in which 
the group reflects on their previous idiotic happening. The scene is suddenly cut and the 
temporality changes. The location is now Axel’s (Knud Romer Jørgensen) flat. Von 
Trier’s voice is heard in the background asking him to give a quick summary of the 
project. Axel’s response is followed by von Trier’s point that he has already heard 
seventeen different versions that fail to give a clear explanation of their motivations. 
Axel’s failure to give a concrete answer is followed by Katrine’s (Anne-Grethe Bjarup 
Riis) argument that the whole project was initiated by Stoffer, a statement that denies his 
version. Jeppe, the next to be interviewed, asserts that the project began thanks to his 
initiative. Von Trier responds ironically claiming that none of the rest has told him that 
Jeppe was the pioneer of the collective.  
The interviews bring to the surface the film’s dialogue with itself about its own 
scope and efficacy. Their intervention within the narrative operates as a linkage of the 
episodes that constitute the film’s loose dramaturgy. The contradictory answers given by 
the characters problematise the audience’s quest for a diegetic motivation of the actions. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that these interviews break the chronological unity of 
the narrative and make the audience step out of the story and reflect on it. Their function 
in the film is problematic because they hover between being part of the story and a 
reflection on it. Their unclear position in the narrative is heightened by the fact that the 
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interviewer’s (von Trier’s) position in the diegetic world is quite ambiguous. We can hear 
his voice but he is in-between, that is, he hovers between being part of the diegesis and an 
external agent too.  
Yet there are moments that these sequences become argumentative, that is, they 
aim at modifying or undermining the originality of the project or the characters’ 
reliability. One prime example can be seen in the sixth interview break, in which von 
Trier asks Axel, if he holds some anti-middle-class ideas. Axel responds positively. 
 
INTERVIEWER: Katrine says that you held some very anti-middle-class views or 
ideologies. 
AXEL: I do. (Plays with his baby). How are you darling? 
INTERVIEWER: Based on what? Your ideologies? 
AXEL: Anti-middle-class ideologies? 
INTERVIEWER: Yes. 
AXEL: Mainly that there is something more than meaningfulness and 
purposefulness. 
INTERVIEWER: Oh! She made it sound as something that has to do with family. 
 
 
Axel’s response to the first question is problematised by the image that follows which 
shows him embracing his little child in a middle class flat. Here the scene operates as an 
ironic commentary. The scene also prepares the ground for the subsequent one, in which 
Katrine visits Axel at his professional environment in order to embarrass him and 
challenge his anti-bourgeois rhetoric.  
Consequently, the narrative interruptions produced by the interviews tighten the 
film’s loose narrative structure, which is based on a repetitive pattern. We see the 
characters preparing to embark on their idiotic provocations, their ensuing idiotic 
happenings and the characters’ discussions/reflections on them. By systematically 
interrupting the narrative, the interviews aim at stimulating the audience’s critical 
alertness. Their role is not to soothe and confirm but to challenge the viewers’ 
conventional forms of perception. This emphasis on interruption serves the role of 
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combining analysis and demonstration. The actions are interrupted, and the viewer can 
notice the episodic format of the film’s structure and she/he can step back and reflect on 
the represented material.  
This structure can be aptly characterised as Brechtian. For Brecht, interruptions 
constitute an essential aspect of his work in theatre and film. In theatre, he argued for a 
knotting of the episodes in a way that could be distinguished by the audience. As he 
explained, such a structure could provoke different responses that would not lead to a 
seamless linking of different materials. The audience would be forced to acquire ‘a 
disconcerting look’, which would develop their analytical skills.63 Similarly, his cinematic 
work strived for the breaking of ‘total visibility’, in order to deconstruct the portrayed 
incidents and reveal the social conditions of their construction. Indicative of this practice, 
is the repeatable biking sequence in Kuhle Wampe (Dudow, Brecht, Ottwald: 1932), 
which places the individual story in a historical context.64  
The interruptions have a bearing on the acting as well, which is concerned with the 
act of demonstrating and analysing specific incidents and actions. Walter Benjamin, in his 
discussion of the role of the narrative interruptions in Brecht’s work, explains that this 
methodology shifts the focus from the unfolding of the actions to a representation of the 
conditions that lead the characters to acquire certain attitudes.65 Accordingly, the 
audience’s capacity for identification with the characters is undermined and they are 
asked to seek the meaning beneath the surface of the actions. In a like fashion, the breaks 
caused by the interviews in The Idiots give the audience time to think and reflect on the 
portrayed actions, instead of following the narrative passively.  
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One should also add that the interviews problematise the relationship between 
actors and characters. This practice recalls analogous deconstructionist devices on the part 
of other European directors. Ingmar Bergman in Passion [En Passion, 1969] and in 
Autumn Sonata [Höstsonaten, 1978] employed similar techniques that unsettled the 
narrative. His aim was to bring extra-diegetic material stemming from interviews with his 
actors, who offered their hermeneutical approach towards the characters they performed. 
Similarly, Jean-Luc Godard has employed parallel tropes in films, such as Masculin 
Féminin (1966), so as to foreground a different type of film-making, which he loosely 
described as ‘survey film’. Godard’s practice combines fictional material with a cinema 
direct reportage that aimed at freeing film narrative from a conventional reliance on plot.66 
 Von Trier goes beyond these practices and his interview sequences have a degree 
of novelty. For instance, in Bergman’s case, the interviews are clearly distinguished from 
the rest of the narrative. They operate as a ‘break in the diegesis’ but this break marks 
itself clearly from the fictional narrative. In Godard, on the other hand, the interviews are 
conducted by the main character and they are part of the story. What renders von Trier’s 
interview sequences innovative is the fact that their placing in The Idiots’ narrative plays a 
dual role, that is, they are part of the narrative and combine material that exceeds it. In a 
way, these sequences are self-critical explorations of The Idiots project on the part of the 
filmmaker and the cast. When asked about their placement in the film, von Trier outlined 
their defamiliarising effect and explained that they were added after the completion of the 
main filming, because they were not scripted.  
 
They [the interviews] were completely improvised. The actors answer for their 
characters, and at the same time they defend their characters. You can’t write 
those sorts of answers beforehand, because they’d look false and constructed at 
once. The breaks caused by the interviews have a kind of a distancing effect. But 
they are also an affirmation. This whole idea of a few people running round 
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playing as being idiots gained a whole other significance because of the 
interviews. If the members of the cast could sit down afterwards and talk about 
their experiences, then it must have meant something to them. And that validates 
the interviews, as well as giving impetus to the plot and the film as a whole.67  
 
 
The fact that the interviews were shot long after the completion of the main film adds to 
the film a semi-documentary aesthetics about its own making, since the actors are not in 
the position of retaining a continuity of character.  
Furthermore, their improvisatory aspect allowed for the intrusion of moments, in 
which the boundaries between characters and actors collapse. This is clearly confirmed in 
all these sequences, in which the characters are separated from their previous roles as 
idiots, and the actors are somewhat separated from their fictional roles. As it has been 
evidenced in an interview with Anne Louise Hassing (Susanne in the film), von Trier 
gave the impression that he addressed himself to the actors rather than the characters, a 
choice that created confusion for the performers involved in these scenes.68  
The achievement of these split identifications through the interviews shifts the 
interest from the finished object and draws the audience’s attention to the dialectical 
interplay between the object and its performance, that is, its interpretation. Consequently, 
these interruptions do not simply question the group or the characters’ motives, but they 
deny the authority of a finished object, opening the preceding and the ensuing scenes to 
the audience’s hermeneutical activity. Reflecting on the film’s practice, the interviews 
defy an unsophisticated understanding of ‘truth’ and suggest that one can reach ‘truth’ by 
means of experimentation. 
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Performance as the Subject and the Object of the Film  
The film’s pseudo-documentary form accumulates three different representational levels: 
the reality of the story line, the reality of the characters, who pretend to be mentally 
disabled, and the reality of the movie’s filmmaking process. Such a complex narrative 
structure deprives the audience of a psychological in-depth access to the characters, since 
for the most part the film’s dramaturgy is concerned with the performing of a non-
authentic identity. In effect, the performing of the performance becomes the film’s 
thematic interest and the prolonged scenes of ‘spassing’ are shorn of a clear dramatic 
dimension or an illustration of the characters’ psychological state.   
What renders these scenes more problematic is the combination of a realist/long-
take cinematography with an acting style, according to which the actors are not asked to 
deliver for the camera. As von Trier says reflecting on the film’s shooting, ‘the handheld 
camera follows the actors, which allows them to concentrate on acting with each other, 
and not acting towards a big monster of a camera’.69 The result is a privileging of a 
gestural acting, which is not solely concerned with the communicating effect, since the 
camera captures the ‘real’ and here the ‘real’ stands for the process, the documentation of 
the actors’ performances. Brecht aimed for the same result when he argued in favour of a 
camera movement that would not aim at capturing emotions and psychology, but at 
revealing the relationship between reality and its representation. The difference is that he 
aimed to solve the problem via an interjection of montage sequences. Silberman’s 
writings on Brecht’s understanding of the role of the camera can help us establish the 
connection. As Silberman says: 
 
The camera’s operation of registering physical reality – objects and gestures 
rather than emotions and psychology – in other words its Von-Aussen-Sehen 
(seeing from the outside) becomes the cornerstone of an aesthetics of making 
visible das Sichtbarmachen. Finally, in the cinema the perception of the image 
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undergoes a disintegration of visual perspective with the levelling of difference 
between the image and the original. Aura is no longer attached to the 
photographic or cinematic image as material value, but to the process, to the 
functioning of the reproduction.70  
 
 
This process favoured by Brecht acknowledges an important difference between cinema 
and theatre. While in theatre identification, which Brecht aimed to abolish, is produced by 
means of the acting technique and the actors’ portrayal of their roles, in cinema a very 
important element in the production of empathetic feelings is the camera itself. 
In The Idiots, empathy with the characters and the action is problematised through 
the very process of the film’s production, which combines an emphasis on the materiality 
of the performances with a handheld camera movement that points to the very practice of 
recording. Since performance is the thematic core of the film, the camera is concerned 
with the capturing of a contradictory process, that is, the registering of the characters’ 
simulations in real time. Thus, the film becomes a film about performance and identity, 
and while this aspect develops into a finished object that is contained in its dramaturgy, 
there are moments when performance becomes a process of self-discovery. 
A prime example of this process can be observed in a moment when the camera 
registers the cameraman and a sound technician. At this point, the diegetic and the meta-
diegetic level collide and once again the film incorporates the process of its own making 
in the final object. As the film employs the trope of performance to rethink the boundaries 
between ‘self and other’, this scene incorporates the basic media of the film’s own 
articulation as a means of challenging the boundaries between inside and outside. Thus, in 
copying the copying of its own making the film questions the very idea of its own 
originality and the very idea of a concrete ‘real’.   
This self-exhibitionist strategy explores the thin boundaries between identity, 
performance and social construction. In this section I am interested in the dramaturgical 
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effects. Later on, I focus on the moments, in which performance and reality conflate. 
There is a moment in the film that merits particular attention. There is a scene taking 
place in a forest, in which Karen and Stoffer discuss the objectives of the project. Karen 
asks Stoffer for their motives, and while the latter starts his ardent tirade, the camera pans 
away and captures some members of the group ‘spassing’ (figure 1). Then again, it returns 
back to Stoffer and Karen, capturing only the lower part of their bodies to end up in a 
close up of their faces (figure 2). During their discussion, images of the ‘spassers’ 
intervene making clear that this is not a point of view shot (figure 3 and 4). Here the 
camera plays a dual role, that is, it manifests its presence and the immediacy of the event; 
on the other hand, its consciousness of the process of representation is not 
demystificatory. On the contrary, the staging makes a self-mockery of the immediacy of 
the event, since what is presented is inauthentic, that is, simulations on the part of 
fictional characters. Thus, the ontological status of these images crumbles into 
performance. 
During Stoffer’s and Karen’s discussion the camera pans away, and for a moment 
Katrine’s head appears completely out of focus. Then again, instead of returning to the 
characters, the camera registers minor details. Stoffer’s voice is heard in the background, 
but we do not see his face. What appear on screen are fragments from the idiotic 
performances and minor details from the forest that do not enhance the dramatic aspect of 
the scene. When the camera returns to Stoffer, Karen asks him how one can justify their 
game given that there are people that are truly handicapped. Stoffer replies laconically 
‘you can’t’. This scene and the short dialogue sequence between Karen and Stoffer 
indicate that their role is not just to advance dramatic and narrative forms of progression. 
Here there is a sense of performative excess on the part of the camera and the actors, since 
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the scene aims at discovering the moments that cannot be contained within a conventional 
narrative.  
The film, therefore, is in constant dialogue with itself and such a manipulation of 
the materiality of the actors’ bodies renders performance – as a thematic and as a formal 
element – its principal referent. This facet of The Idiots can be seen in light of Ivone 
Margulies’ discussion of ‘corporeal cinema’. Margulies discusses Chantal Akerman’s 
cinema taking into consideration Neorealism’s and direct cinema’s ‘investment’ in the 
concrete reality, and their simultaneous acknowledging of cinema’s artificial nature. As 
she says: 
 
This double-layered cinema allows only inscription. It is not an idealist cinema, 
though utterly ascetic, it prizes materiality. In this cinema, in fact, the quality of 
presence wavers precisely because of its materiality, because of the excess 
produced in it by hyperbole and redundance. The radical figuration of this 
excess is the American experiment with real-time representation: Warhol’s films 
are the signpost to a corporeal cinema, in which the concreteness of both the 
filmic body and the body represented eludes the very idea of materiality. At the 
same time that text is perverted by tone, and that gesture is troubled by dialogue, 
the works of Rohmer, Dreyer, Bresson and Ackerman, create an 
extramateriality, a surplus, I call, for lack of a better term, “theatricality”. The 
term emphasises that this cinema works its principal effect on the ever fragile 
link between artifice and nature, the figure and the body of the performer.71  
 
 
Margulies’s description of the direct registration of the concrete body and its simultaneous 
inscription as an ‘immaterial’ construct is something that applies to The Idiots. Similar to 
the formula she describes in Warhol’s films, the camera registers the process of the 
actors’ embodiment of a role and the very embodiment itself as contained in the film’s 
dramaturgy. While Margulies uses the term ‘hyperrealism’ to describe this process, I am 
inclined to discuss it under the rubric of post-Brechtian performance art and its emphasis 
on the performative rather than the referential aspect of the body.  
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Earlier, I mentioned Jean Alter’s distinction between the two functions, that is, the 
‘referential’ and the ‘performant’ one that demarcates the boundaries between 
representation and performance. Let us see Alter’s comments in relation to the film’s 
dramaturgy. What characterises the group’s idiotic provocations within the film is not a 
desire to communicate a message. They understand their role to be of political 
importance, but their happenings do not intend to enlighten but to provoke. Accordingly, 
they do not provide resistant political messages, but their political effect derives from 
their challenging of certain aspects of living (that they are also part of it) and their refusal 
to provide any explanations for it. Stoffer’s view of the idiot as ‘the person of the future’ 
in the aforementioned scene with Karen is not convincing neither for the characters nor 
for the audience.  
What von Trier omits is an elucidation of the characters’ motives, and to an extent 
his film acts as a performative provocation towards the audience, similar to the 
provocations conducted by the group towards the people they meet during their 
happenings. For that reason, the film’s ‘performant’ function is valorised over the 
communicative one. The restaurant scene, which activates the narrative, demonstrates this 
characteristic more clearly. The ‘spassing’ in the restaurant starts unexpectedly after 
Karen has ordered her meal and the camera has established a rudimentary narrative 
orientation. Suddenly, the camera points to another table and we see Susanne trying to 
feed Stoffer and Henrik. When her attempts fail, Stoffer and Henrik burst into 
hyperactivity, typical of mentally disabled people. At this point, the captured material, 
which focuses on the idiotic performances and the customers’ uneasiness, creates feelings 
of empathy with the ‘idiots’. These feelings are frustrated a few minutes later, when we 
get to realise that this was just a performance. Like Karen, the audience feels distanced 
and the question that arises is why? 
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The story of the group’s performing of an abject identity can be seen along with 
the historical changes provoked by the establishment of capitalism and the decline of the 
social movements after the late 1970s. The following formation of various groups, who 
asserted the unique and intense aspect of their oppression, aimed at increasing visibility 
for individuals with marginal identities. This emphasis on ‘identity politics’ led to the 
gradual exclusion of class questions from the political movements that followed.72 
Performance art and avant-garde film practice posed questions concerning the boundaries 
between ‘normative’ and ‘deviant’ identities. Their objective was to raise issues that could 
give public voice to individuals who remained in the margins of society.73  
Yet the contradiction that arises when watching The Idiots lies in the fact that with 
the exception of Karen none of them could be seen as representative of a marginal 
identity. They are all middle-class, heterosexuals, white, and none of them has a mental 
disability. Their emphasis on mimicry, as a form of ‘political radicalism’, creates a gap 
between the characters and their intentional feigning of a marginal identity. This gap is 
heightened at moments when their non-performative identity predominates over the 
idiotic one. One example can be drawn in the scene that they dine eating caviar. Initially, 
they all refrain from wasting it, and they seem to enjoy it. It is only when Stoffer senses 
that the whole thing will not differ from the bourgeois life-style that they mock, that he 
provokes them to eat caviar ‘as they do in Søllerød’ (a wealthy part of Copenhagen) and 
starts spreading it all over their faces.  
This performative struggle generates contradictions and raises questions regarding 
identity. The question that arises is what it means to assume an abject identity. Is it just a 
matter of performative choice or a choice based upon the capitalist model of exchange-
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value? Thus, The Idiots puts forward the conjecture that identity as difference can be quite 
problematic in a historical period, in which radicalism can be reappropriated and thus 
commodified. Rebecca Schneider’s writings on the mimicry of ‘disprivilege’ in 
contemporary capitalism offer an implacable autopsy of this latent commodification of 
difference. Schneider analyses the connection between terms such as performance and 
performativity and the tensions between self and other, the individual and the social 
dimension of performance.74 Schneider points out the danger in reducing everything to a 
performative masquerade and especially when it comes to the mimicry of abjection.  
 
The rampant mimicry of disprivilege across emaciated bodies dressed in 
extremely expensive clothing compels questions about the envy of disprivilege 
in a culture of insatiable accumulation. Perhaps, the imagining of despair, 
violence and loss attempt to appease anxiety about reality effects-claiming 
ownership or control over the signs of wreckage in the wake of capitalism’s 
progress – turning them into artifacts of privilege. Appropriating such images to 
the dreamscape may reassure the consumer with one of postmodernism’s 
dictates: that even the most troubling ‘reality’ can be considered masquerade, 
hype, sham. Such tragedy is not ‘really real’. Impoverishment becomes a choice 
one can buy into, wearing its signs like blackened eye-shadow, re-appropriating 
fear of the disenfranchised ‘other’ into the belly of high-cost consumptive 
desire.75   
 
 
Schneider’s observations help us understand the historicity of the film’s dramaturgical 
interest in the simulation of ‘disprivilege’. Schneider can also make us rethink whether 
emancipation is a matter of mimicry of an abject identity. The film’s ending with Karen 
‘spassing’ in the presence of her family points to the tensions and contradictions of class 
and gendered relations within an oppressed working-class environment. At this point, the 
incommensurability between being someone and performing someone becomes clear, 
since Karen’s performance points to states of marginalism and oppression that cannot be 
reduced to a masquerade, or to a postmodern surface reality. 
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Characters as Bodily Effects  
Von Trier lays these contradictions bare, and his semi-documentary treatment of the 
material does not facilitate the audience’s involvement in the fiction. There is one 
particular scene, which draws upon the Brechtian concept of gestus and makes one rethink 
the idea of identity as difference. Brecht introduced this term to point to the differences 
between an acting style, in which the actor disappears into her/his role, and the one he 
favoured, in which the actor exhibited the Haltungen (the realm of the attitudes) assumed 
by the characters. In this manner, the development of the character is not unequivocal but 
takes place in front of the audience. The actor’s body combines the very act of showing 
with the object which is shown.76 Furthermore, the joining of the two processes produces 
a character, who is not unchangeable, but one who embodies different attitudes according 
to the circumstances she/he faces.  
To return to the film, there is a noteworthy scene which utilizes a gestic acting to 
question the group’s happenings and the very conflict between the individual and the 
mimicry of an abject identity. While the group performs their happenings in a swimming 
pool, the camera focuses on Axel who performs the idiot (figure 5 and 6). After receiving 
a professional phone call he adopts different bodily attitudes. At this point, he assumes a 
different identity setting himself at a distance from the performing happenings (figure 7). 
As a result, the actor is split in two and the gestus offers an embodiment of a social 
contradiction that renders Axel’s participation in the group problematic. Here, gestus is 
used as a means of setting at a distance the character as an impersonator of an abject 
identity, and as a social being that is part of the very reality he negates.  
Here subjectivity is characterised by disunity. While this scene illustrates a 
concrete antiphasis, there are moments in the film, in which the characters’ physical 
attitudes pose stronger questions vis-à-vis identity and offer contradictory possibilities of 
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interpretation. I should like to support this last proposition with reference to two scenes. 
The first one involves Josephine and Jeppe, who engage in a private sexual intercourse, 
while the rest of the group are having an orgy (a scene I discuss in detail below). The 
couple’s sexual activity is not separated from their performative identity, namely the 
idiotic one. In a prolonged sequence, the camera captures the couple, which starts their 
performance in a kind of bio-mechanical way (figure 8). The effect is that there is a 
constant tension between distance and affect that creates confusion for the audience, 
which presumes that the whole thing is a simulation. Eventually the two characters come 
closer to each other and the scene culminates in a dramatic moment, which hovers 
between being part of their idiotic performance and part of the character’s ‘real identity’. I 
refer to the moment that Josephine falls into tears and tells Jeppe that she loves him 
(figure 9 and 10). Subsequently, the characters move from their performing to their social 
identity. Later on, uncertainty is heightened when Josephine is forced by her father to 
leave the group because she suffers from a mental illness.  
As a result, the interplay between performing and being raises questions about 
identity and performance. This aspect of the film has been acknowledged by Ove 
Christensen. As he says: 
 
Basically the film is about role playing and being. What does it mean to be 
someone and what does it mean to pretend to be someone? Is being a 
consequence of acting or does acting make a disguise of an individual’s 
character? Is the individual a persona or a mask? This concerns the status of 
fiction in relation to art.77 
 
 
 Christensen’s questions can be clarified by my discussion of the previous scene, in which 
the individual disintegrates into gestures that cannot be attributed to a unified character. 
This disintegration connects the scene with post-Brechtian employments of gestus, in 
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which the body does not simply flatten and clarify the contradictions, but crosses the 
boundaries between its physical presence and its transformation into material.78  
A similar effect occurs in the last scene of the film, in which Karen ‘spasses’ in 
the presence of her family. Earlier, the audience becomes aware of her recent 
bereavement. During her ‘spassing’, what makes the scene emotionally intense and 
complicated is the gestic camera which avoids establishing a clear origin of the shots. The 
camera alternates between Karen and her family capturing different gestures and reactions 
and generates abstract responses that hover between critical distance and engagement 
(figure 11-13).79 Like the character, the camera is in-between, that is, it constantly shifts 
from a semi-documentary observation to a direct involvement with the material, which 
cannot be reduced to a pure reproduction. The audience is given space to analyse the 
material and identify at the same time with Karen as a character.80 Yet Karen’s 
convincing idiotic performance splits her in two, it becomes psycho-physical, in the sense 
that it is a simulation and a response to her trauma at the same time. The camera and the 
story have her reduced to bodily effects but her body is not simply transformed to a locus 
of dialectical explication. The process becomes dialectical the moment that the body 
crumbles into performance and the boundaries between inside and outside cannot be 
determined.          
Anne Jerslev has described this process from a different viewpoint and argues that 
the film does not privilege ‘the real’ at the expense of the ‘performative’, or the other way 
around, to the extent that indeterminacy prevails. As she says, ‘are characters performing 
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‘“spass”’ or are characters’ innermost feelings being given a means to express themselves 
through the very activity of being a ‘“spasser”’?81 Despite acknowledging these 
ambiguities, Jerslev asserts that the film adopts such a reflexive structure as a means of 
approaching reality with the help of emotions and not as a defamiliarising effect. In my 
reading, this clash between performing and being advances a hermeneutical approach 
according to which performance becomes the precondition of identity and not the other 
way around.  
This point helps us understand the ways that the film goes beyond the Orthodox 
Brechtian acting, which intended to reveal the social drive that motivates the body. Brecht 
put forward an acting style, in which there was a gap between subject and language, as 
well as a distance between the character and his bodily attitudes. This distance could 
expose the characters as products of the social and political relationships. However, his 
employment of performance sounds too reductionist today judging from the political and 
historical differences that separate us from the period he wrote. Therefore, the film’s 
confusion of ‘reality’ and ‘performance’, in a narrative fiercely occupied with ‘reality’ 
and ‘performance’ employs many Brechtian tropes in its depiction of identity. On the 
other hand, the film’s treatment of identity cannot be understood as an Orthodox 
Brechtian one, given that the limits between self and other, and subject and performer are 
not easily distinguishable and reducible to definite social relationships. These 
complications become the film’s self-reflexive scrutiny of its own purpose and of the 
Dogme project as a whole. In this context, The Idiots undermine the Dogme ambition to 
capture the world authentically and reveal ‘the truth’ underneath the appearances.  
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Performing out of Character 
Anthony Dod Mantle, who acted as a cinematographer in three Dogme films (but not in 
The Idiots) , has given a summary of The Idiots’ aesthetics and argues that the interesting 
aspect of the film is that the audience is faced with  a ‘sudden experience’ of not knowing 
whether the object is ‘real or unreal’.82 This ambiguity stems to a large extent from the 
manipulation of the body of the actor as a presence. Jens Albinus (Stoffer in the film) 
attributes this uncertainty to the acting style, which does not allow for much preparation 
and for the actors’ complete identification with their roles. As he says: ‘Even though 
Dogma might look like method acting, it is something else. You cannot prepare yourself 
for the part; the fiction can only take shape here and now’.83 This lack of preparation 
described by Albinus favours the moments in which reality intrudes, and the performer 
oscillates between acting as an actor and as a character. 
Such an example can be drawn from the film’s most provocative scene, in which 
the characters meet up with some people that are truly mentally disabled (the people 
performing them are people with disabilities) (figure 14). Here the responses on the part 
of the characters (or the actors?) heighten the ethical dilemmas and undo the viewer’s 
certainty regarding the fictionality of the portrayed events. Jargil’s behind the scenes 
documentary contains a moment in which von Trier recalls the making of the specific 
scene. As he explains, during the first shooting none of the actors could remain in 
character. They also forgot their fictional names and used their real ones.84 Yet even in the 
final cut, one senses this clash between reality and fiction that makes the actors acting out 
of character. This ambiguity is accentuated by the fact that the Down-syndrome sufferers 
do not act, but literally perform themselves. At this point, the film moves from the 
symbolic to the literal, since von Trier shifts the focus from the bodies of the group, who 
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imitate a fake identity, to the bodies of the disabled people who perform themselves. 
Schneider in her writings on contemporary performance identifies a preference for an 
aesthetics, in which the literal, that is the physical presence of the bodies, downplays their 
symbolic function. As she says: 
 
To render the symbolic literal is to disrupt and make apparent the fetishistic 
prerogatives of a symbol by which a thing, such as a body, or a word, stands by 
convention for something else. To render literal is to collapse symbolic space, 
‘leaving no room for the signified’ (Kristeva). It is to pose borrowing Benjamin 
again and noting his allegiance to Brecht a ‘direct threat’ to the naturalised 
social drama of ‘comprehensibility’.85  
 
 
An analogous suspension of coherent meaning occurs in the aforementioned scene, in 
which there is a shift from representation to presence. It should be noted that 
dramaturgically the specific scene has no connection with the episodes before and after 
(apart from a brief allusion by Henrik in an interview preceding it) and its placement 
within the film is quite arbitrary. At this point, dramatic realism is abandoned in favour of 
a materialist realism (in the literal corporeal sense) given that one cannot affirm whether 
the parts played by the Down-syndrome sufferers are acted or not. The spontaneity that 
characterises them intensifies the feeling that these people do not perform but appear in 
the film’s universe as themselves. Their physical presence undermines the film’s 
fetishistic aspiration to become as realistic as possible, simply because the characters’ 
preceding simulations and the disabled persons’ ‘real’ behaviour fuse reality and fiction 
within the film’s narrative.   
This conflation of illusion and reality operates as an act of aggression against the 
audience. Von Trier is committed to an aesthetics, which attacks the unproblematic 
consumption of images and the pleasure stemming from the certainty that the represented 
material is illusory and not real. Here, the intrusion of the material corporeal reality of the 
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disabled people becomes a defamiliarising effect that interrupts the viewer’s concentration 
on the narrative. Von Trier questions the limits of the medium itself and, in placing an 
excess of reality within the film’s diegesis, he does not simply create a scene, but 
activates medium awareness and points to the medium’s ability to intermix the illusory 
and the real.  
This oscillation between illusion and reality forces also an awareness of the 
audience’s voyeurism, which is made abundantly clear in another provocative scene, in 
which the group decides to have an orgy. Throughout the orgy, there are moments that the 
camera captures the male actors’ erections and at this point the distinctions between the 
bodies of the actors and the bodies of the characters, who perform the idiots, collapse. The 
scene documents sexual actuality and fiction, an effect that characterises films of sexual 
adult content. By mixing actuality and fiction, the scene blurs the boundaries between 
sexual activity and simulations of that activity. When the camera registers Stoffer’s and 
Henrik’s erection, the actors shift from states of acting to not-acting; the effect is that 
separations between actors and characters, film and non-film are constantly placed into 
doubt. 
This scene does not derive its power solely from the presence of the naked bodies 
and the sexual activity, but from the coexistence of images of real penetration within a 
context of artifice, since the characters perform the idiots during the orgy (figure 15). This 
coexistence is rendered more problematic because of the camera’s uninterrupted capturing 
of the action, which adds a sense of ‘liveness’ to the film. In effect, the simultaneity of 
‘real’ sexual activity and simulation valorises the very process of making a scene rather 
than the finished product. For this reason, the audience participates in a different way 
which mobilises its ability to assess the material critically and activate affective responses 
at the same time.  
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At this point, I want to consider Brigitte Peucker’s discussion of cinema’s ability 
to incorporate the real through the corporeal presence of the body. Peucker explains that 
certain portrayals of the body within a film’s narrative may provoke material-somatic 
responses on the part of the audience and challenge the subject and object relationships. 
Peucker sets as an example Michael Haneke’s cinema, which derives its power from an 
emphasis on austere images that provoke the viewer intellectually and create affective 
responses too. As she says: 
 
Indeed, these films elicit a spectator who is provoked, feels irritated, on the 
defensive, and in a situation of conflict, thus moving considerably beyond 
Brecht’s intellectual provocation into the realm of programmed emotion. It is in 
this affective and corporeal sense that Haneke’s films are “interactive”.86 
 
 
In her discussion of Funny Games (1998), Peucker clarifies her point and suggests that 
Haneke’s shocking images of implied violence create feelings of irritation, feelings that 
are not solely intellectual but somatic too. Peucker quotes Haneke saying that his way of 
working intends to activate spectatorial reactions that will render the audience as co-
creators in the production of meaning.87  
Peucker’s analysis draws attention to certain film practices that valorise the 
performative aspect of the medium rather than the representation of a reified product. 
Similarly, von Trier’s incorporation of moments in which the actors are in and out of 
character creates a split in the represented material and the mode of its representation. The 
audience is neither totally distanced, nor in complete identification with the characters. 
The incorporation of truly mentally handicapped people  and real sexual activity in the 
film’s diegetic world makes one oscillate between distanced scrutiny of the material and 
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somatic participation; this participation is expressed through responses of anger, disgust 
and/or stimulation. As a result, the film coerces the viewer to respond, and to engage in a 
process, which perceives the film-making and film-viewing process as a resistance to the 
consolidation of the movie into a consumable object.  
One of the most important pieces of evidence stemming from the critical approach 
I maintained in this chapter is that a film that benefits from certain aspects of Brecht’s 
theory and practice is not necessarily antithetical with realism. It may also be worth 
noting, that Dogme as well as The Idiots draw our attention to the fact that realism in art is 
a set of conventions (for example meaningful dialogue and goal-orientated dramaturgy) 
that may have nothing to do with ‘reality’. Von Trier revolts against these conventions 
and his utilisation of the Dogme rules leads to an oppositional realist practice that is not 
structured upon the empirical reproduction of reality. My argument has been based on the 
fact that his employment of a ‘performative’ camera questions the distance between the 
film as filmed narrative and the film as a documentation of the process of its own making. 
In effect, the film does not efface the apparatus of its production, while the intentional 
foregrounding of its ‘performant’ function acts as a means of questioning the very idea of 
‘the real’.  
The Idiots inaugurates a new trajectory in von Trier’s filmmaking, since he starts 
engaging in a dialogue with the art of performance and theatre. This dialogue is 
strengthened in his post-Dogme works and in particular in Dogville (2003) and 
Manderlay (2005), two films that have pushed the ascetic Dogme aesthetics even further. 
Action takes place in an empty space reminiscent of a theatre stage and emphasis is 
placed mainly on the actors’ performances. This method is the logical outcome of the 
Dogme principles, yet certain tenets of the Manifesto, such as location shooting and the 
negation of extra-diegetic music, are modified. Nonetheless, von Trier continues a 
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filmmaking practice that calls attention to the performances, with the intention of creating 
emotional shocks that generate contradictions. The next chapter analyses Dogville and 
delves into these issues in more detail. 
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Chapter 4 – Dogville: Theatricality as Experimentation.  
 
Representation as an Experiment  
Dogville (2003) and Manderlay (2005) are the only films by von Trier that have been 
consistently discussed in relation to Brecht.  The two films comprise a trilogy still 
incomplete – titled USA Land of Opportunities – and share thematic and formal 
similarities. Von Trier has promoted them as aesthetic, political, and moral experiments 
that aim at challenging the established cinematic language and the audience’s film-
viewing habits of uncritical consumption.  In this chapter I will focus on Dogville, so as to 
place emphasis on certain formal and thematic elements that can elucidate the film’s 
politics and innovations. I am interested in investigating the whole idea of the experiment 
in the film’s form and content, so as to reveal Dogville’s dialectical complexity which has 
been ignored by previous readings. More specifically, I relate von Trier’s view of the film 
as an experiment to Brecht’s understanding of experimentation as a dialectical process. 
For Brecht, this process intends to complicate form so as to question perceptions that are 
taken for granted.  
What I want to keep from Brecht is his view of formal complication as a means of 
demystifying the aura of timelessness and universality in human relationships, and his 
understanding of the individual as a process. In this context, I discuss the ways the film 
employs theatricality and performativity to destabilise the characters’ identities. I suggest 
that Dogville investigates the ways that the capitalist law of exchange-value affects social 
relationships, including the oppositional forces that are concerned with introducing 
changes on a moral rather than a political level. On the other hand, this chapter concerns 
itself with reading the film in a way that goes beyond Brecht’s understanding of 
experimentation as a means of envisaging an alternative political reality. In particular, I 
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analyse the formal strategies employed by von Trier that generate contradictions which 
resist epistemological mastery of the posed questions. 
I want to start this section by unpacking von Trier’s definition of Dogville as an 
experiment so as to identify the term’s Brechtian resonances. To begin with, I want to 
address formal issues that can elucidate the way that the film challenges film language. 
Then, I will proceed to discuss how the film’s content dramatises a social experiment. 
Primarily, the experimental aspect of the film springs from its form. Dogville employs a 
minimalist aesthetics with respect to the set and was shot in a hangar in Trollhättan, a 
Swedish town. The hangar is used so as to resemble a theatre space where chalk marks are 
used to define scenography (figure 1). The actors act realistically in a set which is far 
from being realistic. Despite the stylization that stems from the spatial simplicity, sound 
effects are used to substitute the lack of frames so there are moments that we hear door-
knockings even though there are no visible doors or houses in the set. According to von 
Trier, the aim of this spatial simplicity and unity is to make the audience focus on the 
portrayed relationships and reinstate their creativity during the film-viewing process.1  
The film consists of a prologue and nine chapters, where each subject heading 
gives a brief account of what is about to follow. The story is told by an omniscient 
narrator (John Hurt) who pares away with the inessentials of plot and intervenes to 
comment on the actions and pose questions to the audience. One can certainly see that 
Dogville features literary, theatrical, and filmic elements. In an interview given after the 
completion of the film, von Trier explained that the film’s aspiration is to challenge any 
stereotyped ideas regarding film form. As he says: 
 
The most reactionary attitude to art has always been the question ‘what is art?’, 
followed by the statement ‘This isn’t art’. Limiting it, labelling it. In the same 
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way, people have tried to contain and limit film – and literature too for that 
matter. I’m trying to challenge that now by creating a fusion between film, 
theatre and literature. That doesn’t mean filming a performance in a theatre 
though. Dogville lives its own life, according to highly specific value criteria 
within the genre which, as of now, can be called ‘fusion film’. It’s important not 
to get bogged down in questions of what is cinematic or not cinematic, because 
it seems like we’ve reached a position where everything is possible. The 
cinematic has been purified to the point where it has all become completely 
lacking in interest. There, a bit of cinema philosophy!2 
 
Von Trier’s argument that ‘film has been purified’ emanates from an acknowledgement of 
the cinematic institution’s ability to reduce film-viewing into a process of commodity 
consumption. Consequently, one of the aims of Dogville’s aesthetics is to experiment with 
a variety of media so as to challenge medium specificity, and transform a set of 
conventions with respect to film language and film-viewing habits of uncritical 
consumption.  
This aspiration helps us to expose the idea of experimentation as production 
instead of reproduction. Here, one recalls Brecht’s understanding of experimental thinking 
as a means of changing a medium, rather than simply producing for it. For Brecht, the 
experiment is a synonym of a new method of production which is not satisfied with 
perpetuating the institution of theatre/cinema. His argument is rooted in the fact that as 
long as the medium’s function is not criticised, then the final object consolidates in an 
item to be sold. In this way, one should aim at challenging the established institutions that 
resist any modification in their function. Brecht’s intention to change the 
cinematic/theatrical institution is in accordance with his view of the dialectical process as 
a means of confronting certain established ideas by means of practical activity. 
Subsequently, he equates experimental thinking with praxis and utility of thought.3 At the 
heart of Brecht’s argument, is his view of representation as science that can make one 
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rethink social institutions and the historically formed reality. Such a rethinking is of vital 
importance, because as Brecht points out, institutions have a tendency to co-opt the most 
dangerous art objects and turn them into cultural commodities.4 
With Brecht’s comments in mind, one can see von Trier’s experimentation in 
Dogville as a means of resisting the commodification of the medium. Furthermore, what I 
see as a Brechtian gesture is the synthesis of materials from different media as a means of 
encouraging a more productive spectatorship. To clarify this point, one has to recall 
Brecht’s argument concerning the process of ‘literalization’, which I discussed in the 
second chapter too. According to Brecht, the ‘literalization’ of the theatre refers to a 
process in which the medium experiments and makes contact with other institutions so as 
to produce ‘complex seeing’. The term ‘complex seeing’ describes a dialectical 
engagement with the material that is not concerned with transmitting a single-minded 
message. By contrast, the audience adopts a ‘reading attitude’ that guarantees a freedom 
of thought as opposed to the theatrical institution’s tendency to homogenise the 
audience’s perceptions and reactions.5 This ‘reading attitude’ invites the audience to 
experiment with the material and as Brecht says, ‘illusion is sacrificed to free 
discussion’.6 This ‘new attitude’ can make the audience question ‘the present form of 
society’ and transform certain institutions from places of reproduction to places of 
productive communication and discussion. For Brecht, this ‘reading attitude’ is 
tantamount to an experimental thinking that sees reality as open to transformative 
practice.  
In a like fashion, von Trier’s formal organisation of Dogville as filmed theatre, the 
chapter structure, and the omniscient narrator invite a reading response that valorises the 
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role of the audience in the construction of meaning. The fusion of image, narrated text, 
and fixed narrative space show the represented material via representation, a process that 
is not dedicated to the production of a seamless narrative. Moreover, the off-screen 
narrator interrupts the story and delivers it to the audience to analyse it, something that 
reinforces the film’s interest in encouraging discussion. The crucial corollary of this 
method is that what are called into question are the cinematic institution itself and the 
understanding of the medium as a consumable reflection of reality. As such, Dogville’s 
impoverished conditions of production become the logical continuation of von Trier’s 
critique of the cinematic institution through the Dogme project. In a way, the film’s set 
turns into a laboratory that aims at reactivating the relation between production and 
reception.  
Brecht thought the same when he argued in favour of a separation of elements and 
against Wagner’s concept of the opera as a Gesamtkunstwerk [integrated work of art], 
which aimed at the total assimilation of different elements. In his view, the 
Gesamtkunstwerk prevented the audience from making the leap from the 
habitual/empirical perception of reality to a detached view of things that could reveal their 
dialectical complexity. Currently, Brecht’s critique of the Gesamtkunstwerk is still 
relevant, because as Dietrich Scheunemann points out, a large amount of films produced 
at the present time have inherited the Wagnerian understanding of art as a harmonious 
integration of elements.7 This quest for a synthetic integration of elements is evident in 
the hyperrealism of contemporary ‘post-photographic’ cinema.8 In a way, Dogville’s 
minimalism aims at freeing the medium from the conventions of the synthetic 
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hyperrealism of contemporary digital cinema, which perceives cinema as ‘a reality in its 
own right’.9 By restricting the action in a bare stage, the film aims at preventing the 
audience from being completely absorbed by the story and at making the viewers focus on 
the examination of the portrayed relationships, and their susceptibility to change. 
The productive aspect of film’s reference to the art of theatre and the idea that 
such a method produces an ‘anti-spectacle effect’ that can make the audience focus on 
dialectical contradictions has been acknowledged by Stephen Heath. For Heath, the 
‘theatricalisation of cinema’ leads to a fusion of theatricality, textuality and cinematic 
narration. This fusion of different media produces heterogeneous effects, which challenge 
the dominant cinematic language and disturb the film’s representational flow. The result 
is that this practice favours formal and thematic indeterminacy that leads to provisional 
and non-authoritative conclusions. Heath’s comments derive mainly from his theoretical 
engagement with the cinema of Straub/Huillet and in particular with films such as, The 
Bridegroom, the Comedienne and the Pimp [Der Bräutigam, die Komödiantin und der 
Zuhälter (1968)], Othon [Les Yeux ne veulent Pas en Tout Temps se Fermer, ou Peut-être 
qu'un Jour Rome se Permettra de Choisir à Son Tour, 1970 (1970)] and Moses and Aaron 
(1974). As Heath writes: 
 
The films of such a textual practice are themselves a constant process of reading, 
this process then itself demanding new modes of reading, displacing the 
spectator from the positions in which he is interpellated in the classic film... 
Classic film is finally less a question of mise-en-scène than of mise-en-place and 
anything that disturbs that place, that position, the fictions of myself and my 
‘Reality’ can only be theoretical, the theatricalisation of representation in its 
forms; film theatre, critical cinema, a cinema of crisis and contradiction.10 
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Of great note here, are Heath’s comments on the reading attitude encouraged by the 
‘theatricalisation of cinema’, something that I identify in Dogville too.  
However, Heath’s essay refers mainly to Straub/Huillet, who film in open-air 
theatres (The Bridegroom is the only exception) in which their actors use the text as a 
‘vocal body’ separated from the individual who delivers it. Straub/Huillet manipulate the 
image, the text and the theatre space in order to make the audience experiment with the 
produced ‘sound-body’.11 For them, this radical separation of elements is the route to a 
cinema that resists the mainstays of character and plot. In their view, the audience’s 
enlightenment can only take place through such a process of negativity.  
Evidently, von Trier does not share this commitment to cinematic unpleasure, 
which responds to a limited audience of ‘experts’. Mainly, because Dogville does not go 
against the story-telling function of the medium as the aforementioned filmmakers do. 
The film employs a dramaturgical simplicity that can make the ‘non-initiated’ participate 
in the questions it poses. Then again, as I explain later on, the references to the art of 
theatre have their impact on the film’s portrayal of the characters, since the limited 
diegetic space demonstrates the dialectic between the individual and society. This aspect 
of the film makes the audience understand the characters as the outcome of social 
relationships and not as self-determined individuals motivated solely by psychology. 
Furthermore, the understanding of Dogville as an experiment which aims at activating the 
audience is reinforced by its content too; the film theatricalises a social experiment, which 
aims at exploring how an act of solidarity can result in punishment, animosity and 
retaliation.  
Dogville, as the narrator announces at the beginning of the film, is the sad story of 
a small American town in the Rocky Mountains the year of 1932 and consists of a 
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prologue and nine chapters. The people living in the town are hard-hit by the great 
depression and live under adverse conditions. As the narrator says, ‘most of the buildings 
were pretty wretched, more like sacks frankly’. After having being given a brief 
introduction to the characters, the off-screen narration focuses on Tom (Paul Bettany), a 
young self-appointed intellectual, who organises regular meetings with his fellow citizens, 
aiming at the town’s moral ‘re-armament’. When he meets a young fugitive, Grace 
(Nicole Kidman), chased by a bunch of gangsters, he protects her and decides to 
accommodate her in Dogville.12 To do so, however, he has to gain permission from the 
people. Therefore, Tom decides to use Grace as an ‘illustration’ for his argument that 
Dogville is not a tolerant town and its people have forgotten how to receive 
unconditionally. Grace will be their chance to prove that they are committed to 
community values. The people accommodate her and Grace for her part, and at Tom’s 
suggestion, volunteers to help the citizens of Dogville with any errands that need to be 
done. Initially, nobody accepts her services, but eventually people consent to let her do 
things ‘that they do not really need’, but can make their lives better.  
The people decide that Grace is entitled to stay, but when they realise that there is 
a large amount of money offered to anyone knowing of her whereabouts, they start 
abusing her in various ways. Grace is coerced to work more hours, to accept a pay cut and 
she eventually becomes the victim of sexual assault on the part of the male population. In 
the last chapter, the citizens of Dogville decide to deliver her back to the gangsters. The 
‘big man’ (James Caan) turns out to be her father and after a brief conversation between 
them, we learn that the two of them had disagreed about his brutal methods. The reason 
that Grace left him was because of her willingness to prove that human beings are 
essentially ‘good’. Now that her experiment has failed her father offers her the possibility 
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of sharing his power with her. Initially, Grace hesitates but eventually she accepts his 
offer and orders the gangsters to burn the town and execute its citizens.  
The pioneers of the social experiment are Tom and Grace. Tom suggests that 
Dogville is a community structured upon individualism and self-deception. The young 
fugitive becomes ‘an illustration’ that can cancel out his argument and reveal the town’s 
potential for something else. Grace, on the other hand, disagrees with her father’s 
practices and flees from him to prove that a mode of conduct based upon unconditional 
generosity and forgiveness can make individuals show their best qualities. Throughout the 
film, Tom’s and Grace’s experiments raise contradictions that do not solidify to a concrete 
resolution. For instance, Tom’s willingness to make Dogville a community based upon 
values of openness and acceptance leads to Grace’s exploitation and suffering. 
Eventually, Tom adapts himself to the community’s treatment of Grace and ends up 
delivering her to the gangsters. Equally problematic is Grace’s behaviour and her shift 
from a stoic acceptance of her abuses to a violent retribution. This change acts as a 
provocation towards the audience that has been fooled to identify with her throughout her 
misfortunes.  
The end of the experiment finds one in confusion; the audience has to play a more 
active role, since von Trier offers  us material and asks us, whether we consent to the 
film’s resolution or not. Dogville’s dialectical collisions show conditions from the 
perspective of their changeability and not as static, but in ways that go beyond a 
juxtaposition of a ‘correct’ and an ‘incorrect’ political behaviour. I wish to examine this 
point in connection with Brecht’s Lehrstücke (usually translated as learning plays in 
English). The Lehrstücke constitute experiments in theatrical form and intend to 
experiment with exercises in political, ethical, and social behaviour. In these plays, there 
are no distinctions between actors and audience, since they are pedagogical exercises for 
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those who perform them. Brecht intended to raise points of tension that render the very 
idea of Einverständnis [consent] problematic. The most popular examples are plays such 
as He Who Says Yes [Der Jasager], He Who Says No [Der Neinsager] and The Decision 
[Die Maßnahme]. In the first two plays, Brecht questions the individual’s sacrifice for a 
collective cause and while He Who Says Yes seems to approve the whole idea of the 
individual self-sacrifice, He Who Says No contradicts it. In The Decision, a young 
Communist acquiesces to his own extermination because his actions endanger the Party’s 
mission.  
What these plays question is the very idea of consent, and despite criticism’s 
initial condemnation of the Lehrstücke as “didactic” and single-minded plays, studies in 
the 1970s and 1980s have revealed their dialectical complexity.13 By performing them, the 
participants learn to think dialectically and to reject one-dimensional solutions to complex 
problems. A key term here is theatricalisation which is equivalent to the very idea of 
experimentation. Emphasis is not placed on the actions, but on their theatricalisation, that 
is, their re-enactment. In re-enacting specific actions and questioning decisions that have 
been previously taken, the performers learn to think dialectically and discover the thin 
boundaries between consent and dissent. For instance, in the conclusion of The Decision 
the control chorus approves of the political killing. However, the performers can either 
agree or disagree with this absolute conclusion. Thus, the Lehrstücke generate unresolved 
contradictions, only to focus on morality itself as the problem, and reveal that ethics 
cannot be dissociated from social and political interests. On this basis, actions that aim at 
the promotion of progressive politics are constantly questioned and analysed so as to 
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demonstrate that unless the moral, traditional certainties of the past are changed, progress 
can easily lapse into regression. 
What I find relevant pertaining to Dogville is Brecht’s scepticism concerning 
consent. Obviously given the medium differences, Dogville does not assume the 
Lehrstücke’s radical abolition between stage and auditorium, but the film operates as a 
sociological experiment that activates questions regarding decision-making. Furthermore, 
von Trier moves away from such binaries like the ones presented in these plays, and one 
cannot simply identify with any of the conflicting forces (Grace or the citizens of 
Dogville). The film’s similarity with the Lehrstücke is that Dogville proceeds to confront 
the audience with experimental situations that show that an act of solidarity can lead to 
regressive politics. Grace’s entrance into Dogville aims at making the town’s residents 
change their individualist ethic. Nonetheless, both parties are more intent on introducing 
changes that preserve certain norms instead of changing them. Thus, Dogville accepts 
Grace only to take advantage of her and preserve the community’s individualist ethic. 
Similarly, Grace acquiesces to the gangster rule with the intention of ‘changing the 
world’, and one can see how an act of change can turn into a means of enforcing the 
social norms and customs that it theoretically opposes.  
Dogville problematises the whole idea of ‘social consent’ within the reality of 
democratic capitalism, which is ostentatiously structured upon a ‘social contract’. The 
community consents to saving Grace from the gangsters and later on it consensually 
agrees to her exploitation.  But the most problematic form of consent is advanced by the 
film’s ending, in which Grace consents to her father’s view of power as something ‘not 
necessarily wrong’. The audience’s identification with her martyrdom may release 
cathartic feelings when viewing her decision to destroy a whole town. Thus, the question 
that arises is whether the audience consents to this solution or not. Empirical research 
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from student screenings shows that reactions can vary. Certain viewers cannot identify 
with any of the characters. However, other viewer responses can be quite crude. Linda 
Badley, for instance, brings evidence from plenty of IMDb users, who demand ‘payback’ 
and, like Grace, they consent to the gangster rule.14 The feelings of relief that these 
spectators experience become problematic. Von Trier seems to assault the audience’s 
desire for solution and revenge, as if he wants to expose one’s ‘indre svinehund’ (inner 
bastard) – a Danish expression which as Nikolaj Lubecker explains, ‘became popular 
during the 1980s when it was introduced into debates about xenophobia’.15 The film does 
not simply question the character’s decision but the very tropes of identification employed 
by mainstream cinema and the ways they affect the viewers’ perception of social reality.  
Von Trier, like Brecht, employs ‘the negative example’, in order to frustrate any 
easy decision-making on the part of the audience. By the term ‘negative example’, I 
understand the predilection for including within an argument something which is 
heterogeneous to it, so as to stimulate responses that provoke dialectical questions. In 
certain plays for example, Brecht takes as a starting point the argument that the world 
must be changed. To explore the ways that change can occur, he sets as examples people 
supporting changes in moral and ethical attitudes that do not challenge the broader 
political reality. The failure of these paradigms intends to make the audience understand 
change beyond the limits of moral reformism. This method is used by Brecht in plays 
such as The Good Person of Szechwan [Der Gute Mensch von Sezuan] and The Saint Joan 
of the Stockyards [Die Heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfe], in which the characters act 
good-heartedly only to realise that the reality of capitalism demands different actions. In a 
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way, the similarities that Dogville shares with these two plays may make one perceive 
them as ‘models’ that are reworked to open out a set of different questions.  Brecht 
employs the term ‘model’ to refer to the imitation and reproduction of patterns from 
widely known works with the view to presenting them in a different context.16 
Von Trier has admitted Dogville’s parallels to many Brechtian plays and has 
explained that one of the film’s starting points was Pirate Jenny’s song in The Threepenny 
Opera. As he says: ‘I listened to that a lot and was seduced by the revenge motif in the 
song ‘“And they asked me which heads should fall, and the harbour felt quiet as I 
answered, all”’.17 From the aforementioned comments and the obvious similarities that 
the film shares with Brecht, one can easily understand the reasons why critics have 
connected Dogville with Brecht. Below, I intend to look at Dogville’s critical reception so 
as to detect the ways that critics have discussed the film as part of a Brechtian film 
practice.  
I want to begin with Caroline Bainbridge’s analysis that is based upon a paradox, 
which states that the film is a ‘Brechtian didactic’ piece that invokes self-reflexivity. 
These two terms are in conflict with each other taking into account that the process of 
encouraging the audience to reflect and analyse the material on screen cannot be 
reconciled with the propagation of a single-minded lesson. Moreover, Bainbridge 
proceeds to read the film under the rubric of the postmodern, but her reading does not 
clarify the different ends that von Trier’s ‘Brechtian aesthetic’ serves. Bainbridge 
concludes her analysis asserting that the film operates as an indictment of the 
contemporary geopolitical scene and the Bush administration.18 
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All the same, for Seyhan Özmenek the film’s Brechtianism is tantamount to a 
‘didactic parable’ against America. He argues that the film’s narrative sees America as a 
place of ‘crime’ and articulates a ‘universal picture’, according to which the dichotomies 
between ‘good and evil’ are discernible. For Özmenek, the film’s politics is nothing but 
‘an allegory of the power America exerts on other countries’. 19  Thus, one can see that his 
interpretation does not go beyond an allegorical reading of the film’s content, which he 
understands to be an indictment of America as a nation. My major disagreement with his 
point of view and Bainbridge’s emanates from the fact that they both tend to see in von 
Trier’s and Brecht’s formal choices a willingness to articulate a ‘universal truth’. This 
argument is very un-Brechtian given that Brecht favoured representations that would 
show ‘historical incidents as unique and transitory’ and not as ‘universally human’.20 
Equally problematic is the tautological perception of the bare stage as a 
‘defamiliarising effect’ in itself. This line of argument is followed by Linda Badley, who 
suggests that Dogville reflects ‘a uniquely American shallowness, the composite result of 
its pragmatism, parochialism and historical amnesia’.21 Badley argues that Grace in the 
film becomes a ‘caricature’ of Bush and the military idealism of the United States. 
Moreover, Badley quotes Robert Sinnerbrink’s argument that von Trier’s employment of 
‘Brechtian devices’ produce the very type of emotions that Brecht wished to abolish. For 
Badley, the effect is un-Brechtian, because the film intensifies feelings, which she 
considers to be antithetical with Brecht’s practice.22  
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I am not entirely convinced that her point necessarily holds, given that the feelings 
in the film are subject to a process of changeability. Furthermore, Brecht did not intend to 
abolish feelings tout court. This is evidenced in a well-known passage, in which he says: 
 
It is not true, though it is sometimes suggested, that epic theatre (which is not 
simply undramatic theatre, as it is also suggested) proclaims the slogan: ‘Reason 
this side, emotion (feeling) that’. It by no means renounces emotion, least of all 
the sense of justice, the urge to freedom and righteous anger; it is so far from 
renouncing these that it does not even assume their presence, but tries to arouse 
or to reinforce them. The ‘attitude of criticism’ which it tries to awaken in its 
audience cannot be passionate enough for it.23  
 
 
My formal analysis intends to demonstrate how von Trier follows Brecht and shows that 
feelings are motivated by social conditions. Certainly, the film goes beyond an Orthodox 
Marxist and Brechtian critique that aspires to lead to cultural enlightenment, but this 
aspect does not render it un-dialectical. Lubecker has acknowledged this point and argues 
that the film is less about Dogville and Grace. It is rather a ‘manipulative machine’ which 
intends to tease out some ‘anti-social drives’ within the spectator. Certainly, Lubecker’s 
point is valid and I shall return to the film’s interest in offending the audience in the 
second section of this chapter.24  
Other critics have focused on Dogville’s similarity with a variety of Brechtian 
plays, such as The Good Person of Szechwan, The Threepenny Opera [Die 
Dreigroschenoper], The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui [Der Aufhaltsame Aufstieg des 
Arturo Ui] and The Caucasian Chalk Circle [Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis].25 Again, the 
majority of these discussions are busy identifying semantic similarities between Brecht 
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and von Trier, while others are simply keen on laying out the basic tenets of Brecht’s 
Verfremdungseffekt, which they discover in certain formal choices.26 There are also plenty 
of articles, popular reviews and festival reports that tend to reduce von Trier’s Brechtian 
elements to a one-dimensional intellectualism structured upon binary oppositions between 
good versus evil. These reviews normally tend to adopt an uncritical equation between 
Brecht and von Trier based on the assumption that both see America as a violent place, in 
which intolerance is the rule.27 Again, one can recognise a line of argument that strips the 
film from its dialectical complexity. 
Far more complicated is Jacques Rancière’s argument that Dogville manipulates 
the Brechtian fable of Saint Joan of the Stockyards in which Joan Dark wanted to impose 
Christian morality within a capitalist system of exploitation. Rancière suggests that the 
Brechtian play exhibited the impossibility of reconciliation of different interests within 
capitalism. Unlike Brecht’s play, Rancière argues that Dogville is an object representative 
of an era, in which political questions are replaced by an unmediated relativism. As 
Rancière says:  
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By contrast [to Brecht’s play], the evil encountered by Grace in Dogville refers 
to no other cause but itself. Grace no longer represents the good soul mystified 
by her ignorance of the causes of evil. She is just the stranger, the excluded one 
who wants to be admitted into the community and who is subjected by the 
community before being rejected by it. Her disillusionment and her narrative of 
suffering no longer depend on any system of domination that could be 
understood and destroyed. They depend upon a form of evil that is the cause and 
effect of this reproduction. This is why the only fitting retribution is the radical 
cleansing exercised upon the community by a lord and father who is no one else 
but the king of thugs. ‘Only violence helps where violence rules’ was the 
Brechtian lesson. Only evil repays evil, is the transformed formula, the one that 
is appropriated for consensual and humanitarian times.28  
 
For Rancière, the difference between Dogville and Brecht’s play lies in the gap between 
political and post-political art. What I find problematic in his reading is the fact that his 
argument is structured upon the absolute and fixed categories of ‘good versus evil’. Such 
an approach not only simplifies the film’s politics, but Brecht’s as well, whose work he 
cites approvingly. I suggest that Dogville’s seemingly ‘cynical amoralism’ – that Rancière 
understands to be apolitical – disorientates the audience so as to produce shock-effects. 
The purpose of disorientating the audience by means of shock-effects is to provoke 
feelings of astonishment that expose the contradictions within social relationships. These 
shock-effects do not restrict the film’s politics to the transmission of a thesis which assists 
the spectators in arriving at a single or final understanding of the object. Thus, what 
Rancière and the aforementioned critics do not address are the historical transitions that 
have changed the ways in which art attains its political function.  
For Brecht, the alignment of contradictions aimed at leading the audience to 
achieve class consciousness, which he thought to be a position of knowledge. In von 
Trier’s case, the film does not become political through the advocating of a concrete 
political thesis that can signal social progress. Like Brecht, the film’s form is interested in 
identifying the social and the political in the everyday relationships, but in a way that the 
boundaries between oppressors and oppressed are not easily distinguishable. Thus, the 
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working-class community of Dogville is not shown as a revolutionary subject in-process, 
but as a historical victim that accepts the very logic of oppression for its own short-term 
benefits.  
Theatricality  
To highlight the ways that Dogville makes use of Brechtian strategies without sharing 
Brecht’s tendency towards political enlightenment, I am interested in exploring the 
theatricality with which the film is infused. The aim is to demonstrate the ways that the 
film problematises identity and blurs the boundaries between the individual and the 
collective. More precisely, I intend to show that von Trier’s complication of identity goes 
beyond Brecht’s Orthodox Marxist dialectics according to which the collective subject is 
the force of radical change and innovation. I suggest that Dogville focuses on the primacy 
of social processes in the formation of human relationships and negates any binary 
distinctions between oppressors and oppressed. By exploring these issues, I intend to 
reveal von Trier’s aesthetics of negativity. By the term aesthetics of negativity, I 
understand the employment of contradictions in ways that produce a collision of theses 
and antitheses which defy the idea of a conclusive end point. 
A good starting point to explore these issues is to discuss the ways von Trier 
employs theatricality to suggest that the lives of the citizens of Dogville are embedded in 
an ideological sense of inevitability and unchangeability. While the term theatricality 
refers to the overt foregrounding of artifice in the acting and the mise-en-scène, in cinema 
the term is associated with a modus operandi that produces excessive frames and 
performances. In other words, theatricality is the intentional foregrounding of artificiality 
as a means of opposing cinema’s self-effacing uses of the medium for the production of 
narrative content. An enlightening definition of theatricality that addresses the very idea 
of theatre as a restricted space has been given by Samuel Weber. Weber discusses 
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theatricality with respect to other media, such as film that concerns my discussion. As he 
says: 
 
“Theater” signifies the imposition of borders rather than a representational 
aesthetic-genre. The former focuses upon the manner in which a place is 
secured, whereas the latter regards the place as already taken or given, and 
therefore as a means or instrument of that which is to be represented. In respect 
to its mediality then, theatricality is defined as a problematic process of placing, 
framing, situating, rather than as a process of representation.29  
 
 
Weber’s definition of theatricality as a process of framing/exploring the borders of a 
spatial reality applies eloquently to Dogville. The restriction of the action in demarcated 
boundaries becomes an allegory for the community’s isolation. 
Dogville, as we learn from the voice-over, is a community that does not have 
many exchange relations with the world outside its boundaries. The place is inflicted by 
poverty, but as the narrator informs us from the very beginning, the people saw no reason 
to change anything in their lives. What the voice-over puts forward is the idea that the 
people living in this town mechanically reproduce a reality that perpetuates their 
deprivation. This point is reinforced by the way von Trier uses the camera to frame the 
action in this limited diegetic space. One particular frame in the film’s prologue is telling 
concerning the idea that the community uncritically reproduces a reality that seems to be 
enforced by historical and financial conditions that people fail to challenge. When Tom 
leaves his house for the first time, the camera follows him and zooms out so that we can 
see all the characters’ activities in the background (figure 2). The unity of space gives us a 
panoptic view, but the characters’ movements within it look stylised and they appear as 
mechanical reproductions of tasks.     
Of particular interest here, is the way the combination of image and sound show 
individuals as part of a collective subject. The camera pans to frame the action, while 
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characters are reported by the voice-over, making them look like a collection of semes. In 
doing so, von Trier does away with psychological portrayal, an effect that is strengthened 
by the set, whose minimalist scenery gives one the chance to detect the interactions 
between individuals. This aspect of the film follows the Brechtian paradigm of showing 
the characters being motivated by socio-historical impulses. For Brecht, the portrayal of 
characters as products of history aims at making the audience understand the individual as 
historically defined and not as a universal human subject. Brecht’s key contention is that 
representation should aim at transforming the audience’s view of reality as natural. 
Emancipation from nature is imperative for the transformation of the audience’s 
perception and as an extension for any progressive social transformation.30 
Dogville’s formal asceticism assists us in seeing the characters as part of a 
collective reality. Yet what von Trier omits is the idea that the self-realisation of the 
individual as part of a collective is the route to radical transformation. The residents of 
Dogville see themselves as part of a community, but what unites them is their acceptance 
of the social circumstances of their town, which has not really followed modernisation. 
Their collective spirit is not an act of class consciousness but a way of reproducing the 
existing reality of their rural economy. As mentioned earlier, Dogville’s economic 
interaction with the outside world is limited something that is constantly underlined by the 
voice-over narration. This lack of interaction, leads the community to a collective 
understanding of social-life as a process of self-preservation. Consequently, the collective 
subject is shown as being implicated in an uncritical mimicry of nature and not as a force 
of transformation. 
What is particularly suggestive here, is that the community’s isolation transmits a 
sense of unfreedom and fixity. Partly, this unfreedom can be attributed to the fact that 
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Dogville is more or less a ‘primitive’ and poor, but self-reliant society and not one that 
has been properly adapted to the reality of modern capitalism. It is this lack of interaction 
that forces the town’s intellectual to argue in favour of ‘openness and acceptance’. Tom 
speaks from the moral point of view which intends to identify meaning in the life of the 
community, beyond the goals of self-preservation. When Tom meets Grace and asks the 
people to show an attitude of acceptance, he actually manages to introduce Dogville to an 
exchange-value relationship with someone beyond the town’s limits. 
What is theatricalised here by von Trier is the drama of unlimited generosity and 
goodness as put forward by Grace. Grace offers to the people of Dogville her affective 
labour in exchange for her survival. But the voice-over intentionally foregrounds an 
economic vocabulary that makes one rethink the agreement between the two parties. 
Eventually, the town lets Grace do things that the people ‘don’t want to be done, but 
would make their lives better’. A conflict arises here, given that the community succeeds 
in adopting the Christian values of ‘openness and acceptance’, but these values are solely 
achieved by means of an economic interaction. Thus, Tom’s intention to let Grace enter 
into the community does not challenge the attitude of self-preservation that characterises 
Dogville.  
The film does not expose this point until Chapter five, in which a policeman lets 
the town know that Grace is wanted for criminal activities. Until that moment we are 
given the impression that Grace’s arrival in Dogville has reinforced the community spirit 
in the town. There is a very interesting scene preceding the policeman’s arrival that 
challenges this idea through jerky camera movements and framings that invite the 
audience to adopt a more inquisitive attitude towards the material. Dogville’s residents 
and Grace are shown celebrating the Fourth of July. At this point, one senses that the 
community ties are stronger than before. When people finish singing the American 
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national anthem, the camera zooms out to capture all characters while dining and then it 
focuses on Jack McCay (Ben Gazzara). The latter, addresses Grace on behalf of the town 
and expresses the peoples’ gratitude for making Dogville a better place to live. Jack’s 
position in the frame is on the left-hand side, while Grace and Tom are placed on the right 
one opposite him (figure 3). When Jack starts his speech, the camera zooms in towards 
him and then briefly captures the people placed on the right side of the frame. Suddenly, a 
close-up of Grace’s face is interjected, but at this point her position is on the left side of 
the frame (figure 4). The image that follows captures Jack while giving his speech, who is 
on the left side again (figure 5). Here the characters’ position within the frame is changed. 
Both appear on the left, while they are meant to face each other and not to share the same 
position. Afterwards, the camera cuts once again to Grace and ultimately ends on Jack 
who is now placed on the right side of the frame (figure 6). A rapid camera movement 
captures the people at the table, and at this point the characters are shown in different 
positions from the ones they had at the beginning of the scene (figure 7). 
Here von Trier violates the 180 degree rule (the facilitation of continuity editing 
through the organisation of narrative action along an imaginary narrative line of 180 
degrees line) and the function of this violation is not a matter of formalist trickery. This 
movement indicates the camera’s inquisitive function, which plays a dual role, namely it 
represents an object and subverts it at the same time. The audience’s sense of orientation 
and stability is challenged and the camera movement functions as a means of urging them 
not to reconfirm the material facing them. Von Trier here baffles the viewers with the 
intention of showing the dynamic aspect of image-reading. What distinguishes this 
violation of the 180 degree rule compared to directors, such as Straub/Huillet and the 
French New Wave ones, is that von Trier does not simply intend to emphasise the 
materiality of the shot, or to discover the hidden aspects of a concrete material spatial 
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reality. Certainly, Straub’s/Huillet’s, Godard’s and other post-New Wave directors’ 
violation of the 180 degree rule was a political gesture that aimed at challenging the 
established film grammar and at showing the limitations of the medium.  
In von Trier’s case, the violation focuses on the very act of performance as a 
simulation. The camera engages in an interaction with the actors and the space, an 
interaction that is not simply of dramatic or self-reflexive importance. In processing the 
material from different angles that disorientate the viewer, von Trier aims at focusing on 
the way the characters perform the ‘ritual’ of the functional community so that we can 
question it. The way the camera is employed is analogous to Brecht’s concept of the 
‘gestic camera’, which I discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, the camera 
becomes performative and searches for material rather than simply reproducing dramatic 
effects. The difference is that here von Trier is not concerned with discovering the 
character’s social identity underneath the appearances. For Brecht, the ‘gestic camera’ 
acts as a sociologist that intends to explore and identify concrete social material. In the 
scene I described above, the camera movement captures the actors embodying the 
characters and the characters performing a social ‘ritual’ in an inauthentic space per se. In 
effect, this formal deviation stresses the simulation of the event. The formulation is 
telling, for it implies that the reconciled and happy community of Dogville is a copy that 
does not have an original.  
This point is made visible by the scene that follows, in which a policeman informs 
the town that Grace is wanted for having participated in criminal activities and a reward is 
offered to anyone knowing her whereabouts. From now on, the social dynamics change 
against Grace, because another exchange opportunity has been given to Dogville by the 
outside world. This scene negates the previous image of Dogville as a reconciled and 
tolerant community. The characters’ reactions make clear the economic foundation upon 
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which Grace’s admission is established and the town’s adaptability to a reality of 
exchange-value relationships.31 The community decides to make Grace work for longer 
hours, because, as Tom puts it, ‘her presence in Dogville has become more costly’. The 
underlying assumption is that Tom’s ‘illustration’ has unconsciously introduced Dogville 
to the capitalist reality of making profit through exchangeability. Moreover, by offering 
services that are not necessarily needed, Grace creates needs analogous to the ones created 
by advertising in a capitalist society.  
Grace’s affective labour is replaced by the exploitation of her use-value, that is, of 
her labour and eventually of her body. In taking advantage of the short-term benefits of 
Grace’s value, the community unconsciously reproduces its forthcoming destruction. 
Furthermore, the film suggests that violence is an inseparable element of a political 
system founded on exchange. Indicative of this point, is the rape scene in Chapter six. 
What interests me here is the way von Trier manipulates the restricted space in a way that 
unveils the collective dimensions of an individual action. The scene starts when Chuck 
(Stellan Skarsgård) enters his house and finds Grace helping his children with their 
homework. After forcing the children to leave, Chuck informs her that the police is 
looking for her, implying that unless she submits to his sexual desires he will give her 
away. The camera follows Grace while she confronts Chuck’s sexual advances (figure 8). 
When the latter imposes his body on top of her, the camera shifts away and captures the 
policeman (who asks information about Grace). Simultaneously, images of Dogville’s 
everyday routine are interjected. The jerky camera shifts from one person to another and 
juxtaposes different point of view shots that create a sense of disorientation. These shots 
are interrupted by images of Chuck while raping Grace. One senses that the characters can 
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 Sinnerbrink’s online article, which I quoted earlier, discusses the film’s emphasis on the ethic of 
exchange. Yet he does not understand this to be a dialectical critique of capitalism. Sinnerbrink argues 
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see what takes place within Chuck’s house and ignore it (a point to which I shall return to 
later on), something that heightens the scene’s affective impact (figure 9). Then again, 
panoramic shots follow this uneven registration of different materials and put the very act 
of rape in the background (figure 10).  
The camera manipulates the unity of space in such a way that the impression we 
get is that the individual cannot be dissociated from the collective. Elaine Canning’s 
analysis of the scene illuminates this argument. As she says:  
 
As the rape takes place, the camera pulls back to provide a panoramic shot of the 
sordid act in a home which has no walls, no physical boundaries. Chuck and 
Grace are positioned just a stone’s throw from the other residents of Dogville 
who frequent the street beyond them. The non-existence of frames and 
boundaries means that the whole community is implicated in the rape of Grace; 
it is a potent symbol of the manipulation of Grace, both in a physical and 
emotional sense by the town in general. Clearly then, the theatrical and the 
cinematic are skilfully interwoven by von Trier not only for aesthetic reasons, 
but also for the exposition of the film’s key motifs.32  
 
Subsequently, von Trier exhibits the collective complicity in an act of individual abuse 
and here this complicity is joined together with the very idea of exchange. The police cars 
in the background emphasise the price Grace has to pay, in order to avoid being delivered 
to the gangsters. At this point, the film demonstrates clearly the connection between 
relationships founded upon exchange-value and violence. The narrator’s comments that 
conclude the chapter highlight this point: ‘Yet again, Grace had made a miraculous escape 
from her pursuers with the aid of the people of Dogville. Everyone had covered up for 
her, including Chuck’.  
This sound and image counterpoint allows us to perceive the scene in its 
dialectical complexity and not as an isolated dramatic event. Moreover, there is another 
aspect of the rape-scene that complicates matters more. When the camera cuts from 
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Contemporary Film, 4:3 (2007), pp.159-171, here p.162.  
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Grace’s rape to the actors, who are shot unaware, there are moments when they are 
reproduced as spectators of her abuse, as if they cannot avoid looking. For instance, the 
moment the camera captures Ma Ginger (Lauren Bacall), Liz (Chloë Sevigny) and Martha 
(Siobhan Fallon Hogan) while Grace is being raped, the minimalist setting gives the 
illusion that they can see what takes place inside the house (figure 10). The characters 
seem busy not looking, but the actors as sentient human beings cannot help but look. This 
effect is a violation of the characters’ position within the story, according to which they 
are ignorant of Grace’s rape. Certainly, the actors do not have their vision trained on the 
rape scene as the audience does, but clearly von Trier plays with their attempt to pretend 
that they do not see something that takes place in front of them.  
Von Trier’s rapid camera movement achieves a similar effect in an earlier frame 
too (figure 9). In effect, the characters reproduce our own status as audience and here von 
Trier questions the very act of being a spectator. Of particular interest are the way the 
camera captures the rape scene in the context of the political condition of the town’s 
collective guilt, and the way it shifts from Dogville’s collective subject to the collective in 
the auditorium. In making the characters reproduce our spectatorial position, von Trier 
makes a parallel between their complicity and our film-viewing process so as to challenge 
the safe distance between screen and auditorium. Crucially then, the material confronts 
the audience with aggression and this gesture complicates our position in relation to the 
diegesis. Thus, the boundaries between what Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen call 
the represented participants (the participants in the shot) and the interactive participants 
(the spectators) are complicated.33 The safe distance that normally protects the interactive 
participants is negated while the represented ones interact with the audience so as to 
challenge it.  
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New York: Routledge, 2007), p.47.  
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Certainly, a parallel here exists between Brecht’s intention to implicate the 
audience in more productive ways. Yet it will be instructive here to clarify the difference 
between Brecht’s and von Trier’s practice. Brecht employs dramaturgical strategies that 
aspire to deconstruct an individual action into its social determinants, so as to put forward 
a positive affirmation. Thus, by shifting the questions from the collective subject on stage 
to the auditorium, he aims at revealing the collective subject’s potential to become a 
means of positive transformation of the historical reality. Von Trier follows Brecht’s 
paradigm and exposes the individuals as part of a collective reality; but when the 
characters in the aforementioned scene challenge our spectatorial position they proceed to 
denounce the collective in the auditorium with the intention of offending them, instead of 
declaring them to be a positive force of change. This shock is heightened by the fact that 
on the diegetic level, the audience identifies with Grace’s misfortune. Yet on the meta-
level, when the camera captures the actors (or the characters?) looking at Grace’s rape we 
share their point of view and not the victim’s.  
Evidently, von Trier’s aim is to denounce the audience and this gesture operates as 
a means of preventing us from being placed in a position of superior knowledge that is not 
accountable for the portrayed reality on the screen. For it is here that von Trier’s view of 
the audience exceeds the Orthodox Brechtian one. To illuminate this point, I want to 
address Thomas Elsaesser’s discussion of ‘the institutionalisation’ of Brechtian aesthetics 
in film and theatre. Elsaesser analyses the way that the ‘Brechtian Avant-Garde’ tended to 
address the ‘initiated’ spectator, who can recognise the source of the social and political 
problems but feels unaffected, as if she/he is not part of the problem she/he acknowledges. 
As Elsaesser says: 
 
The Brechtian Avant-Garde became vulnerable to the charge of implying in its 
critical practice not only an imaginary subject of enunciation – be it the artist, 
the filmmaker or theorist as owner of normative or prescriptive discourses – but 
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also of speaking to an imaginary addressee: the yet to be constituted 
revolutionary subject. In this respect, Brecht’s own strategy had been 
ambiguous: because the implied spectator of the Brechtian text is invariably the 
spectator-in-the-know. He (Brecht’s spectator is mostly conceived as male) is 
the ironic spectator for whom the text provides a complex matrix of 
comprehensibility based on allusion and intertextuality.34  
 
Elsaesser’s comments may help one identify the shift from a practice that intends to 
address an ‘imagined revolutionary addressee’ to one that is concerned with offending the 
audience. This argument can be clarified by Elsaesser’s discussion of Michael Haneke’s 
employment of Brechtian self-reflexive elements in ways that the audience is deprived of 
a ‘secure’ distance. Elsaesser refers to Haneke’s meta-filmic elements in Code Unknown 
(2000) and to the direct address to the audience in Funny Games (1997). These formal 
elements defy the very distinction between ‘“reality-versus film”’. As he says: 
 
The effect is not to make us aware of being voyeurs and in the cinema, but to 
undermine even the voyeuristic ground on which we normally arrange ourselves 
as cinema-goers. If until that point in the film we thought ourselves safe and 
“outside”, we now realise how generally unsafe we are and how we may be 
caught “inside” whenever we are in the cinema: if classical narrative cinema’s 
spectator felt safe at any distance, however close he or she got, the spectator of 
Haneke’s films might be said to be unsafe at any distance, however far that 
person thinks he or she is.35    
 
Elsaesser’s comments apply to Dogville’s aforementioned scene, which blurs the 
boundaries between inside and outside and indicates the audience’s subordination to a 
collective reality of violence. In this way, the exposition of the individual’s subordination 
to collective structures and institutions does not necessarily go hand in hand with the idea 
of progress. From this perspective, neither the collective on the screen, nor the one in the 
auditorium is produced positively by von Trier. I have already described the ways in 
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which the collective subject in Dogville is depicted as reproducing its own oppression. 
Primarily, this situation occurs by their apolitical disposition and afterwards through their 
entry into relationships founded upon exchange value. However, Dogville’s portrayal of 
the collective does not argue in favour of a return to a bourgeois individualism, something 
that I wish to explore below in my discussion of the depiction of Tom and Grace.  
Performativity and Performative Contradictions 
So far, I have proceeded to discuss von Trier’s treatment of the collective subject as a 
nexus of conflicting forces and processes. In this section, I suggest that von Trier follows 
Brecht’s critique of identity and explores the discrepancies between the individual’s 
pronouncements and his/her actions. My discussion proceeds to identify the moments that 
the camera engages in an interaction with the actors’ bodies so as to fragment and de-
individuate them. In particular, I am interested in the ways the camera splits the body and 
creates conflicts between the characters’ attitudes and their pronouncements. I suggest 
that von Trier employs performativity as a means of destabilising identity and exhibiting 
the conflicting forces and contradictions within the subject. The aim of this formal 
analysis is to identify how the film questions the short-term reformist attitude, as 
embodied by Tom and Grace, according to which ethics are dissociated from politics.  
I put forward the idea that von Trier’s criticism of liberal humanism intends to 
show it as part of the capitalist reality and not as an antithetical force. My analysis is 
concerned with revealing the performative contradictions of an attitude committed to the 
pursuit of humanist ideals of progress that backfires into domination and violence. The 
term performative contradiction has been analysed by Terry Eagleton. Eagleton, in his 
discussion of ideology, explores the ways that certain ideological beliefs affect the 
individual’s actions, even when they clash with her/his own social interests or her/his own 
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ideas. Eagleton quotes Denys Turner’s perception of ideology as the clash between social 
ideas and actions. As Eagleton says:  
He [Turner] claims that ideology consists in a ‘performative contradiction’ in 
which what is said is at odds with the situation or act of utterance itself’. When 
the middle class preaches universal freedom from a position of domination, or 
when a teacher hectors his students at tedious length about the perils of an 
authoritarian pedagogy, we have a contradiction between a meaning conveyed 
explicitly and a meaning conveyed by the act itself of conveying’.36 
 
Eagleton offers an analysis of the ways that social practices collide with ‘the ideas by 
which we live them’. 37 Thus, the term performative contradiction describes the collision 
between social actions and the theoretical utterances that accompany them. In this section, 
I intend to reveal the characters’ performative contradictions through a study of the ways 
Dogville mobilises performativity. 
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of these ideas I want to unpack the term 
performativity. While performativity describes the passage from theatre to performance 
art, its function in the cinematic medium has been acknowledged and discussed by film 
scholars. The major example is Gilles Deleuze, whose distinction between ‘the cinema of 
action’ and ‘the cinema of the body’ has been influential in contemporary studies of film 
performance. Deleuze elaborates on Brecht’s concept of gestus and proceeds to identify 
the ways that cinema engages in processes of ‘theatricalisation’ so as to disturb narrative 
coherency and identify the moments that the camera’s interaction with the body goes 
beyond narrative motivation. This interaction challenges identity which is not treated as 
fixed, but becomes subordinate to ‘a process of becoming’.38  
Deleuze’s arguments have been clarified by Elena Del Rio’s recent study on film 
and performance. Del Rio analyses the ways that performativity can be employed in 
cinema as a means of challenging identity and revealing the individual as subject to a 
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process of transformation. She also employs the term ‘affective-performative’ to describe 
a process in which the mimetic mirroring of identity is replaced by performative moments 
that fragment the body; these performative moments are not solely subordinate to 
narrative requirements. As she says: 
 
From the affective-performative perspective I propose, spectacle does arrest 
narrative, but such arresting by no means inhibits the force of the body. If 
anything, it favors the unleashing of that force by freeing the body from the 
tyranny and the rigidity of narrative requirements. Spectacle in this sense is no 
longer a framed view or fetish, for it indeed becomes an actively dislocating or 
deforming force.39 
 
 
 What I want to keep from Deleuze’s and Del Rio’s arguments is the idea of 
performativity as a process that reveals the transformability of identity and disrupts, 
questions, and affects at the same time the narrative.  
With these comments in mind, I should like now to return to the film and discuss 
the ways it mobilises performativity as a means of exploring a set of contradictions. There 
is one particular scene in chapter five that merits attention. Tom explains to Grace the 
town’s decision to make her work longer hours after the second police visit to Dogville. 
The camera alternates between him and Grace. When Tom announces to her the news the 
camera stays persistently on him and we have a view of the right angle of his face (figure 
11). A jump-cut follows, while the character continues speaking. The visual track is 
interrupted but not the acoustic one and at this point we see his face from the same angle, 
but his alignment with Grace has changed (figure 12). While he keeps on speaking to 
Grace, the camera moves back and forth abruptly and we expect that it has assumed his 
point of view to produce an eyeline match. To our surprise, the camera returns to Tom 
again and he is now placed at the centre of the frame (figure 13).  
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Here the camera disrupts narrative coherency, since the unusual framings 
complicate the communication of story-telling material. What the camera makes 
conspicuous is the character’s body, which is manipulated in such a way so as to bring 
forth contradictions that are hidden underneath Tom’s pronouncements. As such, the 
camera’s role here is not simply representational, but intends to disembody the character 
so as to bring our attention to the transformability of his identity. On the narrative level, 
this transformability is put forward by the fact that the character is placed in-between his 
fondness for Grace, while he simultaneously reports to her the town’s decisions. 
Throughout the scene, it is quite difficult to distinguish the boundaries between Tom as 
the member of the collective – whose decisions he reports – and the person who wants to 
help Grace. It is this performative contradiction that is stressed by the camera, which 
destabilises the image so as to question it. The question that arises is how Tom’s intention 
to help Grace accepts the very logic of exchange-value, which will eventually lead to the 
latter’s exploitation. Even Grace is astonished at his composure when he outlines the 
town’s rationale behind their decision to make her work more. When he tells her that they 
expect ‘some counterbalance’ (a term from physics euphemistically used by economics – 
and here the film stresses the economic exchange) for their decision to protect her from 
the police, she responds astonished: ‘that sounds like words that the gangsters would use’.  
In this scene, Tom’s portrayal crosses the frontier between humanism and self-
interest. This performative contradiction is most visible in a scene in chapter eight. People 
embarrassed by Grace’s public disclosure of her abuses challenge Tom to take sides and 
choose either them or Grace. Frustrated by the town’s response, Tom returns to Grace’s 
house. Initially, we get to see both characters lying down and sharing an affectionate 
moment. When Tom explains to Grace that he has been asked to choose between her and 
Dogville, the camera alternates between the left and the right angle of the frame. This 
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alternation is followed by Tom’s radical change of attitudes. His calm and passive body 
composure is replaced by a gesture of aggression and he starts making sexual advances 
towards Grace. The moment he imposes himself on her, the camera zooms out and the 
material is captured by a high-angle shot. This high-angle shot remains at a distance from 
the characters and shows them at a great remove (figure 14). Ultimately, the camera 
slowly zooms in, and the dialectics between distance and proximity highlights Tom’s 
exaggerated posture and attitude (figure15).   
Tom’s shift from passivity to sexual aggression does not advance a psychological 
change. The scene releases an amount of energy that can be observed in Tom’s postural 
behaviour and in the sudden camera movement that decreases the magnification of the 
image and then zooms in so as to adopt an analytical stance towards the material. Here, 
von Trier’s representation of the body follows the Brechtian practice, according to which 
the body becomes the medium that enhances our perception of the social laws that 
regulate an individual’s relations to other bodies. The social law that regulates Tom’s 
relation to Grace’s body is the law of exchange-value. What is made profoundly clear is 
that by rejecting everyone else, he acquires the right to enjoy her body. Tom is siding with 
Grace hence his attempted rape becomes a reward for his loyalty to her. However, at the 
level of actions, he is siding with the community by oppressing Grace and his attempt to 
force himself on her ratifies this. Critical here is the contrast between image and 
communicated speech. Tom justifies his lust for Grace, arguing that it is the ideals they 
share that made him choose her, whereas he is portrayed as unable to suppress his carnal 
passion.  
Here, a natural instinct, namely sexual desire is estranged, and calls attention to 
the connection between sexuality and power. Thus, sexuality is not treated as natural but 
as part of a relationship founded upon exchange value, which is heightened by Tom’s use 
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of language that alludes to an economic terminology. This particular scene showcases 
how the camera’s interaction with the body of the actor de-individuates an action and 
embeds it in a social context. Von Trier confronts us with a question that could be 
summed up like this: ‘how Grace’s entry into Dogville which is based upon an act of 
reciprocal exchange assumes the form of a coercive exchange’?  
At this point, the performative contradiction, or the false relationship between the 
character’s pronouncements and his social practice is rendered visible by von Trier. Tom, 
the embodiment of a liberal attitude of ‘openness and acceptance’ adheres to Dogville’s 
mental outlook and proceeds to impose his sexual desires on Grace following the 
capitalist law of exchange-value that he introduced to the town. When Grace refutes his 
sexual advances, Tom aligns himself plainly with Dogville and decides to deliver her to 
the gangsters so as to benefit from the financial reward. The film offers an implacable 
autopsy of the ‘financialization of social relationships’, and of particular importance here 
is the way von Trier shows that a liberal humanist response is not an answer to the 
problem.  
Tom’s example is crucial to our understanding of the film’s critique of an abstract 
‘liberal and humanist’ attitude. In the beginning of the film, Tom challenges the residents 
of Dogville to be more receptive and suggests that the whole country would benefit from 
mutual collaboration. The contradiction is that the town achieves social cohesion by 
means of acts, such as sexual exploitation, that promote an individualist mental outlook. 
In effect, the individualism that characterised Dogville before Grace’s entrance is firmly 
entrenched in the town by Tom’s ‘illustration’. It will be instructive here to understand 
how liberalism of this sort perpetuates social oppression. Liberal humanism derives from 
an idealist standpoint according to which individuals can change morally, without altering 
the broader social mechanisms. Let us consider Fredric Jameson’s explanation, which 
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demonstrates how the ‘liberal view of the world’ does not actually question the social 
conditions that perpetuate injustice. As Jameson says: 
 
For the liberal view is generally characterised by the belief that the “system” is 
not really total in that sense, that we can ameliorate it, reorganise it, and regulate 
it in such a way that it becomes tolerable and we thereby have “the best of the 
best worlds”.40 
 
In light of Jameson’s comments, one can see that Tom’s initial plea for an attitude of 
‘openness’ is centred on a ‘moral righteousness’ rhetoric that intends to restore to the 
community a higher form of ‘moral purpose’. By the time Tom introduces Grace to 
Dogville he starts a ‘reciprocal financial’ exchange between the town and the young 
fugitive. From its very inception, Tom’s ‘illustration’ has to emphasise Grace’s repayment 
so as to guarantee her the right to stay despite the ethical rhetoric that accompanies it. 
Consequently, people’s ethics change when they realise that Grace benefits more than 
them from this exchange. 
It is not difficult to intimate the parallels between the film’s portrayal of human 
relationships and the late capitalist reality, which is structured upon the very idea of 
‘reciprocal exchange’ accompanied by a rhetoric that stresses the rights of the individual 
and the ‘universality’ of human rights. One can identify such a language in Anglo-Saxon 
liberalism and in Neoliberalism. Both are predicated upon a contradictory language.41 
They valorise a possessive individualism and consider it to be the key to the formation of 
a meaningful collective life based upon a commitment to moral and ‘universal rights’. Yet 
the paradox is that the freedom and the rights these policies advocate are premised upon 
the preservation of the current political relations of domination and the abolition of any 
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strong collective institutions. This lack of strong social bonds – aside from the ones 
structured upon financial exchange – is replaced by a religious, Christian language that 
appeals to freedom and the ‘universalism of human rights’.42 Another contradiction arises 
here, given that the freedom and the rights advocated by this religious rhetoric are 
premised upon the very preservation of the established market economy, which achieves 
wealth accumulation by dispossession. Subsequently, moralism of this sort propagates the 
established market reality and the ‘financialization’ of human relationships.  
It is instructive here to connect these points with the film’s critique of the 
capitalist ethic of ‘reciprocal exchange’ and its mistrust of a liberalist humanist attitude. 
Clearly, Dogville manifests the very falsity of the idea of ‘reciprocal exchange’ and 
demonstrates that the reduction of social relationships to financial interactions is bound to 
backfire into violence. Embedded in von Trier’s negative view of the ‘financialization’ of 
human relationships is a mistrust of moralist values predicated upon abstract ideas of 
freedom and universal rights. As the example of Tom aptly exhibits, oppositional forces 
based upon such a rhetoric end up propagating the reality that they negate. Emblematic of 
this point, is a scene in chapter nine in which Tom delivers Grace to the gangsters and 
asks them in a roundabout way for a financial reward. 
Consequently, the performative contradiction that is evidenced in Tom’s and 
Dogville’s attitude is that a gesture of acceptance assumes the form of domination and 
abuse. The film stresses the economic aspect of this abuse and here von Trier’s portrayal 
of the characters follows the classical Brechtian strategy of deconstructing an individual 
action into the social laws that motivate them. Brecht argued in favour of representations 
that would show the individual as the outcome of ‘the processes of human co-existence’, 
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something that he thought to have an enlightening effect in the audience. 43 In Dogville, 
the social law that reveals the individual as alterable is the establishment of a capitalist 
ethic of making profit through exchangeability, which is introduced to the town by Tom’s 
‘illustration’.  
Far more complicated is Grace’s portrayal, which again follows the Brechtian 
perception of the individual as a process, something evidenced by her shift from a person 
acting ‘good-heartedly’ to a mass-murderer. Nonetheless, Grace as a character gives a 
more thorough insight into von Trier’s mistrust of idealist humanism. A closer 
examination of a set of contradictions that arise from her depiction may help one perceive 
the film’s intricate texture and go beyond the understanding of it as a story of female 
exploitation. It is vital here to consider some of von Trier’s comments that draw attention 
to the fact that Grace is not a ‘Goldheart figure’.44 This term describes the role of women 
in his previous trilogy, which consists of Breaking the Waves (1996), The Idiots (1998) 
and Dancer in the Dark (2000). In these films, the main characters demonstrate self-
renunciation as a means of saving someone else. In contrast to these paradigms, von Trier 
explains that Grace does not belong to this category.  
 
Yes Grace acts good-heartedly, but she isn’t – and will not be – a ‘Goldheart 
figure’. She has to possess a capacity for something else. I tried two or three 
things to get it to work, but I don’t know if it does. This is where the concept of 
arrogance comes in, a refusal to discuss things and analyse them.45   
 
Grace as a character stresses the tension that arises when one is dedicated to enforcing 
values upon people not prepared to accept them. Apparently, the film’s critical reception 
has not really identified this idea, something that led von Trier to elaborate on it with 
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more clarity in Manderlay.46 In this film, Grace naively believes that the empowerment of 
the former slaves will end their oppression, whereas the members of the community use 
their democratic rights to their own advantage and eventually lead it to self-destruction. 
However, in Dogville there are also moments that question Grace’s seemingly flat 
character and her portrayal as the embodiment of unconditional generosity and 
forgiveness. Apart from her metamorphosis in the last chapter of the film, nowhere is this 
point more acutely evident than in a scene in chapter three in which she forces Jack, a 
blind man not reconciled with his disability, to admit that he is blind. Aside from the 
obvious thematic allegory, what renders the scene quite distinctive is the way the camera 
observes the character and places emphasis on gestures that somehow disembody Grace 
and attest to her transformation. Oblique close-ups of Grace’s face are followed by frantic 
camera-movements that capture Jack and the very diegetic space, creating a complex 
interaction between the bodies and space (figure 16, 17). Furthermore, the scene merges a 
series of images that have a narrative significance with others that focus on the very idea 
of performativity as a process of movement and readjustment. The sequence reaches a 
climax when Grace opens the curtains in Jack’s room and the light accentuates the 
performative space (figure 18). Interestingly, the intrusion of light changes Grace’s 
composure, a change that is irreducible to psychological explanation.     
In this scene, von Trier’s manipulation of the body in space becomes a process in 
which character, identity, and space are set apart and reworked. At this point, the 
actress’/character’s relation to the diegetic space becomes multifaceted. The space 
encompasses the actress performing the character, the character as a narrative agent and 
the character as a performative persona, namely as a person who is caught in a process of 
working to embody and display certain social qualities. In effect, von Trier draws 
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attention to Grace’s identity as a performative process that is acted out in the process of 
acting up.  
My understanding of performative identity is informed by Judith Butler’s 
discussion of a performative act as an act that is simultaneously ‘“dramatic”’ and ‘“non-
referential”’.47 A performative act is ‘non-referential’ because it does not describe an act 
deriving from an inner essence or a fixed identity. By contrast, identity emerges out of the 
performing of specific acts and thus it is performative, that is, subject to transformation. 
Butler appeals to the concept of performativity to discuss gender construction as a process 
that reproduces cultural stereotypes regarding gender identity. From this perspective, 
Butler concludes that gender identity is performative and as she says, ‘it is real only to the 
extent that it is performed’.48 For Butler, the revelation of the process of performativity is 
of political importance, because it may give one access to the very falsity of ‘identity 
normalisation’ and uncover processes of social construction that are not visible.  
Butler’s discussion sets up the terms that may help us understand the ways von 
Trier’s camera interacts with the restricted space and the body so as to uncover Grace as a 
performative construction. Formally and thematically, the scene addresses Grace’s 
performative struggle and the very performative contradiction, which is that an act of 
kindness results in an aggressive enforcement of values. For it is here that the film alerts 
us of Grace’s capacity for something else, and it is not accidental that the third chapter’s 
title – ‘In Which Grace Indulges in a Shady Piece of Provocation’ – refers to the specific 
scene. Consequently, von Trier’s processing of the material is an index of the idea that the 
humanist/moralist values embodied by Grace are nothing but a simulacrum, a copy that 
does not have an original. Grace is implicated in a reality that she opposes, so as to 
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enforce certain values on people not prepared to accept them, and it is in this vein that her 
moral attitude involves a violent side. In this context, Grace’s performativity involves 
both the process of integrating herself in a set of relationships that contradict her ‘ideals’ 
and the means she employs to resist her complete assimilation into Dogville.  
The mistrust of liberal humanism and short-term reformism that informs the film’s 
content demonstrates von Trier’s dialogue with Brecht. In a number of plays, Brecht 
doubts a liberal/humanist response to human misery and exploitation. Amongst them, one 
can identify some of the plays I discussed in the first section, such as The Good Person of 
Szechwan, Saint Joan of the Stockyards and The Decision. In the first two plays, the 
author poses the question whether one can retain moral standards within the capitalist 
reality, while in the latter he proceeds to investigate whether a humanist response to social 
misery can be a means of combating capitalism. The conclusion in all these plays is that 
‘goodness of character’ does not eradicate class-exploitation, but reinforces it. In 
Dogville, morality and short-term reformism are called into question too, but the conflict 
is not as clear-cut as in the aforementioned plays by Brecht. Here liberal humanism is not 
simply portrayed as the ‘incorrect political attitude’. By contrast, liberal humanism and 
social domination are shown by von Trier as the double side of the same coin. 
Commenting on Grace’s behaviour in Manderlay, von Trier stated something that applies 
to her attitude in Dogville too. As he says: ‘The idea of spreading your values to other 
places is that’s what in the past used to be called a mission and is problematic’.49 
This standpoint is rendered visible by the film’s ending in which Grace decides 
that the town’s actions ‘were not good enough’. What is theatricalised here is the 
excessive moral polarity of ‘good versus evil’ only to prove the very fallacy of these two 
terms. In the midst of a lengthy camera movement, the lighting changes and we get to see 
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a high-angle shot of Dogville (figure 19). The camera slowly zooms in and in a 
choreographic movement pans from right to left to capture the people of Dogville in a 
state of bewilderment. Critical here is the antithesis between the camera’s mobility and 
the static position of the actors (figure 20). Then, the camera returns to Grace, who 
performs a circular movement that heightens stylisation. In effect, the tableau mobilises a 
performative energy, whose role is not the framing of dramatic action, but the performing 
of connections between the bodies; it is by means of this performing that the image 
dissolves our certainties vis-à-vis the boundaries between oppressors and oppressed. 
When Grace comes to her final conclusion, she walks backwards in a steady and stylised 
movement that unleashes an energy which prognosticates the forthcoming catastrophe 
(figure 21).               
It is useful now to go back to Elena Del Rio’s discussion of the affective 
performative that I mentioned earlier so as to explain the effects of this energy unleashed 
by the tableau. Del Rio explains that the ‘eruption’ of performative moments that 
privilege the bodies of the actors is a means of freezing dramatic action and bringing to 
the fore ‘unforeseen connections between bodies and concepts’. As she says: 
 
The affective-performative unfolds as an interval demarcated by first the 
cessation and then the resumption of narrative. Prior to the affective-
performative event, ideology seems to be securely in place, yet certain narrative 
causes or psychological motivations build up a pressure that leads to the moment 
of performative eruption. In the aftermath, we witness a certain wreckage of 
ideological stability, the debris of a passing storm, as former corporealities and 
their relations appear profoundly altered or dislocated.50    
 
In light of Del Rio’s comments, one can see the performative excess of the 
aforementioned scene as a moment that disrupts ‘ideological stability’ and here 
‘ideological stability’ refers to the ethical certainties that the audience has formed so far. 
Grace’s stylised movement towards her father’s car becomes a gestural exposition of an 
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attitude and a rhetorical statement that uncovers the thin boundaries between liberal 
humanism and violence. This rhetorical statement is intensified by the ironic voice-over 
which asserts that it was one’s duty to reinstate order ‘for the sake of humanity and for the 
sake of other towns’. At this point, passive humanism transforms into military humanism. 
What renders the situation strange is the moralist and humanist raison d'être that leads to 
a rational legitimization of violence. The contrapuntal use of sound and image de-
individuates Grace and places emphasis on the performative contradiction of effacing a 
whole town ‘for the sake of humanity’.  
Action, images and the recited text are in conflict and the effect is that Grace’s 
identity is deprived of any notion of interiority or psychological motivation. As such, one 
is asked to rethink a whole set of values and attitudes advocated by Grace. In the course of 
history, appeals to human rights and ‘universal’ values have justified acts of military 
humanism on the part of self-appointed powers. 51 What renders these acts problematic is 
the appeals to the collective ‘human’ interest for the perpetuation of a whole set of 
policies that serve private interests tout court. In this way, the film’s depiction of Grace 
becomes a means of exposing how appeals to morality and ‘universal values’ may serve 
certain social interests. Consequently, the values of self-abnegation and unconditional 
giving are exhibited to be simulacra, which conceal deeper political conflicts and 
processes.  
Dogville’s deconstruction of the characters’ identities by means of theatricality 
and performativity proceeds to frustrate the audience’s expectations, and to show the 
individual as the outcome of conflicting forces and interests. The film’s experiment 
proceeds to reveal the characters’ dependence on social structures. In this way, their 
changeability cannot be reduced to a change in moral attitudes. By contrast, the form 
emphasises that alterations in attitude are inextricably linked with social interests and 
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changes in the social circumstances. The establishment of the capitalist ethic of exchange 
leads to the subsequent alteration of Dogville’s attitudes towards Grace, making one 
consider the boundaries between ‘reciprocal exchange’ and violent seizure. Moreover, 
von Trier’s investigation of Tom’s and Grace’s liberal humanism puts forward the 
conjecture that the moralist reform of a system is an illusion given that ethics are 
inextricably linked with a specific social context.  
Political cinema is based on the condition that society and the individuals it 
consists of are changeable and is not anchored in changes in ethical attitudes that merely 
conceal the roots of oppression. Such an argument figures importantly in Brecht’s theory 
and practice and as the Philosopher says in The Messingkauf Dialogues, a dialectical 
representation ‘would treat the moral problem as a historical one too’.52 Von Trier’s 
depiction of the individual and his handling of ethics follow Brecht’s approach and depict 
the individual as the product of social forces. In this context, the moral questions are not 
dissociated from political ones. However, the characters’ changeability performs conflict 
and exhibits the persistence of social antagonisms without pointing to a definite 
resolution. One cannot identify neither with Dogville’s depoliticised working-class nor 
with Tom’s and Grace’s support of moral values that reproduce the causes of social 
injustice. This facet of the film led the Cannes Film Festival’s jury to accuse the film of 
‘being anti-humanist’.53 The issue of whether the film’s open-endedness advances a 
nihilistic or a political interpretation is something that I explore in the following section.  
Narrative Openness  
The first section of this chapter mentioned the film’s critical reception, which has largely 
focused on Dogville’s ‘anti-Americanism’. One has to acknowledge that von Trier’s view 
of the United States is important in the articulation of the film’s narrative. However, I am 
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inclined to maintain that the simplistic dichotomies of the European auteur versus 
American society, as propagated by friendly and hostile critics of the film above, have 
paralysed any fruitful investigation of the political implications of Dogville’s form. In this 
chapter, I have avoided entering these debates, because I consider that reading the film as 
an ‘anti-American parable’ can distract our attention from its politics and innovations. In 
my estimation, America in Dogville can be seen as the paradigm of the falsity of 
capitalism and the ideas of progress that have been appropriated by right-wing forces.  
 The first section of this chapter mentioned Jacques Rancière’s denunciation of the 
film on the grounds of its ethical relativism. This section is interested in addressing the 
film’s narrative openness, in order to theorise a pathway, which sees the film out of the 
cul-de-sac of nihilism. The reason for addressing Dogville’s narrative openness is because 
I want to clarify the distinction between Brecht’s quest for dialectical enlightenment and 
von Trier’s open-ended dialectics. As I mentioned in the previous section, von Trier 
employs Brechtian strategies of experimentation as a means of exploring the social laws 
that regulate human relationships. However, Dogville as an experiment is not concerned 
with producing a world view that implies a concrete solution to the social problems. 
Accordingly, experimentation operates as a means of production, but here the term 
production refers to the generation of contradictions and not to their synthetic resolution.  
To be more specific, I would like to explore the dialectical collisions that work 
upon the film’s key metaphors. Tom’s preliminary argument that Dogville is not a 
receptive community is negated by Grace’s admission in the town and by her eventual 
integration. Yet the temporary harmony brought about by Grace’s admission is negated by 
the exchange ethic upon which her residence is founded and by the abuses she suffers. At 
the same time, Tom’s willingness to help Grace is negated by his subordination to the 
‘reciprocal exchange’ ethic, which eventually makes him betray her. Finally, Grace’s 
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attitude of unconditional generosity and forgiveness is negated by her siding with the 
gangsters, and by the fact that her decision to destroy a whole town is justified upon the 
same ethical grounds. Thus, the opposite side of the preliminary negative force, namely 
Dogville’s lack of acceptance and community values, is negated by another negative 
force, which is the town’s brutal catastrophe.  
One can clearly see that the dialectical collisions do not unify to a synthetic 
resolution. Von Trier offers them to the audience to stimulate argumentative 
experimentation and this treatment of the material avoids the pitfalls of easy conclusions. 
This aspect of the film recalls Seymour Chatman’s formulation of the ‘antistory’. 
Chatman employs the term ‘antistory’ to describe the diegetic structure that opposes the 
classical narrative. As he says: 
 
If the classical narrative is a network for (or “enchainment”) of kernels affording 
avenues of choice only one of which is possible, the antistory may be defined as 
an attack on this convention which treats all choices as equally valid.54  
 
While von Trier does not offer a resolute choice, his dialectical strategy of examining an 
argument from different viewpoints does not render all choices as ‘equally valid’, but 
problematises them. Each antithesis that comes as a negation of a preliminary thesis does 
not become a positive force, but an act of negativity that refutes an answer to the 
questions.  
Like Brecht’s plays, the film’s open-endedness shifts the questions from the 
screen to the auditorium but without sharing the closed form of the Brechtian Fabel. To 
clarify the difference, I intend to unpack Brecht’s preference for narrative 
inconclusiveness and compare it to von Trier’s. One of the fundamental tenets of Brecht’s 
theory and practice is that catharsis should be replaced by contemplation something that 
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has influenced political cinema too. One may recall Peter Wollen’s table of counter-
cinematic traits, in which he argues that narrative closure that characterises classical 
cinema is replaced by ‘narrative aperture’ in ‘counter-cinema’.55 Brecht considered that 
the Aristotelian valorisation of the emotional purging of the audience flattened out the 
portrayed contradictions and failed to implicate the audience in a productive way.56 For 
Brecht, narrative openness served the role of awakening the audience, so as to perceive its 
historical role. Furthermore, this formal element aimed at changing the social function of 
the medium, which restricted the audience to the status of consumers. As I discussed in 
the first chapter, in Brecht’s utopian view, the reinstating of the audience’s productive 
position within the theatre/cinema could be a means of rethinking their productive role in 
the social field.  
Nonetheless, Brecht’s interest in leaving the contradictions unresolved is restricted 
by the closed form of the Fabel which implies that socialism can be a means of combating 
social injustice. One has to recall the last scene in Kuhle Wampe (1932), which makes 
quite evident that socialism could resolve the peoples’ misery. Similarly, Joan’s assertion 
that ‘where force rules only force can help’ in Saint Joan of the Stockyards becomes an 
agitational call for change.57 According to Brecht, the Fabel is the logic of history, and for 
the socialist left of his time history moved towards progress. 
In contrast to Brecht’s progressive view of history, von Trier’s deployment of 
narrative openness does not put forward any specific political proposition that might 
tackle the causes of social oppression. In many respects, Dogville’s ending is pessimistic, 
and this pessimism can be understood historically. The establishment of late capitalism 
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after the collapse of a socialist alternative forces us to reconsider politics and 
representation, and radical politics can be joined together with historical pessimism. Thus, 
a critique of the existing social reality can be effective given that one combines it with a 
critique of the perception of history as progress, something that I discussed in the second 
chapter too. Susan Buck-Morss, a Benjamin scholar, has aptly described this process.  
 
Traditionally it was the socialist left that believed in historical progress, while 
the right, the social conservatives were the nostalgic critics of history’s course. 
But in this century, revolutionary politics and historical pessimism have been 
brought together because intellectual integrity would not allow otherwise. One 
cannot have lived in the twentieth century, which is grinding and bumping to a 
close as we speak and still maintain an unshaken belief, either in capitalism as 
the answer to the prayers of the poor, or in history as the realization of reason.... 
Meanwhile as the grey background of these political events, the economic gap 
between rich and poor not only persists; it has become an abyss, a situation for 
which the new global organisation of capitalism – unchallenged as the winner in 
history – no longer even tries to apologize.58 
 
Buck Morss’ argument can help us see Dogville’s pessimism historically and clarify 
Dogville’s post-Brechtian dialectics. Contrary to the forward looking politics of Brecht’s 
dialectics, Dogville exhibits the falsehood of the very notion of historical progress, which 
informs the rhetoric of right-wing forces that celebrate capitalism’s establishment.  
One could object that the film’s portrayal of violence and – to quote the Cannes’ 
Jury – its ‘anti-humanism’ offers a very abstract and static perception of social 
relationships and a fixed view of ‘human nature’.59 However, as I suggested in the 
previous section, von Trier’s treatment of identity is dynamic and not static, since changes 
in social/economic circumstances modify the characters’ attitudes. When it comes to 
violence, the film takes a dialectical view of it to show the impossibility of mutual 
collaboration and prosperity within a system structured upon the capitalist ethic of making 
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profit by means of exploitation. As such, the characters’ uncritical reproduction of this 
ethic and the violence that accompanies it assume the form of dialectical negations that 
indicate the unlikely prospect of change within capitalism. This argument is reinforced by 
the film’s end-credits that offer a succession of still images (taken from the Farm Security 
Administration’s photographs of the Great Depression) of poverty, racism and violence 
accompanied by David Bowie’s song Young Americans. The images become rhetorical 
manifestations against the capitalist narrative of progress and prosperity. At this point, 
von Trier connects the filmic with the extra-filmic reality. The obvious inference is that 
the world needs to be changed, but the director is not in the position to provide the 
audience with a thesis that can lead to social transformation.  
I would like to conclude this chapter with some observations on the industrial 
context in which von Trier operates. Obviously, for a film like Dogville, which challenges 
film language and the cinematic institution, it would have been very difficult to attract 
funding, under a more conventional film production process.  An important aspect (which 
for reasons of space I have not elaborated in this thesis) of von Trier’s ability to 
experiment with film form and to challenge the institution of cinema is his involvement 
with Zentropa, a film production company he co-founded with Peter Aalbæk Jensen in 
1992. Initially set up to produce von Trier’s films, Zentropa has now turned out to be the 
largest film production company in Scandinavia.60 Zentropa produces a plethora of films 
including both risk-taking projects and other films that respond to a wider audience.  
The company’s modus operandi allows von Trier to engage in projects without 
worrying about the box office success. It is not accidental that both von Trier and Jensen 
consider Dogville as one of their most important achievements, simply because very few 
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companies would invest their money in such a project.61 One has also to acknowledge the 
role of the Danish film policy. Denmark provides state funding for filmmaking and prides 
itself on being a nation that funds arts. Commenting on the Danish film funding policy, 
von Trier has stated: ‘I can’t imagine being able to make the films I’ve made in any other 
country than Denmark. Maybe I could have made them in the Soviet Union before things 
changed’.62 Von Trier’s comments help us understand the amount of freedom he has in 
the filmmaking process and the reasons why he can still make films that would have been 
difficult to produce under a more standard financing system. 
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Conclusion: Dialogue with the ‘Dissensual’ Past 
Lars von Trier’s films continue dividing the audiences and the critics and perform 
conflicts revealing the persistence of historical, social and sexual antagonisms without 
offering any resolutions. In the previous chapter, I discussed Dogville (2003) as a 
cinematic and social experiment. In many respects, the idea of representation as an 
experiment describes eloquently the whole body of von Trier’s work. His films keep on 
challenging film form and subject-matter without offering reductive messages.  
It is fair to conjecture that von Trier’s cinema is much more interested in 
experimenting with different ideas, rather than following the canons of the industry or 
even repeating formulas that have been previously proved commercially successful. For 
instance, the international box office success of Breaking the Waves (1996) was followed 
by The Idiots (1998), a film whose treatment of the subject-matter made it inaccessible to 
a wide audience. Similarly, the popularity of Dancer in the Dark (2000), which sold 4.4 
million tickets globally and earned him the Palme d'or in the Cannes film festival, was 
followed by the release of Dogville (2003).1 The film’s cinematic austerity and 
experimentation was bound to appeal to a smaller audience, something that did not 
prevent von Trier from following the same formula in Manderlay (2005). Finally, the 
release of such a provocative film as Antichrist (2009) was bound to stir controversy and 
respond to a smaller audience compared to his past works. Von Trier’s essential concern 
is to undertake projects that push the limits of film grammar and to explore aspects of the 
medium that he is not necessarily comfortable with. As he says: ‘You can become so 
good at producing things that they become nauseatingly boring to look at. That might 
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have happened had I continued to make the same film again and again, as some people 
do’.2   
It is of paramount importance to emphasise that von Trier’s intention to reanimate 
film practice is very much influenced by the past historical/cinematic debates. Von Trier 
can be paralleled to Walter Benjamin’s historian, who quotes the fragments of the past to 
make sense of the past and the present. Many of his formal experiments are not innovative 
and as he says: ‘I don’t think I am becoming increasingly extremist within film. I just take 
some old principles and try to do something funny with them. Like a carpenter, who 
explores wood’s many possibilities’.3 My discussion of the films’ form has already 
pointed out that some of the films’ formal features are not necessarily innovative. For 
example, how can one characterise the Dogme 95 project as original? Even Dogville’s 
reference to the art of theatre is not something innovative, a point I have already discussed 
in the fourth chapter. Perhaps, there is something historically important in this dialogue 
with the cinematic/historical past and this is something that can account for my own 
anachronistic methodology, which returns to a figure like Brecht so as to understand the 
politics of von Trier’s cinema.  
Brecht’s theory and practice introduced the idea that political art does not strive 
for unity and harmony in the auditorium, but for division. The main point behind the 
Verfremdungseffekt is a polemical one and intends to present the audience with 
experimental situations, with the view to activating conflicts that have been suppressed by  
the ‘naturalisation’ of certain aspects of social and historical reality. Accordingly, the role 
of political art is not to transmit ‘humanist messages’ that repress social conflict, but to 
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confront the audience with questions that can reanimate conflict.4 This shift from a 
habitual viewing of the world to a politicised one cannot be achieved by means of 
political correctness either in the form or the content. If we turn our attention to von 
Trier’s practice, we can certainly identify this willingness to create conflict and not unity 
in the auditorium. His employment of contradictions makes one rethink aspects of history 
and social life beyond the limits of political correctness and any abstract ‘humanist’ ideas.  
For example, as I discussed in the second chapter, his portrayal of history in the 
Europa trilogy does not see the mistakes of the past as historical aberrations, but as the 
product of social processes that can be identified in the present. Furthermore, films like 
Dogville and Manderlay portray oppression in a more complex way, rather than offering a 
‘humanist sympathy’ for the oppressed. Equally important is to acknowledge that von 
Trier’s refusal to reduce politics to ‘humanised messages’ is combined with his insistent 
belief in the European art cinema narration. In his very first Manifesto that accompanied 
the release of The Element of Crime (1984) he writes: 
 
We will no longer be satisfied with ‘well-meaning films with a ‘humanist 
message’, we want more – of the real thing, fascination, experience – childish 
and pure, like all real art. We want to get back to the time when love between 
film-maker and film was young, when you could see the joy of creation in every 
frame of a film!5 
 
While at that point of his career, von Trier spoke in a derogatory way over the 
institutionalisation of the European art cinema aesthetics, it is important to highlight his 
insistence in the art cinema narration of the past, something that can be identified even in 
his more recent works. For instance, his latest film Melancholia (2011) is full of 
references to European directors, such as Ingmar Bergman and Michelangelo Antonioni.   
                                                          
4
 See Bertolt Brecht, The Messingkauf Dialogues, trans. by John Willett (London: Methuen, 1965), pp.42-
43.  
5
 Von Trier, ‘Manifesto 1’, see appendix, p.280.   
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What does then this dialogue with the past indicate? A pertinent starting point 
would be that modernist art cinema’s formal experimentation can still perform conflict 
and reveal contradictions, which do not produce uniform interpretations based upon the 
‘humanisation’ of complex political issues. As a first step in clarifying this point, I want 
to consider the writings of Jacques Rancière. Despite Rancière’s reservation towards 
Dogville, his writings can illuminate the historical aspect of von Trier’s dialogue with the 
past and the historicity of my Brechtian methodology. 
Rancière has published various essays on film and it is important to point out his 
insistence on figures of the past, such as Brecht, Rossellini and Godard.6 What he 
identifies as relevant in the aforementioned figures is the sense of conflict, which he 
considers to be necessary for the politicization of art. The works of Brecht, Godard and 
Rossellini communicate ‘dissensus’ that is absent from many contemporary films. 
According to Rancière, ‘dissensus’ describes a political process which intends to confront 
our established framework of perception. As he says: 
 
 
What ‘dissensus’ means is an organization of the sensible where there is neither 
a reality concealed behind appearances nor a single regime of presentation and 
interpretation of the given imposing its obviousness on all. It means that every 
situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime 
of perception and signification. To reconfigure the landscape of what can be 
seen and what can be thought is to alter the field of the possible and the 
distribution of capacities and incapacities. Dissensus brings back into play both 
the obviousness of what can be perceived, thought and done, and the distribution 
of those who are capable of perceiving, thinking and altering the co-ordinates of 
the shared world.7  
 
                                                          
6
 Jacques Rancière quoted in, ‘The Janus-Face of Politicized Art: Jacques Rancière in Interview with 
Gabriel Rockhill’, in Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. by Gabriel Rockhill (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2004), pp.47-66, here pp.62-65.  
See also, Rancière, The Future of the Image, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 
pp.33-61.  
7
 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2009), pp.48-49.  
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To retain its counter-cultural force, cinema should avoid generating ‘consensus’ in the 
auditorium. Producing a unity of ethics, aesthetics and politics in the auditorium is 
tantamount to depoliticising the medium and reproducing the social reality as natural. For 
this reason, contemporary cinema has much to learn from the European films and from 
the modernist debates of the past.  
Rancière’s point that there is more to be sought and found in the ‘dissensual’ 
politics of Brecht, Godard and Rossellini can be seen as a negation of the reign of the 
commodity and as a desire to re-activate conflict and re-politicise the medium.8 Mostly, 
this gesture implies that films do not become political by reproducing a political subject-
matter, but by helping to disrupt our perception of reality as self-evident and 
unchangeable. If we turn our attention to recent European films, we can certainly see that 
the mere reproduction of politically sensitive content is not enough for the politicisation 
of the medium.  
Seen through the prism of Rancière’s argument, von Trier’s dialogue with the 
past, as well as his insistence on the art cinema narration demonstrate a willingness to 
avoid the commodification of the medium and to produce films that challenge our social 
certainties. In a historical period that alternatives find no firm foothold, von Trier’s films 
build upon the ‘dissensual’ politics of the art cinema of the past so as to challenge the 
politics of perception. His approach towards filmmaking is rooted in a practice that 
renders the familiar strange so as to create conflict in the auditorium, in the press, and in 
the media. It is by means of such a division that he activates questions regarding the world 
outside the cinema. In effect, his films do not produce relief to the audience by means of 
moralist assertions, but negations that are not complemented by positive instructions on 
                                                          
8
 See Tom Conley, ‘Cinema and its Discontents: Jacques Rancière and Film Theory’, in Substance, 34:3 
(2005), pp.96-106, here p.105. 
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how to overcome the impasse. It is time to draw our attention to the politics of form in the 
films of Lars von Trier.   
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Figure 10. Lars von Trier and Niels Vørsel performing themselves.   
Figure 11. A Danish historian reading a letter from written from a plague victim. 
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Figure 13. Udo Kier performing himself.  
Figure 14.  Raphael’s and Raimondi’s The Massacre of the Innocents in Bethlehem (1509). 
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Figure 15. Gitte Lind as the medium.  
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Figure 17. Cæcilia Holbek Trier as Dr Mesmer’s girlfriend in the film-with-in-the-film 
Figure 18. Europa - the fascist past merging with the post-War present. 
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        Figure 19. The film starts with the railway tracks. 
           Figure 20. Leo (Jean-Marc Barr) meeting Katarina 
          Figure 21. Following the previous frame, Katharina (Barbara Sukowa) from Leo’s point of 
view shot. 
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Figure 25. Leo witnessing Ravenstein’s murder. 
 
Figure 26. While witnessing Ravenstein’s murder, Leo is transferred to Hartmann’s party. 
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Figure 27. Polish extras performing the Germans.  
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Figure 4. Troels Lyby and Anne-Louise Hassing as Henry and Susanne.  
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Figure 5. Knud Romer Jørgensen as Axel.  
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Figure 8. Louise Mieritz and Nikolaj Lie Kaas as Josephine and Jeppe. 
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Figure 12. Lotte Munk Fure as Karen’s sister.  
 
 
 
Figure 13 Hans Henrik Clemensen as Karen’s husband.  
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Figure 3. Ben Gazzara as Jack Mackay on the left side of the frame. 
 
Figure 4. Paul Bettany, Nicole Kidman and Stellan Skarsgård, as Tom, Grace and Chuck. 
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Figure 10.Lauren Bacall, Chloë Sevigny, Siobhan Fallon, Harriet Anderson as Ma Ginger, Liz,    
Martha, and Gloria respectively. 
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Interview with Lars von Trier 1 
 
AK: One of my favourite experiments is showing your films to people that have no 
background in art cinema. What interests me is that they always provoke discussions and 
strong responses as opposed to other art films that cannot address the non-expert. I use the 
term ‘narrative avant-garde’ to describe your films. What do you think? 
LvT: Yes, yes I agree. I am just right now editing Melancholia and it seems I am back, for 
various reasons, to very sentimental issues. It is very strange because even when I am 
writing a script that has no sentimentality whatsoever, when I am working with the actors 
extreme emotions seem to take over. It is a kind of perversion. It always comes back to 
these extreme themes – persons suffering etc – which is very non-art cinema. I do not 
know. If it is fun to write something it is fun on a narrative level. But when you direct it, it 
is fun to direct it so that it works on an emotional level. It is different things you are after 
in a different level of a work. I asked myself today how this film (Melancholia) turned out 
to be so emotional and it should not be at all.  
AK. Speaking of emotions, since Breaking the Waves some of your films are 
characterised by an excess of affect and emotionality. It is interesting because this excess 
becomes problematic. It does not necessarily make the audience identify with the 
characters. In my point of view, this excess renders emotions and feelings strange.  
LvT. I can only say that, when I do something I tend to do it very much. That is technical 
wise too. I think I started with Breaking the Waves. I wanted to do a film that my parents 
would hate, in order to investigate emotions a bit. It is like bad taste that I like working 
                                                          
1
 The following interview took place on Friday 12 November 2010 in Lars von Trier’s office in Zentropa 
Productions.    
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with. You should not underestimate the pleasure of doing it. It’s like painting something 
and putting blue into green. It is a strange pleasure when things become very emotional. It 
is also a forbidden area too, because we tend to adhere to logic and rationality. In my 
childhood we laughed a little at films that were very sentimental. The right way to see a 
film was to be detached. I am quite emotional... 
AK. Just a footnote in this question. Despite this excess of emotionality I think that you 
do not force feelings to someone. One cannot digest this excess easily. So, I think that 
there is an element of detachment. 
LvT. But here you are talking about technique. Emotion is like using very strong colours 
in a painting and after you are done with the painting you are using some stuff to hide and 
disguise it. That is how I see it. 
AK. Yet all your films are self-reflexive, they do not just reproduce a story, they reflect 
the process of their making too. 
LvT. Yes that is true. Earlier in my career it was very important to show how things were 
done. For instance, in Europa, I wanted to show that I am superimposing images and not 
to hide it. Not so much with the last film, which is all about computers. Though you could 
do that with a computer. 
AK. Sometimes your manipulation of genres brings to the surface some of their most 
reactionary aspects. For instance, Antichrist created so much commotion, because it 
manipulates a genre – the thriller, which has reproduced many misogynist stereotypes. 
The same with Dancer in the Dark, you demonstrate how flat the musical genre is and 
then you make it more dangerous.  
LvT. The portrayal of the sexes in Antichrist has to do with my big love for Strindberg. 
There is something about the battle of sexes that is quite interesting. Strindberg was a 
kind of a hero also because he allowed himself to be completely unreasonable.  
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AK. Yet speaking of Strindberg, it is interesting that he was not politically correct. The 
same applies to you. Your films are not politically correct. Political correctness normally 
tries to hide something. 
LvT. There are different ways of doing a film. I am trying to avoid the obvious. Also, you 
have no respect for your audience when you do a film that is politically correct. Political 
correctness kills everything. I think that people who see a film should have an opinion 
about it and form their own views and even protest against the film. Political correctness 
is inartistic. Especially American political correctness is really tiresome.  
AK. So you see your audience as collaborators in the construction of meaning? The 
popular press sometimes presents you as somebody who wants to force ideas to the 
audience. 
LvT. Yes certainly. The audience has to participate when watching my films.  
AK. I want to go back to the Europa trilogy. Recently I organized a screening of Europa 
and it is interesting to see how the film works under the current historical circumstances 
in Europe.  
LvT. Well you know that I used to be a communist. I am still getting fascinated when I 
see a documentary about Mao. Especially the Cultural Revolution was a great idea. I must 
admit some of these people, like Lenin and Mao, are icons that I can understand. Even 
though, they were all quite horrible, because they killed millions of people. Lenin was 
horrible too. But they have this celebrity status that I feel I know them. The cynical aspect 
of a film director can be evil also. It is a cynical pursuit of a goal. And I can become a bit 
cynical with my actors. Of course, I do not gas them or put them into camps! 
AK. You just mentioned communism and it is interesting that in the past progress was 
associated with left-wing forces and nowadays the word progress has been appropriated 
by right-wing ones.  
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LvT. It is difficult for me to see that there is any historical progress. I am too old 
fashioned. 
AK. All the characters in the Europa trilogy become voyeurs of history and they are 
punished for that. 
LvT. Of course being a spectator can be tantamount to being a criminal! If you are a 
spectator of a crime!  
AK. Let’s discuss film form. Since Breaking the Waves you have this shooting method 
according to which the actors are not aware whether they are on frame or not. 
LvT. That’s how it should be in principle, but I kept telling them off. Especially in 
Breaking the Waves I kept telling them: ‘You just waited for the camera!’.  
AK. Yes but there are moments that one senses that the actors act out of character due to 
this shooting style. Especially in The Idiots.  
LvT. Oh yes. I am very interested in this. I am interested in capturing the actors when they 
are in and out of character. The borderline between the private individual and the 
character is very intriguing. Especially, when it overlaps and you cannot tell whether a 
reaction can be attributed to the actor or the character. That is where I try to go very often.  
AK. Thus, in a way the characters manifest their own fictionality.  
LvT. Yes you could say that.  
AK. Also most of your films have a kind of semi-documentary form. As if they document 
the process of their own making.  
LvT. But this is like cheating as well. I had this camera-operator in Breaking the Waves 
that I had to lie to him so as to do these strange movements. I told him for example pan to 
the left the actors are going to the left, and the actors would move to the right. The aim 
was to use the camera to find things instead of framing things. But that is not very easy 
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for a lot of camera-operators. For me, it is not interesting when I am watching a scene and 
know where the camera movement starts and where it is going to end. 
AK. But you have acted as a camera operator in The Idiots, in Dancer in the Dark and in 
Dogville. Does it allow you more freedom? 
LvT. Oh yes I have been a camera operator. Unfortunately, not in my last film, because I 
was not capable of directing and being the camera operator at the same time. I like it very 
much because it lets your interest move the camera. That is the best, I like it very much. 
But that is also because we were using hand-held camera. A hand-held camera tells you 
more, while a camera on the tripod tells you less. A hand-held camera is like hand-
writing.  
AK. So it is less an interest of reproduction.  
LvT. I become a spectator of the scene and that means that I am going at different places. 
Anyway, it is not an attempt to capture truth. There is a little scene - very improvised - in 
Dancer in the Dark. Selma’s son has just got his bike and they walk around by a bridge. 
In that scene everybody was pretty much out of character. The actors improvised and they 
talked about strange things that made no sense. Somebody says something like ‘women 
are like rust’. I do not know where that came from. This is one of my favourite scenes. 
Mainly because you see Catherine Deneuve and Björk becoming also private and not 
being in character, while both are used to a more controlled way of performing.  
AK I am very interested in the use of language in your films. Sometimes, I have the 
feeling that language stages its own performance. I have in mind the dialogue between 
Grace and her father in Dogville.  
LvT. Ok I will talk to you about this particular scene. I wanted to show Grace’s potential 
for something else and this could only emerge through this long dialogue. It was really 
difficult for me. Normally, when you have your characters so well laid out they cannot 
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say anything that contradicts their behaviour. I was so interested in making her do 
something that she would not do - that would go against the character. That is why the 
conversation became so long. I struggled to do this. The film’s ending became so long 
because of this. But Nicole and James Caan were great.  
AK. Yet out of this conversation Grace ends up justifying the town’s catastrophe. This is 
achieved through rationalised arguments and this is where language’s rationalism 
becomes the synonym for terror. The same happens with the male character in Antichrist. 
LvT. I know what you are getting at and I can see it working as an argument, but I have 
not thought about it. 
AK. I want to go back to the Dogme Manifesto. The Manifesto implies that technology 
should go back ‘to the right hands’. This is something that we can see in political 
modernist writings too. Brecht, in his cinematic writings, argued that technology should 
be taken from the ‘merchants’ so as to be used in a radical way.  
LvT. Interesting, I have not seen Brecht writing anything about film. You know better 
than me where these things come from. I know in principle Brecht’s basic theory of the 
Verfremdungseffekt. I can understand this effect. On the other hand, truth is difficult to 
define and in particular, when we are dealing with the media. It is not just how a character 
says something, but it has to do with all aspects of cinema. It is more the feeling you have 
as a director. There are moments that I can understand that I got a second of truth, though 
it is a banal word. For me, it is very obvious when I capture a moment of truth.  
AK Yes Brecht wrote on film too and he kept on doubting any productive outcome 
stemming from the simple reproduction of dramatic situations. Previously you have also 
said that you are not interested in ‘pure reproduction’. 
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LvT. That is right. I am not interested in reproducing a film. But a lot of people are 
interested in this process. Even though a filmmaker reproduces material or even steals 
from others. 
AK. The Dogme Manifesto argued in favour of an anti-illusionist film practice together 
with a realist style. For many years realism was seen as pure reproduction. In The Idiots 
you manage to make a film, which is realist and self-reflexive at the same time and for me 
it is a very political film.  
LvT. Don’t ask me too much about the Manifesto. I remember the rules but not the first 
page. I used to be a keen reader of Breton’s Surrealist Manifesto. And Manifesto is a great 
word.  
AK. But can realism be political? Can you make a realist film that is not reproduction? 
LvT. Without being very clever about it. I think that The Idiots is a very political film. But 
I am not sure whether I can explain how and why.  
AK. Some of your films have a very dramaturgical simplicity and this simplicity renders 
them very complex. Brecht favoured an aesthetics of dramaturgical simplicity and naivety 
too. He thought that naive questions lead to complex answers.  
LvT. Well in this film that we are doing now- Melancholia - we have this very simple 
thing that this planet is approaching the earth and they are going to collide, which is very 
simple, but it leaves you a lot of space and I think it is like a very simple melody in a 
symphony that you can do anything with it. Imagine a simple theme in a Beethoven 
symphony, which starts in a very melodic way and then explodes. As long as you have 
that theme you can do anything with it. Relatively quickly I thought that it is a good idea 
to start with a simple story. Simple stories want to make you go into the film. It is as if 
you want to enter a wild and mystical forest and you can only go with a friend that can 
show you around. And here ‘the friend’ stands for this very simple narrative level.  
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AK. A question about the way you employ music in your films. After Breaking the 
Waves, though this applies to Epidemic too, your use of music is much more austere. In 
The Idiots you have no extra-diegetic music at all. Some of your best scenes in all your 
films have no music at all. 
LvT. To me it is just extremely irritating when you see a film and then the director tries to 
force you ways to feel a film by means of music. You just listen to the music and you 
realise that the way you feel, your idea of the film are just forced to you. I am like oh 
fuck! I want to see it in my own way. But this is going to be very different in this film. 
We are using Wagner in Melancholia. It is all very romantic.  
AK. What strikes me in your films is that the boundaries between the oppressors and the 
oppressed are not easily distinguishable. 
LvT. Oh yes. But I am old fashioned I do not believe in good and evil. I think that there 
are tendencies inside an individual; it is like a more complex understanding of human 
nature.  
AK. Hmm. Nature is something that I find problematic. This is how the popular press 
approaches your films, as if they disclose the ‘evil’ human nature. I have the feeling that 
the portrayed relationships in your films can be understood historically. You even 
mentioned in an interview that the most banal films are the ones that have a very definite 
idea of human nature. 
LvT. I am definitely trying not to make one-dimensional films and I intend to show 
human relationships in their complexity. 
AK. People used to consuming very violent films find it difficult to deal with your 
employment of violence, which is normally kept to a minimum. Is violence a formal tool 
in your films? 
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LvT. Well I do not take violence easily. But when you are a melancholic person as I am it 
is very interesting to see yourself as a victim. By doing that you can easily see how you 
can make it even worse for yourself. I feel very much from the point of view of the victim 
and that is what interests me when it comes to violence. 
AK. In Dogville and Manderlay you set up film experiments that fuse elements from 
literature, theatre and philosophy. After so many years of cinematic production people are 
still resistant to such a formal experimentation in narrative cinema. Is it because film is 
still considered to be a reproductive medium? 
LvT. Well the main reason for this has to do with the fact that earlier on and right now – 
maybe not in the future – films are very expensive to make. People tend to reproduce 
more and only move a little bit, because it is so expensive. People tend to stand on the 
shoulders of the ones before... Film also depends on a large crew. It is not like sitting in 
front of your computer and writing a novel. It is not costly for a writer to experiment a lot, 
but it is not the same when you are making a film. I am in a privileged situation here that I 
can still finance my films. I am kind of working with this in mind, that is, that I do not 
have problem funding my films. And this obliges me to be a bit freer than most directors. 
It is difficult for me to see a film like Dogville being made under a more standard 
financing system. 
AK. In my thesis, I see you as a political filmmaker. 
LvT. Interesting, people tend to think that political cinema is something like Ken Loach, 
which I do not think is right.   
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Interview with Alexander Kluge 2 
 
Brecht Today.  
 
 
AK. My research is on Lars von Trier and I discuss his films through a Brechtian critical 
angle. I want to ask you some things about Brecht in relation to your own films and 
writings... 
A. Kluge. Yes I have used Brecht in my films and my writings. In my latest feature film, 
News from Ideological Antiquity: Marx, Eisenstein, The capital [Nachrichten aus Der 
Ideologischen Antike - Marx – Eisenstein – Das Kapital, 2008] I mention Brecht’s 
intention to write the Communist Manifesto in hexameter. It’s like Homer’s The Iliad. 
There is a discussion between the poet Durs Gruenbein and myself about this subject. 
AK. Let’s start with Brecht and film then. As a film director you have consciously 
employed Brechtian strategies in your films. Do you think that Brecht’s theory and 
practice can be still beneficial for film practice? 
A. Kluge. Well there are several aspects that we have to consider. Brecht himself got 
involved in filmmaking and he wrote many essays on film. Brecht’s film writings can still 
inspire us to make films in 2011 and with good results. The questions are different. So the 
films will be different from the films he got involved in. His theatre and political theory 
are also very important. Though, I think that his less-ideological pieces, like Baal, are 
more interesting as opposed to plays like Die Maßnahme.   
AK. Brecht introduced a representation that gives more importance to the fragment, so as 
to encourage reflection on the part of the audience. There are moments that one senses 
                                                          
2
 This is a telephone interview that took place on the 29th of March 2011.  
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that the combination of various fragments guides the audience to a certain response. 
Conversely, you pile up many fragments that deny hermeneutical orientation.  
A. Kluge. It is respect for the audience. The ‘fiction’ has already been told by history or 
the reality. We are only giving you comments when we make a film or write a piece of 
literature. We do not guide you to a counter-reality. We only give you hints. We are like 
scouts. Take as an example my last film News from Ideological Antiquity: Marx, 
Eisenstein, The Capital [Nachrichten aus Der Ideologischen Antike - Marx – Eisenstein – 
Das Kapital, 2008]. This is a new film and shows the ways I employ Brechtian practices 
in the present. The author does not take any decisions. The author analyses or counter-
analyses, or repeats, or makes comments. The spectator is asked to make her/his own 
associations.  
AK. You write somewhere that film has to recover the degree of abstraction inherent in 
language. I was thinking of Brecht’s idea of ‘literalization’ of the medium.  
A. Kluge. Film should include all capacities of language. But language and images should 
not strive for precision. They will be uncertain and open. I am anti-Wittgenstein. I do not 
believe in logic, I believe in the power of associations. 
A.K. Is there a dialectical aspect in this? 
A. Kluge. I am not sure if it is dialectical. It has to do with the medium itself. The medium 
already exists in people’s brains. You find film since the Stone Age, in the people’s mind. 
Then we have the technical invention, which is more than 100 years old. This film exists 
before in our brain and our emotions. The films in our brain are not logical. They are full 
of illusion, temperament and music. This world of associations has its own logic. Cinema 
should understand what it can do and not to suppress film by thought. I believe in thought 
and ideas, but the clear ideas have to respect what the camera does and what people can 
do. 
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A.K.  I want to talk a bit about historical representation. You said once that one can 
represent history only at the expense of dramaturgical accuracy. In what ways can the 
medium deal with history? 
A. Kluge. My book Cinema Stories clarifies these issues in detail. You can certainly 
represent history in film but in different manner than the ways history explains itself. So it 
is not a matter of reproduction. 
A.K. One of the intertitles in the beginning of Yesterday Girl [Abschied von Gestern] says 
that ‘what separates us from yesterday is not a rift, but a change in position’. The film 
goes against the idea that the mistakes of the past have reformulated the present. Speaking 
about the historical present in what ways do you think that we repeat past mistakes? 
A.Kluge. History and people repeat mistakes. But these mistakes are different. The 
complete evolution of life consists of mistakes, which form a new kind of life. We shall 
not be afraid of mistakes. People and societies are not capable of repeating everything in 
the same way. They constantly change without even knowing this. Below the conscious 
processes of history, there is an unconscious one. There is an element of progress but you 
cannot tell whether progress favours people. It may be progress for the people (more 
liberty) or progress that leads to Auschwitz. Society sometimes cannot perceive the route 
it follows.  
A.K  In one of your essays, in English it is translated ‘The Political Intensity of Everyday 
Feelings’, you suggest that in order to politicise art one needs to reveal the political 
aspects of life that we do not perceive as political. Brecht suggested something similar, 
when he argued that emotions and feelings are not universal but political per se. With 
these comments in mind how can cinema politicise the depiction of feelings? 
A.Kluge. Well in both ways. By touching form and politics it can be political and by 
touching an explicit political subject it might be private. Elements of organised policy are 
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hidden in our personal lives. Then again, organised policy is only part of the society’s 
political life. I wrote a book this week. It is about three political stories of this year.  
A.K. In one of your conversations with Adorno, you state that Adorno recommended you 
to ‘shoot blind’, that is to shoot without looking. Could you expand a bit on this? 
A.Kluge. This is very essential. You have to be blind, that is, without intentions. You 
should respect the object or the subject of what you describe. You are the author, but you 
must not impose anything. Therefore, the object you describe, or the persons you film are 
the second author or the third author. It is an anarchic idea. The author is as important as 
the object of representation and the object as important as the author. You see, there is a 
balance between the filmmaker and the product. The author in the classical sense does not 
exist at all. You might comment on something but you must not dominate by writing or 
making a film. Heiner Müller, my friend, advocated a blind argumentation and we should 
never forget that the ancient poet Homer was blind. 
A.K. Speaking of Müller, in a very often cited quote he stated that ‘to use Brecht without 
criticising him means to betray him’. In what ways can we use Brecht in film without 
betraying him? 
A.Kluge. Yes because Brecht always agitated. Of course we have to criticise him, you 
have to criticise me too. This is the correct attitude that one has to criticise everybody, 
that’s something that Brecht says too. But on the other hand it is too ‘elegant’ for me. In a 
world where Brecht is neglected, I do not think that we have to criticise him. I agree 
completely with Heiner Müller. However, at the moment I think that it is necessary to 
bring Brecht back to the society and place him into our contemporary reality. There is no 
necessity to criticise somebody relatively unknown and absent from the media and from 
television. You can criticise Berlusconi, but when it comes to Brecht, we have to 
disseminate his work first and then criticise him.  
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MANIFESTO 1 
 
Everything seems to be all right: film-makers are in an unsullied relationship with their 
products, possibly a relationship with a hint of routine, but nonetheless, a good and solid 
relationship, where everyday problems fill the time more than adequately, so that they 
alone form the content! In other words, an ideal marriage that not even the neighbours 
could be upset by: no noisy quarrels in the middle of the night...no half-naked 
compromising episodes in the stairwells, but a union between both parties : the film-
maker and his ‘film-wife’, to everyone’s satisfaction... at peace with themselves... but 
anyway... We can all tell when the Great Inertia has arrived!  
How has film’s previously stormy marriage shrivelled up into a marriage of 
convenience? What happened to these old men? What has corrupted these old masters of 
sexuality? The answer is simple. Misguided coquetry, a great fear of being uncovered 
(what does it matter if your libido fades when your wife has already turned her back on 
you?)....have made them betray the thing that once gave the relationship its sense of 
vitality: Fascination!   
The film-makers are the only ones to blame for this dull routine. Despotically, 
they have never given their beloved the chance to grow and develop in their love... out of 
pride they have refused to see the miracle in her eyes... and have thereby crushed her... 
and themselves. 
These hardened old men must die! We will no longer be satisfied with ‘well-
meaning films with a humanist message’, we want more – of the real thing, fascination, 
experience – childish and pure, like all real art. We want to get back home to the time, 
when love between film-maker and film was young, when you could see the joy of 
creation in every frame of the film! 
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We are no longer satisfied with surrogates. We want to see religion on the screen. 
We want to see ‘film-lovers’ sparkling with life: improbable, stupid, stubborn, ecstatic, 
repulsive, monstrous and not things that have been tamed or castrated by a moralistic, 
bitter, old film-maker, a dull puritan who praises the intellect-crushing virtues of niceness.  
We want to see heterosexual films, made for, about and by men. We want 
visibility! 
Lars von Trier 3 May 1984.  
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MANIFESTO 2 
 
Everything seems fine. Young men are living in stable relationships with a new 
generation of films. The birth-control methods which are assumed to have contained the 
epidemic have only served to make birth control more effective: no unexpected creations, 
no illegitimate children – the genes are intact. These young men’s relationships resemble 
the endless stream of Grand Balls in a bygone age. There are also those who live together 
in rooms with no furniture. But their love is growth without soul, replication, without any 
bite. Their ‘wildness’ lacks discipline and their ‘discipline’ lacks wildness.  
LONG LIVE THE BAGATELLE! 
The bagatelle is humble and all-encompassing. It reveals creativity without making a 
secret of eternity. Its frame is limited but magnanimous, and therefore leaves space for 
life. Epidemic manifests itself in a well-grounded and serious relationship with these 
young men, as a bagatelle – because among bagatelles, the masterpieces are easy to count.  
17 May 1987 
Lars von Trier.  
 
 
 
  
283 
 
 
MANIFESTO 3 – I CONFESS! 
Everything seems fine: the film director Lars von Trier is an artist and a scientist and a 
human being. Yet all the same I say that I am a human being, AND an artist, AND a film 
director.  
I am crying as I write this, because I have been so arrogant in my attitude: who am I to 
think that I can master things and show people the right path? Who am I to think that I can 
scornfully dismiss other people’s life and work? My shame keeps getting worse, because 
my apology – that I was seduced by the pride of science – falls to the ground a lie! 
Certainly it’s true that I have tried to intoxicate myself in a cloud of sophistries about the 
goals of art and the artist’s duties, that I have worked out ingenious theories about the 
anatomy and nature of film, yet – and I am admitting this quite openly – I have never 
succeeded in suppressing my inner passions with this feeble veil of mist: MY FLESHY 
DESIRES!! 
Our relationship to film can be described in so many ways, and is explained in many 
myriad ways: We have to make films with a pedagogical purpose, we can desire to use 
film as a ship that can carry us off on a voyage of discovery to unknown lands, or we can 
claim that we want film to influence our audience and get it to laugh or cry – and pay. All 
this can sound perfectly OK, but I still don’t think much of it.  
There is only one excuse for suffering and making other people suffer the hell that the 
genesis of a film involves: the gratification of the fleshy desires that arise in a fraction of a 
second, when the cinema’s loudspeakers and projector, in tandem, and inexplicably, allow 
the illusion of movement and light to find their way like an electron leaving its path and 
thereby generating the light needed to create ONE SINGLE THING: a miraculous blast of 
LIFE! THIS is the only reward a film-maker gets, the only thing he hopes and longs for. 
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This physical experience when the magic of film takes place and works its way through 
the body, to a trembling ejaculation... 
NOTHING ELSE! There, now it’s written down, which feels good. So forget all the 
excuses: ‘childish fascination’ and ‘all-encompassing humility’, because this is my 
confession, in black and white: LARS VON TRIER; THE TRUE MASTURBATOR OF 
THE SILVER SCREEN.  
And yet in Europa, the third part of the trilogy, there isn’t the least trace of derivative 
manoeuvring. At last, purity and clarity are achieved! Here there is nothing to hide reality 
under a suffocating layer of ‘art’... no trick is too mean, no technique too tawdry, no effect 
too tasteless.  
JUST GIVE ME ONE SINGLE TEAR OR ONE SINGLE DROP OF SWEAT AND I 
WOULD WILLINGLY EXCHANGE IT FOR ALL THE ‘ART’ IN THE WORLD. 
At last. May God alone judge me for my alchemical attempts to create life from celluloid. 
But one thing is certain: life outside the cinema can never find its equal, because it is HIS 
creation and therefore divine.  
Lars von Trier  
29 December 1990.   
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 The Dogme 95 Manifesto and the Vow of Chastity. 
Dogme 95 is a collective of film directors founded in Copenhagen in the spring of 1995. 
Dogme has the expressed goal of countering certain tendencies in the cinema today.  
Dogme 95 is a rescue action! 
In 1960 enough was enough! The movie was dead and called for resurrection. The goal 
was correct but the means not! The Wave was up for grabs, like the directors themselves. 
The Wave was never stronger than the men behind it. The anti-bourgeois cinema itself 
became bourgeois, because the foundations upon which its theories were based was the 
bourgeois perception of art. The auteur concept was bourgeois romanticism from the very 
start and thereby...false! 
To Dogme 95 cinema is not individual! 
Today a technological storm is raging, the result of which will be the ultimate 
democratization of the cinema. For the first time anyone can make movies. But the more 
accessible the media becomes, the more important the avant-garde. It is no accident that 
the phrase “avant-garde” has military connotations. Discipline is the answer... we must 
put our films into uniform, because the individual film will be decadent by definition! 
Dogme 95 counters the individual film by the principle of presenting an indisputable set 
of rules known as THE VOW OF CHASTITY.  
 In 1960 enough was enough! The movie had been cosmeticized to death, they said: yet 
since then the use of cosmetics has exploded.  
The ‘supreme’ task of the decadent filmmaker is to fool the audiences. Is that what we are 
so proud of? Is that what the ‘100 years’ have brought us? Illusions via which emotions 
can be communicated?.. By the individual artist’s free choice of trickery? 
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Predictability (dramaturgy) has become the golden calf around which we dance. Having 
the characters’ inner lives justify the plot is too complicated and not high art. As never 
before, the superficial action and the superficial movie are receiving all the praise.  
The result is barren. An illusion of pathos and an illusion of love.  
To Dogme 95 the film is not an illusion! 
Today a technological storm is raging of which the result is the elevation of cosmetics to 
God. By using new technology anyone at any time can wash the last grains of truth away 
in the deadly embrace of sensation. The illusions are everything the movie can hide 
behind. 
Dogme 95 counters the film of illusion by the presentation of an indisputable set of rules 
known as the VOW OF CHASTITY. 
“I swear to submit to the following set of rules drawn up and confirmed by Dogme 95”: 
1. Shooting must be done on location. Props and sets must not be brought in (if a 
particular prop is necessary for the story, a location must be chosen where the prop is to 
be found).  
2. The sound must never be produced apart from the images, or vice versa. (Music must 
not be used unless it occurs where the scene is being shot).  
3. The camera must be hand-held. Any movement or mobility attainable in the hand is 
permitted. (The film must not take place where the camera is standing; shooting must take 
place where the film takes place).  
4. The film must be in colour. Special lighting is not acceptable. (If there is too little light 
for exposure the scene must be cut or a single lamp may be attached to the camera).  
5. Optical work and filters are forbidden. 
6. The film must not contain superficial action. (Murders, weapons etc., must not occur). 
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7. Temporal and geographical alienation are forbidden. (That is to say that the film takes 
place here and now). 
8. Genre movies are not acceptable. 
9. The film format must be Academy 35mm.  
10. The director must not be credited. 
Furthermore, I swear as a director to refrain from personal taste! I am no longer an artist. I 
swear to refrain from creating a “work” as I regard the instant more important than the 
whole. My supreme goal is to force the truth out of my characters and settings. I swear to 
do so by all means available and at the cost of any good taste and any aesthetic 
considerations. 
Thus I make my VOW OF CHASTITY. 
Copenhagen, Monday, 13 March 1995 
On Behalf of Dogme 95 
Lars von Trier, Thomas Vinterberg.  
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“Defocus 
We are searching for something fictional not factual. Fiction is limited by our imagination 
and facts by our imagination and facts by our insight, and the part of the world that we are 
seeking cannot be encompassed by a “story” or embraced from an “angle”. The subject 
matter we seek is found in the same reality that inspires fiction-makers, the reality that 
journalists believe they are describing. But they cannot find this unusual subject matter 
because their techniques blind them. Nor do they want to find it, because the techniques 
have become the goal itself. 
If one discovers or seeks a story, to say nothing of a point that communicates, then one 
suppresses it. By emphasising a simple pattern, genuine or artificial; by presenting the 
world a puzzle picture with solutions chosen in advance.  
The story, the point, the disclosure and the sensation have taken this subject-matter from 
us – this; the rest of the world which is not nearly so easy to pass on, but which we cannot 
live without! 
The story is the villain. The theme presented at the expense of all decency. But also the 
case in which a point’s is presumably submitted for the audience to evaluate, assisted by 
viewpoints and facts counterbalanced by their antitheses. The worship of pattern, the one 
and only, at the expense of subject-matter from which it comes. How do we rediscover it, 
and how do we impart or describe it? The ultimate challenge of the future – to see without 
looking: to defocus! In a world where the media kneel before the altar of sharpness, 
draining life out of sharpness, draining life out of life in the process, the DEFOCUSIST 
will be the communicators of our era – nothing more, nothing less!”  
Lars von Trier  
22 March 2000. 
 
289 
 
 
The Dogumentary Manifesto3 
Dogumentarism relives the pure, the objective and the credible. It brings us back to the 
core, back to the essence of our existence.  
The documentary and television reality which has become more and more manipulated 
and filtered by camera people, editors and directors, must now be buried.  
This takes place with the following documentarist content guarantee: 
The goal and content of all Dogme documentary projects must be supported and 
recommended in writing by at least seven people, companies or organisations who are 
relevant and vital.  
In its content and context which plays a primary role in Dogumentarism, format and 
expression are secondary to this process. 
Dogumentarism will restore the public’s faith as a whole as well as the individual’s. It 
will show the world raw in focus and in “defocus”. 
Dogumentarism is a choice. You can choose to believe in what you see on film and 
television or you can choose Dogumentarism.   
 
The documentarist code for Dogumentarism: 
1. All the locations in the film must be revealed (This is to be done by text being 
inserted in the image. This constitutes an exception of rule number 5. All the 
text must be legible). 
2. The beginning of the film must outline the goals and ideas of the director. (This 
must be shown to the film’s actors and technicians before filming begins).  
3. The end of the film must consist of two minutes of free speaking time by the 
film’s ‘victim’. This ‘victim’ alone shall advice regarding the content and must 
                                                          
3
 The words in bold as in the original document.  
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approve this part of the finished film. If there is no opposition by any of the 
collaborators, there will be no ‘victim’ or ‘victims’. To explain this, there will be 
text inserted at the end of the film.  
4. All clips must be marked with 6-12 frames black. (Unless it is a clip in real time, 
that is a direct clip in multi-camera filming situation). 
5. Manipulation  of the sound and/or images must not take place. Filtering, creative 
lighting and/or optical effects are strictly forbidden.  
6. The sound must never be produced exclusive of the original filming or vice-
versa. That is, extra soundtracks like music or dialogue must not be mixed in 
later. 
7. Reconstruction of the concept of the directing of the actors is not acceptable. 
Adding elements, as with scenography, are forbidden. 
8. All use of hidden cameras is forbidden. 
9. Archived images of footage that has been taken for other programs must never 
be used. 
   
Lars von Trier Zentropa Real 
October 2001.  
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